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Marriage of Necessity:
Same-Sex Marriage and
Religious Liberty Protections

*

Robin Fretwell Wilson†
Abstract
Since the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in
Hollingsworth v. Perry and U.S. v. Windsor, the number of states
recognizing same-sex marriage has exploded. Even though the
Supreme Court “stopped short of deciding whether the Constitution
guaranteed a right to same-sex marriage,” the Court’s basic
*

Between the date of the Law Review Symposium on October 22, 2013,
and final publication, a flurry of activity around same-sex marriage has
occurred; state elections have also changed which party controls the
legislature and occupies the governor’s office in at least one state. See
infra notes 225 and 232 (discussing Virginia). This Article takes into
account changes to same-sex marriage laws as of January 14, 2014, but
it uses a snapshot of the political terrain as of the symposium date,
October 22, 2013.

†

Roger and Stephany Joslin Professor of Law and Director, Family Law
and Policy Program, University of Illinois College of Law. I am grateful
to Helen Alvarez, Joyce Chen, Rep. Gordon Denlinger, Josh Fairfield,
Richard Garnett, Kent Greenawalt, Howard Katz, Andy Koppelman,
Douglas Laycock, Tim MacDonnell, Steve McAllister, Tamara Piety,
Steven Smith, Mark Tushnet, and Todd Zywicki for their thoughtful
comments, as well as the insights of the panelists and audience at the
Case Western Law Review Symposium and presentations at the
Institute for American Constitutional Heritage at the University of
Oklahoma, UC Davis Law School, George Mason University School of
Law, Kansas University School of Law, Penn State University School of
Law, the International Academy for the Study of the Jurisprudence of
the Family, and the Law & Religion Roundtable at Washington
University School of Law. I would also like to thank the students in the
Seminar for Gay Rights and the Courts at Yale University’s Trumbull
College for our dinner conversation about religious liberty and same-sex
marriage. I am part of a group that urges robust religious liberty
protections in any same-sex marriage legislation. This group, which
takes no position for or against same-sex marriage as a group in its
filings, includes: Thomas C. Berg (St. Thomas (Minn.)), Carl H. Esbeck
(Missouri), Richard W. Garnett (Notre Dame), Edward McGlynn
Gaffney (Valparaiso), and myself. This group works in tandem with a
second group of law professors, all of whom support same-sex marriage
and religious liberty protections; that group includes Douglas Laycock
(Virginia), Bruce S. Ledewitz (Duquesne), Christopher C. Lund (Wayne
State) and Michael Perry (Emory), as well as Professor Berg. I am
indebted to Cameron Flynn for his diligent research, without which the
empirical analysis presented here would not have been possible.
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vindication of same-sex couples’ right to equal treatment has spurred
newly enacted legislation as well as judicial decisions recognizing
same-sex marriage. The net effect has been to erase a boundary that
had largely confined same-sex marriage to the Northeast.
In jurisdictions that voluntarily enacted same-sex marriage,
religious liberty protections for religious objectors who adhere to a
heterosexual view of marriage—exempting them from requirements to
facilitate marriages inconsistent with their religious beliefs, by
providing a reception hall, for example—proved vital to the
legislation’s success. In many Enacting Jurisdictions, more robust
protections resulted in successful legislation where a bill with thinner
or nonexistent protections had failed just years before.
Even though same-sex marriage recognition in the Enacting
Jurisdictions has thus far been yoked to religious liberty protections—
delivering important gains to supporters and opponents alike—
prominent voices on each side now caution against compromise.
Buoyed by their recent judicial victories, some supporters have
hardened against compromise. With the recent spate of favorable
judicial decisions, compromise may simply appear increasingly
unnecessary.
Opponents are hardening in their stance, too. Far from folding in
the face of the momentum carrying same-sex marriage across the
country, some thought-leaders urge opponents to double down on
their opposition. These opponents see only one way forward: fighting
to the bitter end.
This Essay contends that we stand at a critical moment in the
same-sex marriage movement. A clear-eyed examination of the
marriage movement’s success—and the challenges facing it going
forward—reveals that both sides will benefit from remaining at the
bargaining table, although the gains to each will be different.
For same-sex couples, voluntary recognition of same-sex marriage
by legislation delivers the benefits and security of marriage today.
True, many believe that the juggernaut of lower court decisions
requiring same-sex marriage will lead in the near term to a favorable
Supreme Court decision. Although that result is increasingly likely, it
is nonetheless not assured. Moreover, the unanimity of decisions
striking marriage bans may, ironically, delay an ultimate resolution
by the Supreme Court, which often declines review until a meaningful
circuit split arises. For marriage equality opponents, the voluntary
embrace of same-sex marriage permits legislators to consider
competing considerations, including concrete ways to permit those
who adhere to a traditional view of marriage to continue to do so
without facing civil lawsuits or government penalty.
Part I shows that same-sex marriage has spread across America
through three different avenues: judicial decisions, state laws enacting
same-sex marriage, and ballot initiatives—with judicial decisions
being fraught with risk for religious dissenters while legislative or

1162

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 3·2014
Marriage of Necessity

popular enactments offer important, if flawed, protections to religious
organizations and individuals.
Parts II and III document that a “perfect storm” of characteristics
favoring marriage equality in jurisdictions that voluntarily embraced
same-sex marriage, together with extensive bargaining around
religious liberty, nudged same-sex marriage legislation over the finish
line. Even with these favorable conditions, marriage equality bills just
barely squeaked over the line to enactment, helped by religious liberty
exemptions.
That advantageous political terrain is now nearly exhausted, as
Part IV documents. Going forward, one would reasonably expect
more robust religious liberty protections to play a central part in any
legislative compromises over same-sex marriage, at least for the
near term.
Part V evaluates the impulse of some opponents of same-sex
marriage to dig in, resisting same-sex marriage at all costs. In part,
opponents rely on constitutional bans against same-sex marriage.
Constitutional bans may well not survive judicial challenge. However,
even without court action striking a ban, constitutional amendments
banning same-sex marriage do not provide the bulwark against
change that some assume since many can be repealed almost as easily
as enacting ordinary legislation.
Part VI concludes that, in the tougher political terrain that
looms, those who care about marriage equality can continue to sew up
legislative victories—but the price tag in the short term will be to
agree to robust religious liberty protections for dissenters. Those who
wish to protect religious objectors from the unintended consequences
of same-sex marriage should act with all deliberate speed to lock in
robust religious liberty protections, because the window for securing
them is almost certainly closing.
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Introduction
In the space of nine short months—from oral arguments before
the U.S. Supreme Court in Hollingsworth v. Perry1 and United States
v. Windsor2 to a pair of federal district court decisions invalidating
state constitutional bans on same-sex marriage in direct reliance on

1.

133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013) (reinstating the federal district court
decision invalidating Proposition 8, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.
Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010)). The United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit had affirmed the lower court’s decision in Perry v.
Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), but the Supreme Court found
that the parties lacked standing to appeal. 133 S. Ct. at 2668.

2.

133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (holding that the Fifth Amendment requires
the federal government to recognize same-sex marriages that are valid
under state law). The Court heard oral argument in the cases on March 26
and 27, 2013. Argument Audio, Supreme Court of the
United States (March 26 & 27, 2013), http://www.supremecourt.gov/or
al_arguments/argument_audio.aspx (listing the date of oral arguments).
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Windsor3—the number of states recognizing same-sex marriage has
exploded. If one includes the now-stayed decisions in Oklahoma4 and
Utah,5 as of January 14, 2014, 19 states and the District of Columbia
permit same-sex marriage, a leap from ten states mere months before.6
Newly enacted legislation in five states7 and judicial decisions in four
others,8 together with Hollingsworth’s restoration of same-sex marriage
3.

Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, No. 04-CV-848-TCK-TLW, 2014
WL 116013, at *33 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 14, 2014) (striking Oklahoma’s
constitutional same-sex marriage ban on equal protection grounds, using
rational basis review); Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 2:13-cv-217, 2013 WL
6697874, at *30 (D. Utah Dec. 20, 2013) (striking Utah’s constitutional
same-sex marriage ban on due process and equal protection grounds),
stay granted, 134 S. Ct. 893 (2014).

4.

In Bishop, the district court judge stayed the decision until “final
disposition of any appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.”
Bishop, 2014 WL 116013, at *33.

5.

In Herbert, the district court judge did not stay the decision while on
appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Herbert,
2013 WL 6697874. On January 6, 2014, the Supreme Court stayed
the decision “pending final disposition of the appeal by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.” Herbert v. Kitchen,
134 S. Ct. 893, 893 (2014). In the weeks between the decision and the
Supreme Court’s stay, nearly 1,300 same-sex couples married. While
the federal government has said it will acknowledge the marriages as
valid, Utah is “largely refusing to do so.” Charlie Savage and Jack
Healy, U.S. to Recognize 1,300 Marriages Disputed by Utah, N.Y.
TIMES Jan. 11, 2014, at A1.

6.

Eleven jurisdictions permit same-sex marriage by legislation alone:
Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota,
New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington.
See infra Table A1. One state, Connecticut, passed legislation
recognizing same-sex marriages on the heels of a judicial decision
requiring recognition. See infra Table A1. One state, Maine, adopted
same-sex marriage by a ballot initiative. See infra Table A1. Finally,
seven states recognize same-sex marriage as a result of a judicial
decision alone: California, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New
Mexico, Oklahoma, and Utah. See infra Table A1.
As of this writing, the decisions in Utah and Oklahoma are stayed. See
supra notes 4–5.

7.

Since March 2013, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, and Rhode
Island have all legislatively enacted same-sex marriage. See H.B. 75,
147th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2013) (codified as Del. Code Ann. tit. 13 §
101 (2013)); S.B.1, 27th Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Haw. 2013) (codified as
Haw. Rev. Stat. §572-1 (West 2013)); S.B. 0010, 98th Gen. Assemb.
(Ill. 2013) (to be codified at 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/201 (2014)); H.F.
1054, 88th Sess. (Minn. 2013) (codified as Minn. Stat. Ann. §517.01
(West 2013)); H.B. 5015B, 2013 Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2013) (codified as R.I.
Gen. Laws § 15-1-1 (2013)). See also Table A1 infra.

8.

See Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, No. 04-CV-848-TCK-TLW,
2014 WL 116013, at *33 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 14, 2014); Kitchen, 2013 WL
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in California,9 erased a boundary that had largely confined same-sex
marriage to the Northeast.10
Even though the Supreme Court “stopped short of deciding
whether the Constitution guaranteed a right to same-sex marriage,”11
the Court’s basic vindication of same-sex couples’ right to equal
treatment12 hastened a spate of judicial decisions requiring state
recognition of same-sex marriage.13 Just as significant, the Court’s
“historic decisions”14 fueled state legislation as well. In Hawaii, Senator
Brickwood Galuteria introduced SB1 to enact same-sex marriage
during a special legislative session. The bill’s text explained that
“[t]he legislature acknowledges the recent decision of the United
6697874 at *30; Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865 (N.M. 2013) (authorizing
same-sex marriage in New Mexico); Garden State Equality v. Dow, 82
A.3d 336 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2013) (striking down New Jersey’s
civil union statute as violative of the New Jersey Constitution and
requiring the state to permit same-sex couples to marry). Prior to
Griego, New Mexico law neither explicitly banned nor authorized samesex marriages. Griego, 316 P.3d at 871.
9.

Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).

10.

Of the early exceptions to the geographic cluster (Iowa, D.C. and
Maryland), Iowa recognized same-sex marriage by judicial decision while
D.C. and Maryland did so by statute. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d
862, 906 (Iowa 2009); see also Bill 18-0482 (D.C. 2009) (codified as D.C.
Code § 46-401 (LexisNexis 2012)); H.B. 438, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess.
(Md. 2012) (codified as Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law §§2-201
(LexisNexis 2012)). Maryland voters subsequently approved Maryland’s
same-sex marriage law by popular referendum by a vote of 52% to 48%.
See infra note 114.

11.

Adam Liptak, Utah Ruling Means No Respite for the Supreme Court on
Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 2013, at A1.

12.

The federal district court decision invalidating Oklahoma’s
constitutional ban on same-sex marriage references Windsor 65 times.
See Bishop, 2014 WL 116013, at *17 (“This Court interprets Windsor as
an equal protection case holding that [the invalidated federal Defense of
Marriage Act (“DOMA”)] drew an unconstitutional line between
lawfully married opposite-sex couples and lawfully married same-sex
couples). The decision invalidating Utah’s constitutional ban on samesex marriage references Windsor 34 times. See Kitchen, 2013 WL
6697874, at *7 (“The court agrees with Justice Scalia’s interpretation of
Windsor and finds that the important federalism concerns at issue here
are nevertheless insufficient to save a state-law prohibition that denies
the Plaintiffs their rights to due process and equal protection under the
law.”).

13.

See supra note 8.

14.

Marriage at the Supreme Court in 2013, Freedom to Marry (June
26, 2013), http://www.freedomtomarry.org/landscape/entry/c/supremecourt (“The Supreme Court’s historic decisions will dramatically
improve the lives of same-sex couples across the country, allowing many
couples the ability to protect each other and their families.”).
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States Supreme Court in United States v. Windsor”15 and seeks to
“ensure that same-sex couples are able to take full advantage of
federal rights, benefits, protections, and responsibilities granted to
married opposite-sex couples by allowing same-sex couples to marry
under the laws of this State.”16 In Illinois, where proponents
introduced the ultimately successful same-sex marriage bill before the
Supreme Court’s later decisions, Windsor lent further support.17
Even before this Court-powered juggernaut toward marriage
equality, state recognition of same-sex marriage over the last decade18
evolved from a labored, slow moving phenomenon to a steady,
seemingly inexorable one.19 As Figure 1 illustrates,20 the movement

15

S.B.1, 27th Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Haw. 2013) (codified as Haw. Rev.
Stat. §572-1 (West 2013)).

16.

Id. Governor Abercrombie also referenced Windsor when he floated his
own bill text to recognize same-sex marriage. See Press Release, Gov.
Neil Abercrombie, Proclamation and Marriage Equity Bill (Sept. 9,
2013) (“[T]he Governor believes that, in keeping with the United States
Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
2675 (2013), the State of Hawaii should extend to same-sex couples the
right to marry and receive all the same rights, benefits, protections, and
responsibilities of marriage as opposite-sex couples receive under the
laws of this State.”).

17.

See David Masci, Supreme Court’s DOMA decision driving same-sex
marriage efforts in states, PEW RES. CENTER (Oct. 21, 2013),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/10/21/supreme-courtsdoma-decision-driving-same-sex-marriage-efforts-in-states/
(discussing
Illinois’s prior attempts to legislate same-sex marriage).

18.

Recognition of same-sex marriage rights started in 2003 with Goodridge
v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) and gained speed
after 2008, which was marked by a judicial decision in California, In
re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), as well as a judicial
decision and subsequent legislation in Connecticut. See Kerrigan v.
Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); S.B. 899, 2009
Legis., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2009) (codified as Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-20
(2009)).

19.

See Liptak, supra note 11 (“Since then, the pace of change has been
very rapid. . . . [I]n March, same-sex marriage was permitted in nine
states and the District of Columbia. If the Utah decision stands, the
number of states allowing such marriages will have doubled, to 18.”).

20.

Figure 1 reflects the date that a judicial decision was handed down or
legislation was signed into law (or for some states, both). These dates do
not always match the first date on which same-sex couples could marry.
Some states, like Illinois, postponed by months the date when state
officials were authorized to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples.
See S.B. 0010, 98th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2013) (to be codified at 750 Ill.
Comp. Stat. 5/201 (2014)).
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gathered momentum when state legislatures began acting
independently, as Vermont did, to “ensure that equality was there.”21

Figure 1: Same-Sex Marriage Timeline

In jurisdictions that enacted same-sex marriage (“Enacting
Jurisdictions”),22 religious liberty protections for religious objectors
who adhere to a heterosexual view of marriage—exempting them from
requirements to facilitate marriages inconsistent with their religious
beliefs, like providing a reception hall—proved vital to the
legislation’s success. After New York’s watershed same-sex marriage
law, the New York Times observed that the religious liberty
protection:
proved to be the most microscopically examined and debated—
and the most pivotal—in the battle over same-sex marriage.
Language that Republican senators inserted into the bill
legalizing same-sex marriage provided more expansive

21.

Telephone Interview by Anthony Kreis with Heidi Schuermann, Member
of the Vt. House of Representatives (June 28, 2012). See Anthony Kreis
& Robin Fretwell Wilson, Embracing Compromise: Marriage Equality and
Religious Liberty in the Political Process, 15 Geo. J. Gender & L.
(forthcoming 2014).

22.

The Enacting Jurisdictions either recognized same-sex marriage by
legislation alone or with legislation codifying a judicial decision requiring
same-sex marriage. The Enacting Jurisdictions include Connecticut,
Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota,
New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington.
For the enacting legislation, see infra Table A1.
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protections for religious organizations and helped pull the
legislation over the finish line . . . .23

For some legislators, religious liberty protections shifted the question
from whether to embrace marriage equality to how to balance
marriage equality and religious liberty. For example, New Hampshire
State Representative Rick Watrous explained:
[Religious liberty protections] were very important. As you can
see by the closeness of the vote, I think it was the crucial
difference that made success. . . . These types of very personal
and religious freedoms are very important to New Hampshire.24

In many Enacting Jurisdictions, more robust protections resulted in
successful legislation where a bill with thinner or nonexistent ones had
failed just years before.25
In fact, every single bill over a decade that has offered hollow
religious liberty “protections” limited only to the clergy, who simply
do not require protection,26 has failed to garner sufficient support to
become law.27 This remains true after the Supreme Court’s decisions.28
One would expect legislation with enlarged protections to succeed
because legislators inherently balance competing interests in a
23.

Danny Hakim, Exemptions Were Key to Vote on Gay Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES, June 26, 2011, at A20.

24.

Telephone Interview by Anthony Kreis with Rick Watrous, N.H. State
Representative (June 29, 2012). See Kreis & Wilson, supra note 21.

25.

See Kreis & Wilson, supra note 21 (drawing on interviews with state
legislators intimately involved in legislative battles to show that
expanded and honed religious liberty protections allowed for same-sex
marriage in states like Maryland and New York, where earlier bills had
failed).

26.

The clergy do not need statutory protections because of the First
Amendment. See John Corvino, The Slippery Slope of Religious
Exemptions (Nov. 22, 2009), http://johncorvino.com/2009/11/theslippery-slope-of-religious-exemptions/
(“[T]he
gay-rights
debate
concerning religious accommodation is not about worship. No serious
person argues that the government should force religions to perform gay
weddings (or ordinations or baptisms or other religious functions)
against their will. That would violate the First Amendment, and beyond
that, it would be foolish and wrong.”).

27.

See infra Part I.

28.

See Kreis & Wilson, supra note 21. The religious liberty protections may
be thinning, however. See infra notes 35–36 (discussing efforts by samesex marriage advocates in Hawaii to provide a stripped-down exemption
for religious organizations that was ultimately enlarged by the
legislature). For a comparison of the religious liberty protections enacted
in Hawaii with those put in place by earlier Enacting Jurisdictions, see
Table A3.
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pluralistic, democratic society.29 The many clashes over same-sex
marriage have highlighted, for some legislators, the need to insulate
religious organizations from unintended consequences.30 In the words
of Washington State Senator Mary Margaret Haugen:
Once I made the decision [to support same-sex marriage], I felt
very strongly that those provisions [protecting religious liberty]
needed to be there. We have many wonderful organizations. We
need to respect each other’s space. We need to treat and respect
others like we want to treat ourselves.31

Even though same-sex marriage recognition in the Enacting
Jurisdictions has thus far been yoked to religious liberty protections—
delivering important gains to supporters and opponents alike—
prominent voices on each side now caution against compromise.
Buoyed by their recent victories, some supporters have hardened
against compromise. Some supporters have long said that religious
liberty protections are “politically unwise.”32 Now, with a spate of
judicial decisions, compromise may appear increasingly unnecessary,

29.

The first openly gay legislator to vote against same-sex marriage,
Hawaii Representative Jo Jordan, was guided by one question: “[A]re we
creating a measure that meets the needs of all?” Diane Lee, Exclusive:
Why Rep. Jo Jordan Voted Against Marriage Equality, Honolulu
Magazine (Nov. 2013), http://www.honolulumagazine.com/HonoluluMagazine/November-2013/Exclusive-Why-Rep-Jo-Jordan-voted-againstMarriage-Equality/. Representative Jordan explained that she was
“really . . . not happy with the exemptions. Too narrow. I’m not here to
protect the big churches or the little churches, I’m saying we can’t erode
what’s currently out there. We don’t want to scratch at the religious
protections at all.” Id.

30.

See infra Part I for a discussion of the loss of government contracts by
religious organizations. See infra note 128 for discussion of a small
business facing penalty for a refusal to celebrate same-sex marriage. See
infra Part I for a discussion of how justices of the peace, judges, and
government clerks may face firing or other penalty for not providing
services for a same-sex marriage even if other willing individuals are
immediately available to provide the needed service. Although
somewhat dated, see Marc Stern, Same-Sex Marriage and the Churches,
in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING
CONFLICTS 1 (Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr. & Robin
Fretwell Wilson, eds., 2008) [hereinafter Emerging Conflicts] for a
discussion of conflicts between religious liberty and same-sex marriage.

31.

See Kreis & Wilson, supra note 21; Telephone Interview by Anthony
Kreis with Mary Margaret Haugen, Wash. State Senator (July 16, 2012).

32.

Jana Singer, Balancing Away Marriage Equality, SCOTUSblog (Aug. 29,
2011, 1:00 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/08/balancing-awaymarriage-equality/ (arguing for same-sex marriage legislation stripped of
any protections for religious organizations or individuals).
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too. For example, after Garden State Equality v. Dow,33 Senate
Democrats in New Jersey initially supported and then declined to
back state legislation that would have codified same-sex marriage,
explaining that the influential same-sex marriage advocate Lambda
Legal didn’t “want any kind of religious exemption.”34
In Hawaii, where same-sex marriage resulted from legislation
rather than judicial decision, some advocates downplayed religious
liberty concerns. They argued strenuously that:
[t]he proposed marriage equality law ensures that no clergy can
be required to perform any marriage to which they object. This
protects religious freedom. And the law goes further, by
clarifying that churches or other religious organizations need not
allow anyone to use their facilities for weddings, so long as those
facilities aren’t rented for weddings to the general public for a
profit.35

Believing that a broader exemption was needed, the Hawaii legislature
approved slightly more robust protection for religious nonprofit
organizations.36
Opponents are hardening in their stance, too. Far from folding in
the face of the momentum carrying same-sex marriage across the
country, some thought-leaders urge opponents to double down on
their opposition. They say that the “the preservation of meaningful
religious
liberty . . . is
inseparable
from
the
preservation
of . . . [heterosexual] marriage. They stand or fall together.”37 In the
Enacting Jurisdictions, they contend that bargaining has “gotten
exactly nowhere.”38 That is, efforts to shield religious objectors “have
33.

82 A.3d 336 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2013).

34.

Ken Klukowski, NJ Stalls Same-Sex Marriage Bill To Kill Religious
Protections, Breitbart (Dec. 18, 2013), http://www.breitbart.com
/Big-Government/2013/12/18/War-on-Christians-in-New-Jersey
(“Democratic Senate Majority Leader Loretta Weinberg pulled the bill
that she was supporting because of objections from gay-rights
organizations such as Lambda Legal. The reason? Weinberg explained,
‘They don’t want any kind of religious exemption, so out of respect for
that, I will [pull the bill] (emphasis added).’”); see also infra note 63.

35.

Hawaii Facts on Marriage: Telling the Truth About
Marriage Equality in Hawaii, http://www.factsonmarriage.com/
(last accessed Feb. 22, 2014).

36.

See infra Table A3.

37.

Matthew J. Franck, Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Freedom,
Fundamentally at Odds, Public Discourse (June 18, 2013),
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2013/06/10393/.

38.

Id. (“When the above-mentioned religious liberty scholars have pleaded
for accommodation of such persons and groups, they have gotten exactly
nowhere. It seems that for same-sex marriage proponents, the religious
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signally [sic] failed to achieve much, if any, meaningful
accommodation of religious freedom in the recent legislative
enactments of same-sex marriage in New York, Minnesota, Rhode
Island, and Delaware.”39
These opponents see only one way forward: fighting to the bitter
end. As one commentator encapsulates this position:
[T]hey have to win this battle entirely or be crushed
everywhere, as segregationists were, and for the same reason:
their views will be deemed too abhorrent to be tolerated. On
this view, preserving religious liberty cannot be separated from
preserving traditional marriage.40

This Article contends that we stand at a critical moment in the samesex marriage movement. On both sides, some perceive that the
delicate state of affairs that has thus far yoked enactment of same-sex
marriage to protection of religious liberty is dissipating. However, a
clear-eyed examination of the marriage movement’s success—and the
challenges facing it going forward—reveals that both sides will benefit
from remaining at the bargaining table, although the gains for each
will be different.
Marriage equality advocates have exhausted those jurisdictions in
which a “perfect storm” of popular support, political characteristics,
and background legal protections coalesced to yield marriage equality.
As advocates move to more difficult political terrain, trading religious
liberty protections will remain essential to securing marriage equality,
at least in the near term,41 since it is unclear whether and when the
U.S. Supreme Court will weigh in. On the other side, opponents
rightfully worry about the existing scope and degree of protections for
religious dissenters. But as the movement moves to more difficult
political terrain, opponents will be in a considerably stronger position
to get more robust protections. The price tag for those protections,
however, will be to agree to recognition of same-sex marriage on the
merits.
freedom of saying ‘no’ to same-sex weddings belongs only to ‘religious
organizations,’ not to similarly situated religious persons, despite the
obviously personal character of the First Amendment’s free exercise of
religion.” (emphasis in original).
39.

Id.

40.

Rod Dreher, Does Faith = Hate?: Gay Marriage and Religious Liberty
Are Uneasy Bedfellows, AM. CONSERVATIVE (Oct. 2013), at 12, 15
(attributing this view to Robert George).

41.

See infra note 54 and Part V. The near-term benefit of bargaining
assumes that judicial decisions from lower courts striking state marriage
bans, as in Oklahoma and Utah, are stayed pending ultimate resolution
See supra notes 4–5.
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Part I demonstrates that same-sex marriage has spread across
American through three different avenues: judicial decisions, state
laws enacting same-sex marriage, and ballot initiatives. One of these
avenues, judicial decisions, is fraught with risk for religious dissenters
precisely because it leaves no meaningful opportunity for balancing
competing goods, namely, marriage equality with religious liberty. Six
of the seven states recognizing same-sex marriage by judicial decision
gave no new protections to religious objectors. By contrast, the one
ballot initiative state and the Enacting Jurisdictions all offer
important, if flawed, protections to religious organizations and
individuals. Although they could have gone farther, these protections
were enhanced over the course of legislative consideration through
extensive negotiation.
Parts II and III document that the “perfect storm” of
characteristics favoring marriage equality in the Enacting
Jurisdictions, together with extensive bargaining around religious
liberty, nudged same-sex marriage legislation over the finish line. In
every Enacting Jurisdiction except one, a majority of the populace
supported same-sex marriage at the time of enactment42—a marked
departure from the states that have not recognized same-sex
marriage. In virtually all of the Enacting Jurisdictions, Democrats
controlled both houses of the legislature;43 Democrats held the
Governor’s office;44 and the state ranked among the least religious in
the U.S.45 but among the most educated46—all characteristics that
political scientists say matter to support for same-sex marriage.47 In
every Enacting Jurisdiction, same-sex marriage recognition was
42.

Passage of a law may not be assured even when a majority of the public
supports it if one chamber of a state’s legislature is controlled by
legislators strongly opposed to it. Consider the Employment NonDiscrimination Act (ENDA); more than seventy percent of Americans
support ENDA, yet U.S. House of Representatives Speaker John
Boehner will not permit the bill to receive a vote in the U.S. House of
Representatives. Nonetheless, where majority support is lacking,
enactment of a law is less likely. See Andrew Gelman, Polls Say ENDA
Has Majority Support in Every Congressional District, The Monkey
Cage (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkeycage/wp/2013/11/20/polls-say-enda-has-majority-support-in-everycongressional-district/.

43.

New York is the sole exception, where Republicans controlled the
Senate. See infra Table A5.

44.

See infra notes 185–186 (discussing Connecticut and Vermont).

45.

Eight of the enacting jurisdictions are in the bottom third for religiosity,
while the rest are in the middle third. See infra Figure 13.

46.

All but Hawaii are in the top third for post-secondary educational
attainment. See infra Figure 14.

47.

See infra Part III.
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preceded by a statewide law prohibiting discrimination based on
sexual orientation. And in no Enacting Jurisdiction did the state
constitution enshrine a ban against same-sex marriage.
Notwithstanding these favorable conditions, marriage equality bills
just barely squeaked over the line to enactment,48 helped in part by
religious liberty protections.49
That advantageous political terrain is now nearly exhausted, as
Part IV documents. In the thirty-one states that have not enacted
same-sex marriage or recognized it by judicial decision
(“Nonrecognizing States”), the characteristics that favored legislative
recognition splinter and, in some places, vanish entirely. Where the
Enacting Jurisdictions are heavily blue states, the Nonrecognizing
States are heavily red states. Republicans occupy the Governor’s
office in 24 states and control the legislature in twenty-six states,
while splitting control in two others. More than 80% of the
Nonrecognizing States rank among the top two-thirds of states for
religiosity and the bottom two-thirds for educational attainment.50
Only four Nonrecognizing States assure sexual orientation
nondiscrimination by state law.51 And twenty-seven of the thirty-one
Nonrecognizing States ban same-sex marriage in the state’s
constitution, erecting a significant (but not impossible) hurdle to
voluntary same-sex marriage recognition.52 Going forward, one would
reasonably expect more robust religious liberty protections to play a
central part in any legislative compromises over same-sex marriage, at
least for the near term.
Part V evaluates the impulse of some opponents to dig in,
resisting same-sex marriage at all costs. It first shows that
constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage do not provide
the bulwark against change that some assume. Only a fourth of the
constitutional amendment states (seven of the twenty-seven) erect a
significant hurdle to removal of the ban. Moreover, while large swaths
of the country today show deep resistance to same-sex marriage,
public support is mushrooming. Increasing acceptance is fueled by
increased familiarity with and acceptance of lesbians and gays by
Americans. Public opposition will only recede further as the oldest

48.

See infra Table 1 and Part II; Table A5.

49.

See infra Part II.

50.

See infra Part III and Table A4. Oregon, Alaska, Nevada, Wyoming,
Colorado, and Montana all rank in the bottom one-third for religiosity,
while Oregon, Virginia, and Colorado rank in the top one-third for postsecondary educational attainment. See infra Figures 18, 19.

51.

See infra Figure 20 (showing Oregon, Nevada, Colorado, and Wisconsin).

52.

See infra Figure 21 (showing that Wyoming, Indiana, West Virginia,
and Pennsylvania do not ban same-sex marriage in the constitution).
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generation passes on.53 Thus, “[t]ime is on the gay-rights side.”54 At
some point, public support will swamp those characteristics that
augur against same-sex marriage recognition, making enactment of
same-sex marriage in the absence of religious liberty protections
possible—at least in the 20 states where state constitutions can be
readily amended.55 One should not overlook the fact that court
decisions striking bans under the federal constitution have
already occurred in red states, creating yet more urgency to
compromise now.56
Part VI concludes that, in the tougher political terrain that
looms, those who care about marriage equality can continue to sew up
legislative victories—but the price tag in the short term will be to
agree
to
robust
religious
liberty
protections
for
dissenters.57 Concededly, many believe that the early judicial decisions
striking down marriage bans portend a favorable Supreme Court
decision in the near term. Although that result is increasingly likely,
it is nonetheless not assured. Moreover, if the lower federal courts
uniformly strike down marriage bans, that success in the courts may,
ironically, delay ultimate resolution by the Supreme Court, which
often declines review until a meaningful circuit split arises.58 Thus,
marriage equality supporters continue to gain from the voluntary
embrace of same-sex marriage.
The case for bargaining is even stronger for marriage equality
opponents. Those who wish to protect religious objectors from the
unintended consequences of same-sex marriage should act with all
53.

See infra Part II and Figs. 6–10; but compare note 156 (discussing Rice
University study).

54.

Dreher, supra note 40. See infra Parts II and V.

55.

See infra Part I. See also Rachel Zoll, Divide over Religious Exemptions
on Gay Marriage, AP, Aug. 25, 2013, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/
divide-over-religious-exemptions-gay-marriage
(quoting
Douglas
Laycock, a “church-state expert” from the University of Virginia who is
recommending a more pragmatic course, as stating that “The more
same-sex marriage seems inevitable, the less likely we are to see religious
liberty protection in blue states”).

56.

See supra Part V (discussing the deeply red character of Oklahoma and
Utah, where court decisions striking state constitutional bans are
presently stayed).

57.

See Zoll, supra note 55 (quoting Douglas Laycock as stating that, “The
religious community would have done much better to ask for protection
for their religious liberty instead of trying to stop same-sex marriage and
try to prevent it for everybody . . . .”).

58.

Emily Grant, Scott A. Hendrickson, & Michael S. Lynch, The
Ideological Divide: Conflict and the Supreme Court’s Certiorari
Decision, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2138211&download=yes.
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deliberate speed to lock in robust religious liberty protections because
the window for securing them is almost certainly closing. But that
window will not, as some predict, slam shut if the U.S. Supreme
Court recognizes same-sex marriage as a federal constitutional right in
2015 or later. The same factors that make the legislative terrain going
forward difficult suggest that red states will be able to enact religious
liberty protections, if for no other reasons than they will have the
naked power to do so. And even after this point, same-sex marriage
opponents will still have some bargaining leverage if they are willing
to provide a promise of non-discrimination based on sexual
orientation as the quid pro quo for religious liberty protections.
This focus on the pragmatic value of bargaining should not
detract from principled arguments favoring a live-and-let-live regime
that both respects marriage equality and religious diversity. The same
fundamental values of personal liberty that support an individual’s
right to live according to his or her religious convictions also support
an individual’s right to follow and fulfill his or her essential identity,
including sexual identity and same-sex relationships.59

I.

The Importance of Bargaining Before
Judicial Action

Same-sex marriage opponents are running a race against time. As
Parts II and III will show, in the next decade, swelling public support
for same-sex marriage will swallow nearly all opposition to enacting it.
This will likely eliminate, in the not too distant future, the need for
supporters to bargain around religious liberty and same-sex
marriage.60 The more immediate threat to the opportunity to seek
59.

Professor Chai Feldblum (now a Commissioner for the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission) argues that the “identity
liberty” same-sex couples have in marriage and the “belief liberty”
objectors have in their religious tenets are both fundamental values that
deserve protection, however, these values can come into direct conflict
when civil rights laws require one to accommodate the other. See Chai
R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Conflicting Liberties, in EMERGING
CONFLICTS, supra note 30, at 123, 157. Professor Feldblum concludes
that the demand of civil rights laws “can burden an individual’s belief
liberty interest” but that “[a]cknowledging [the burden’s impact] . . .
does not necessarily mean that [civil rights] laws will be invalidated or
that exemptions . . . will always be granted to individuals holding such
beliefs.” Id. at 125; see also Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex Marriage
and Religious-Liberty Claims Have in Common, 5 Nw. J. L. & Soc.
Pol’y 206, 219–20, 230–32 (2010) (engaging Feldblum’s argument); see
also Douglas Laycock & Thomas C. Berg, Protecting Same-Sex
Marriage and Religious Liberty, 99 Va. L. Rev., In Brief 1 (2013)
(noting that religious freedom and marriage equality both seek to
protect minorities that have been historically oppressed).

60.

See infra Parts II and III. Mushrooming public support may lead not to
just successful enactment of marriage equality legislation, but to voter
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compromise is a judicial decision by a state or federal court
authorizing same-sex marriage. While the U.S. Supreme Court could
resolve the federal constitutional entitlement to same-sex marriage
decisively,61 it is unlikely to do so until a meaningful circuit split
arises and even then, not before 2015 at the earliest.62 Experience
led ballot initiatives as well. It is instructive that Maine, the only state
to enact same-sex marriage by popular referendum to date, included
tangible protections of dissenting religious organizations. See infra Table
A1. Nonetheless, it is not at all clear that a ballot initiate will include
adequately developed religious liberty protections. See infra Table A3.
The absence of direct input of religious liberty scholars (to my
knowledge), and the fact that (a) sponsors do not conduct hearings as
legislators do, (b) interested parties do not have the opportunity with
ballot sponsors to enlarge protections with specific constituents in mind
(e.g., religiously affiliated social services agencies, like Catholic
Charities), and (c) protections are not improved across the legislative
cycle all auger against meaningful protections. See infra Parts II and III.
61.

Constitutional challenges to marriage restrictions proceeded early on as
challenges under state constitutional guarantees, while later challenges have
now been brought under the U.S. Constitution as well. Compare Kerrigan
v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (holding that the
Connecticut's state constitution was violated by restricting marriage to
heterosexual couples), and Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d
941 (Mass. 2003) (holding that limitations for the protections of same-sex
individuals violated Massachusetts' state constitution), with Bishop v.
United States ex rel. Holder, No. 04-CV-848-TCK-TLW, 2014 WL 116013,
at *33 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 14, 2014) (holding that Oklahoma's amendment
prohibiting same-sex marriage violated the U.S. constitution), and Kitchen
v. Herbert, No. 2:13-cv-217, 2013 WL 6697874, at *30 (D. Utah Dec. 20,
2013) (holding that Utah's amendment prohibiting same-sex marriage
violated the U.S. constitution). Dean Erwin Chemerinsky believes that early
constitutional challenges under state constitutional guarantees delivered
important, early judicial wins to advocates, without the threat of a federal
court of appeals or Supreme Court decision going the other way. See Erwin
Chemerinsky, Keynote at the U.C. Davis Law Review Symposium, Not
Equal Yet: Building Upon Foundations of Relationship Equality (Feb. 7,
2014). A decision from a U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals under federal
constitutional guarantees would answer the question dispositively in that
circuit, absent a contrary ruling from the U.S. Supreme Court. For example,
a decision in the 10th Circuit would encompass Colorado, Kansas, New
Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming.

62.

See supra note 58 (discussing the importance of circuit splits to Supreme
Court decisions to grant review); Liptak, supra note 11 (“Whatever the
Supreme Court does regarding a stay, it is hard to see how it could hear
the larger issue in the case in the current term. But a decision in the
court’s next term, culminating in a decision in June 2015, is entirely
possible.”). For a discussion of avoiding unintended consequences on
bargaining of a Supreme Court decision, see Robin Fretwell Wilson and
Anthony Kreis, Balancing marriage equality with other social goods,
SCOTUSBlog
(Aug.
22,
2011),
http://www.scotusblog.com/
2011/08/balancing-marriage-equality-with-other-social-goods/ (“But if
the Supreme Court does weigh in here, an unintended consequence of its
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shows, however, that a state-specific judicial decision removes the
urgency to bargain in order to secure legislative recognition of samesex marriage in that state.63
decision may be to strangle the delicate process unfolding in state
legislatures across the country by changing the political calculus for
granting robust accommodations. If the Court recognizes a federal
constitutional right to same-sex marriage, it should take care to leave a
space for individual states to continue to decide how best to balance
marriage equality with other goods in society.”); see also Douglas
Laycock & Thomas C. Berg, Protecting Same-Sex Marriage and
Religious Liberty, 99 Va. L. Rev., In Brief 1 (2013) (arguing that if
the Court recognizes same-sex marriage (as they argue it should), it
should expressly endorse religious liberty protections); Douglas Laycock
& Thomas C. Berg, Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Jewish
Committee in Support of the Individual Respondents on the
Merits (2013), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/03/Marriage-Cases-AJC-Brief-Final.pdf.
Some believe that if the Court constitutionally recognizes same-sex
marriage, religious objectors will be in the place of asking for concessions
because “now they are the ones who are the outliers hoping to be
accommodated.” See Steven D. Smith, Die and Let Live? The
Asymmetry of Accommodation (manuscript at 10) (forthcoming 2014),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2484801. As Part V explains, the more challenging terrain facing
marriage equality advocates going forward will place a premium on
granting religious liberty protections even after a Supreme Court
decision. In the perfect world, those protections would be tied to mutual
benefit to the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT)
community, like a promise of nondiscrimination in state law.
63.

A judicial decision recognizing same-sex marriage means that advocates
need not bargain around religious liberty protections in order to achieve
marriage equality. After a judicial decision, legislators may resist codifying
legislation, worried that including religious liberty protections may be seen
as chipping away at the broader right established by the court. See infra
Part II. That dynamic is seen most vividly in New Jersey.
In October 2013, New Jersey joined those states recognizing same-sex
marriage by judicial intervention. See Garden State Equality v. Dow, 82
A.3d 336 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2013) (permitting same-sex marriage
in New Jersey). Three weeks later, state officials dropped the state’s
appeal of the decision. See Dismissal of Appeal, App Div. Doc. No. A0521-13 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Oct. 21, 2013), available at:
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/samesex/AG%20Withdrawal%20of%20A
ppeal%20102113.pdf. Only 8 months before, Governor Christie vetoed a
2012 same-sex marriage bill that contained modest religious liberty
protection for organizations. See Kate Zernike, Christie Keeps His
Promise to Veto Gay Marriage Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2012, at A19.
The provision would have protected religious institutions against civil suit
or government penalty for refusing to “provide space, services,
advantages, goods, or privileges related to the solemnization, celebration
or promotion of marriage if such solemnization, celebration or promotion
of marriage is in violation of the beliefs of such religious society,
institution or organization.” S.B.1, 215th Leg. (N.J. 2012) (enacted).
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As Figure 1 shows, state and federal courts are handing down
judicial decisions more readily after Windsor.64 As of this writing,
seven states65 (California,66 Iowa,67 Massachusetts,68 New Jersey,69 New
Mexico,70 Oklahoma,71 and Utah72) have recognized same-sex marriage
by judicial decision (“Judicial Decision States”).
In the weeks after Garden State Equality v. Dow, legislators considered
whether to override the Governor’s veto, which would have placed that
modest religious liberty protection into law. When the window for
overriding the governor’s veto closed, Senators Loretta Weinberg and
Raymond J. Lesniak introduced Senate Bill 3109 on December 12, 2013 to
“codify the ruling . . . in Garden State Equality v. Dow.” S.B. 3109, 215th
Leg. (N.J. 2013) (enacted), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2012
/Bills/S3500/3109_I1.PDF. Intending to “leave decisions about religious
marriage to religions, and to uphold the free exercise of religion,” SB 3109
included a limited exemption for religious organization identical to the one
that Governor Christie vetoed. As noted in the Introduction, Weinberg,
under pressure from same-sex marriage advocates, withdrew the bill.
Of course, this could have unfolded differently, as it did in Connecticut
where the legislature followed on the heels of a same-sex marriage decision
with legislation codifying the result and protecting religious liberty. See
infra note 66 and Table A1.
64.

As of Jan. 16, 2014, there have been four decisions recognizing same-sex
marriage since Windsor, in New Jersey, New Mexico, Utah, and
Oklahoma. See cases cited supra note 8.

65.

In addition to these seven Judicial Decision States, same-sex marriage was
also originally recognized in Connecticut by judicial decision. See Kerrigan
v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (concluding that
the state statutory scheme impermissibly discriminated against gay
persons). However, Connecticut is not treated here as a Judicial Decision
State because the state enacted same-sex marriage legislation following
the Kerrigan decision. See infra note 91 and Table A1.

66.

See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013) (holding in
June 2013 that private parties lacked standing to appeal lower court
decisions finding unconstitutional California’s state constitutional samesex marriage ban, permitting California to resume same-sex marriages).

67.

See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906 (Iowa 2009) (holding that
the Iowa marriage statute limiting marriage to one man and one woman
violated the equal protection clause of the Iowa Constitution).

68.

See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003)
(holding that barring an individual from civil marriage simply because
the person will marry someone of the same sex violated the
Massachusetts Constitution).

69.

See Garden State Equality v. Dow, 82 A.2d 336 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 2013) (striking down New Jersey’s civil union statute, which
provided the only relationship recognition for same-sex couples, as
violative of the New Jersey Constitution and requiring the state to
permit same-sex couples to marry).

70.

See Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865 (N.M. 2013) (authorizing same-sex
marriage in New Mexico).
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Same-sex marriage by judicial decision alone is the real
“nightmare for religious liberty” that opponents fear.73 As Figure 2
shows, judicial decisions leave religious objectors the most exposed.74

Figure 2: Degrees of Protection in Same-Sex Marriage States

Six of the seven Judicial Decision States give no protection to
religious objectors that objectors did not already have prior to the
71.

See Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, No. 04-CV-848-TCK-TLW,
2014 WL 116013, at *33 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 14, 2014) (declaring that the
Oklahoma constitutional Amendment precluding same-sex couples from
receiving a marriage license violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution).

72.

See Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 2:13-cv-217, 2013 WL 6697874, at *30 (D. Utah
Dec. 20, 2013) (declaring that the amendment to the Utah constitution
violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).

73.

Ryan T. Anderson, In Illinois, Redefining Marriage Threatens Marriage
and Religious Freedom, THE FOUNDRY, (Jan. 4, 2013, 1:16 PM),
http://blog.heritage.org/2013/01/04/in-illinois-redefining-marriagethreatens-marriage-and-religious-freedom/ (“As my Heritage Foundation
colleague Tom Messner has documented again, and again, and again,
redefining marriage has already been—and will continue to be—a nightmare
for religious liberty.”).

74.

After state courts in Iowa and Massachusetts held that their respective
state constitutions required the recognition of same-sex marriages, the state
legislatures did not revisit preexisting nondiscrimination law. See Zoll, supra
note 55 (“Massachusetts and Iowa, where same-sex marriage won
recognition through the courts, have approved no enhanced religious
exemptions related to the rulings.”). California’s legislature enacted minimal
protections as litigation over Prop 8 worked its way through the courts,
resulting in the Hollingsworth decision. See infra Tables A1 and A3.
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decisions (Iowa, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
and Utah).75 The one Judicial Decision State that does give new
statutory protections specific to marriage, California, did so by
legislation, as noted below. The failure of the judiciary to protect
religious objectors is hardly that fault of the courts. Courts lack the
inherent ability of legislatures to conduct hearings and take testimony
about how to balance competing goods in a plural society. Moreover,
protecting religious objectors is not the issue presented in cases
establishing a right to same-sex marriage.
Contrast this with the Enacting Jurisdictions. The Enacting
Jurisdictions placed into law statutory protections specific to
marriage76 that, while imperfect, generally insulate religiously
75.

Some same-sex marriage decisions acknowledge the possibility of an
impact on something other than solemnization of the marriage itself.
See, e.g., Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865 (N.M. 2013) (“Our holding will
not interfere with the religious freedom of religious organizations or
clergy because (1) no religious organization will have to change its
policies to accommodate same-gender couples, and (2) no religious
clergy will be required to solemnize a marriage in contravention of his or
her religious beliefs.” (emphasis added)). Griego cites N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 28-1-9(B) & (C) (1978 & Supp. 2012), which exempts religious
organizations from the New Mexico Human Rights Act, to support its
holding. But judicial decisions have not, and cannot, provide the kind of
protection for religious dissenters that have been forthcoming from state
legislatures.
Religious objectors may or may not receive protection from the state’s
background nondiscrimination laws. For example, while Iowa’s
background law insulates religious organizations when hiring for a “bona
fide religious purpose,” Massachusetts’ public accommodation statute
provides no express protection for religious organizations. IOWA CODE
ANN § 216.7 (West 2013); see Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 272, § 92A
(West 2000) (defining a public accommodation). The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court has interpreted the Massachusetts Constitution
to require the application of strict scrutiny to free exercise claims. See
Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 236 (1994) (rejecting the
Dep’t of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990),
standard for free exercise claims under the Massachusetts Constitution
and applying strict scrutiny). State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts
(RFRAs) in the Judicial Decision States may provide some protection.
See N.M. Stat. §§28-22-1 to 28-22-5 (2006); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 51,
§§251-258 (West 2010). The federal and state RFRAs all “facially
require strict scrutiny of all substantial burdens on religious practices.”
Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions of Religious Exemptions—A
Research Agenda with Test Suites, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 595, 598
(1999) (arguing that while “RFRAs have more specific, binding text
than does the Free Exercise Clause,” they leave open a number of
questions). See also Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After
Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. Rev. 466 (2010).

76.

Religious objectors may receive some protection from the state’s
background laws. In three Enacting Jurisdictions, a state RFRA,
modeled on the federal RFRA, is also in place. See Conn. Gen. Stat.
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affiliated nonprofits from private suit and government penalty for
refusing to solemnize or celebrate a marriage if doing so would violate
their religious beliefs, as Table A3 shows.77 Protections, especially for
religious nonprofits, are crucial because religious groups have faced
both lawsuits and penalty by the government. For example, the
Salvation Army lost $3.5 million in social service contracts with the
City of San Francisco because it refused, on religious grounds, to
provide benefits to its employees’ same-sex partners.78 In Maine,
Catholic Charities lost access to municipal development funds for
similar reasons.79 In New Jersey, a Methodist nonprofit association
violated New Jersey’s law against discrimination when the nonprofit
Ann. §52-571b (West 2009); 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 35/1-99 (West
2009); R.I. Gen. Laws §§42-80.1-1 to -4 (2006). In addition, three
Enacting Jurisdictions (Maine, Minnesota, and Washington) have
interpreted their state constitutions to protect against neutral and
generally applicable laws that substantially burden religious belief or
practice. See First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174
(Wash. 1992); Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990); Rupert v.
City of Portland, 605 A.2d 63 (Me. 1992). These generalized protections
may or may not provide anything more than the statutory protections
specific to marriage. But they are there, and people can invoke them in
the marriage context.
Finally, the anti-discrimination law in several Enacting Jurisdictions
give modest protection to religious organizations. See Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 363A.26 (West) (2012) (providing accommodation to religious
associations in matters relating “to sexual orientation, [when] taking any
action with respect to education, employment, housing and real
property, or use of facilities”); Md. Code Ann., Md. State Gov’t
§ 20-604(2) (2011) (prohibiting discrimination in employment but
exempting religious organizations); N.Y. Exec. Law § 11 (2011)
(providing religious liberty accommodations for rental and housing in
discrimination ban). In some cases, however, these laws provide little
sanctuary for objectors.
77.

See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45b-35a (Supp. 2013); D.C. CODE § 46-406(e)
(LexisNexis 2012); Md. H.B. 438 §§ 2–3 (West 2012) (codified as Md.
Code Ann., Fam. Law §§ 2-201, 2-202 (2012)); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 517.09 (West 2013); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III) (West 2004);
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-b(1) (McKinney Supp. 2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 15-3-6.1 (LexisNexis 2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4502(1) (2012);
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010(6) (West 2012). See also infra Table A3.

78.

See Manny Fernandez & April Lynch, Salvation Army Cuts S.F.
Programs: Charity Spurns City’s Domestic Partner Law, S.F.
Chronicle, June 4, 1998, at A1, A15 (providing details on the cuts to
the Salvation Army in San Francisco for refusing to provide same-sex
benefits for employees).

79.

See Catholic Charities of Maine, Inc. v. City of Portland, 304 F. Supp.
2d 77 (D. Me. 2004) (upholding ordinance requiring religious charity to
either extend employee spousal benefit programs to registered same-sex
couples, or to lose eligibility for all city housing and community
development funds).
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association denied two same-sex couples’ requests to use the group’s
boardwalk pavilion for their civil union commitment ceremonies.80
In many Enacting Jurisdictions, religious individuals, universities,
social services agencies, and fraternal organizations receive
protections, as well.81 As Table A3 shows:


Four jurisdictions allow the Knights of Columbus or other
religious organizations to continue to offer an insurance product
for spouses in heterosexual marriages (Vermont, New
Hampshire, Maryland, and Rhode Island).



Five jurisdictions expressly say religious organizations need
not promote same-sex marriage through religious counseling
or retreats (Maryland, DC, New Hampshire, Rhode Island,
and Washington). Three extend this to married-couple housing
(Minnesota, New Hampshire, and New York).



Four jurisdictions allow religiously affiliated adoption
agencies to continue to place children only with heterosexual
married couples (Connecticut, Maryland, Minnesota, and
Rhode Island); three condition the exemption on not
receiving government funding for the program (Connecticut,
Maryland, and Minnesota).



Six states expressly exempt individual employees of a covered
entity from celebrating or promoting same-sex marriages—
while it is hard to imagine who this protects, think of a
lawsuit filed against a church employee, instead of suing the
church (Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York,
Rhode Island, and Washington).82

80.

See Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n, OAL DKT. CRT
6145-09, 2012 WL 169302, at *1, 2 (N.J. Adm., Jan. 12, 2012) (“The
Green Acres program is designed to preserve open space and the statutory
scheme authorizes a tax exemption for non-profit corporations utilizing
property for conservation or recreational purposes. One condition of the
exemption is that the property be ‘open for public use on an equal
basis.’”); see also Barbara Bradley Hagerty, Gay Rights, Religious
Liberties: A Three-Act Story, NPR (June 16, 2008, 12:12 AM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=91486340.
The
group also lost its exemption from ad volorem property taxes on the
pavilion, but that loss was hastened by the group’s own decision to tie its
property tax exemption to a public lands program. Although the loss of a
tax exemption expressly conditioned upon “public access” to a parcel of
land hardly seems unfair, see Kreis & Wilson, supra note 21, tax-exempt
religious groups fear that they may lose valuable benefits if their views of
marriage become “disfavored.”

81.

See infra Table A3; see also infra Part II for a discussion of the extent of
protection for religious objectors in state same-sex marriage laws.

82.

See Md. H.B. 438 §§ 2–3(b) (codified as Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law
§§ 2-201, 2-202 (LexisNexis 2012); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 517.09(3)(b)
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Six states specifically carry forward religious liberty protections
present in the underlying anti-discrimination statute or state
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (Delaware, Illinois,
Minnesota, New York, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island).83



One state, Delaware, permits justices of the peace and judges
to choose to solemnize only those marriages they choose to.84

Until Delaware, no jurisdiction had provided protection to
government officials. Where protections are lacking, justices of the

(West Supp. 2013); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III); N.Y. Dom. Rel.
Law. § 10-b (1); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 15-3-6.1(c)(2)(e) (LexisNexis
2013); Wash. Rev. Code § 7(a)(i).
83.

Legislation in Delaware, Illinois, Minnesota, New York, New Hampshire,
and Rhode Island also contained “catch-all” protections, carrying forward
existing preexisting exemptions in each state’s underlying statutory
scheme barring discrimination. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:37 (West
2004) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be deemed or construed to limit the
protections and exemptions provided to religious organizations under RSA
354-A:18.”); SF 925, 88th Legis. Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2013) (“This chapter
does not alter or affect the protections or exemptions provided in chapter
363A for a religious association, educational institution, business, labor
organization, place of public accommodation, employer, or other
person.”); SB 10, 98th Gen. Assm. Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013) (“Nothing in this
Act is intended to abrogate, limit, or expand . . . the Illinois Human
Rights Act or the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.”); 3. N.Y. Dom.
Rel. Law § 10-b. (“Nothing in this section shall be deemed or construed to
limit the protections and exemptions otherwise provided to religious
organizations under section three of article one of the constitution of the
state of New York.”); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 15-3-6.1 (“Nothing in the
marriage laws of this state shall be deemed or construed to limit the
protections and exemptions provided to religious organizations under GL
paragraph 28-5-6(7)(ii) and subsection 34-37-4.2(a)”). Delaware’s law
provides that the same-sex marriage law “does not affect rights, duties or
obligations that matured or were owed, penalties that were incurred, or
proceedings that were begun, before its effective date.” Delaware Laws
Ch. 19 (H.B. 75 2013); see also Table A3.
For Enacting Jurisdictions with state RFRAs, see supra note 76
(cataloging those Enacting Jurisdictions that had enacted state Religious
Freedom Restoration Acts before same-sex marriage). For details of the
sexual orientation nondiscrimination laws that preceded same-sex
marriage recognition in the Enacting Jurisdictions, see Table A2.

84.

See Del. Code Ann. tit. 13 § 106 (2013), http://delcode.delaware.gov/
title13/c001/sc01/index.shtml (“[N]othing in this section shall be
construed to require any person (including any clergyperson or minister
of any religion) authorized to solemnize a marriage to solemnize any
marriage, and no such authorized person who fails or refuses for any
reason to solemnize a marriage shall be subject to any fine or other
penalty for such failure or refusal.”).
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peace have been told to “follow the law, whether you like it or not.”85
The Iowa Attorney General told county recorders to effect same-sex
marriages or face possible “legal actions”—like firing.86 Judges in Iowa
were told they have discretion to decide which marriages over which
to preside, but they better not use that discretion in a biased way,
notwithstanding sincerely held religious convictions.87
Religious liberty protections obviously redound to the benefit of
people who cannot, consistent with their religious beliefs, celebrate or
assist with certain marriages.88 Often overlooked is the fact that the
85.

Katie Zezima, Obey Same-Sex Marriage Law, Officials Told, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 26. 2004, at A15 (“Daniel B. Winslow, chief counsel for
Gov. Mitt Romney said . . . ‘If you hold true to your oath of office and
follow the law, whether you agree with it or not, you will fulfill your
duty as a justice of the peace.’ Mr. Winslow urged any justice with
qualms about officiating for same-sex couples to resign.”).

86.

Statement of the Iowa Attorney General Tom Miller, County Recorders
must Comply with Supreme Court’s Varnum Decision (Apr. 21, 2009),
available
at
http://www.state.ia.us/government/ag/latest_news/
releases/apr_2009/Marrige_Stmnt.html (“We expect duly-elected
county recorders to comply with the Iowa Constitution as interpreted
unanimously by the Iowa Supreme Court, the highest court in Iowa.
Our country lives by and thrives by the rule of law, and the rule of law
means we all follow the law as interpreted by our courts—not by
ourselves. We don’t each get to decide what the law is; that would lead
to chaos. We must live by and follow what the courts decide.”).

87.

See Kilian Melloy, Iowa Magistrate to Stop Performing Marriages,
EDGE BOSTON, Apr. 23, 2009, http://www.edgeboston.com/
index.php?ch=news&sc=&sc2=news&sc3=&id=90310 (quoting Bob
Brammer, a spokesperson for Iowa’s Attorney General’s office).
For an argument that protections for officials who can effectively block
a couple’s access to marriage should be qualified by hardship to samesex couples, see Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation, at 1480
(criticizing an “exemption for government employees or officials—
unqualified by hardship—[as possibly] erect[ing] a roadblock to
marriage”); Douglas Laycock, Afterword, in Emerging Conflicts, supra
note 30, at 200 (arguing that “[r]eligious dissenters can live their own
values, but not if they occupy choke points that empower them to
prevent same-sex couples from living their own values. If the dissenters
want complete moral autonomy on this issue, they must refrain from
occupying such a choke point”).

88.

For many scholars, it is not enough to just protect religious objectors—
the interests of same-sex couples must also be taken into account. A
group of scholars with which I work has argued for qualified exemptions
for individuals—that is, an exemption that allows individual religious
objectors to step away from facilitating any marriage but only when a
hardship will not result for those seeking a service. Religious
organizations would be permitted to decline to solemnize or celebrate or
facilitate a solemnization or celebration, or to recognize a marriage when
doing so would violate the organization’s religious tenets,
notwithstanding hardship to others. For the current text of the model
protection, see Letter from Thomas C. Berg et al., to Hawaii State
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same provisions benefit same-sex marriage advocates because they
take a powerful argument away from marriage opponents.89 Taken as
a whole, these protections extend well beyond the church sanctuary
and provide greater protection than what the Supreme Court has said
is constitutionally commanded.90 Even Maine, the only jurisdiction to
recognize same-sex marriage by popular ballot, included some
meaningful protections for dissenting religious organizations.91
Although the scope and contours of the protection granted by Maine

Senators (May 2, 2013), available at http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.
com/files/hawaii-special-session-letter-10-17-13.pdf (providing model
religious liberty protections). Under this proposal, the ability to object is
not limited to same-sex marriage, but extends to objections for reasons
of faith to any marriage—such as interfaith marriages or second
marriages. Id.
89.

See Robin Wilson, Op-Ed, Rhode Island marriage law should shield
religious liberty, The Providence J., Feb. 13, 2011, at A19. One
prominent gay rights leader, Jonathan Rauch, has pointed out, the
smart move is to “bend toward accommodation,” not away from it. See
Jonathan Rauch, The Majority Report, The Advocate (Nov. 19, 2010,
4:00
AM),
http://www.jonathanrauch.com/jrauch_articles/theemerging-gay-majority/ (arguing that gay marriage advocates adopt
“two important strategic changes . . . . First, accept legal exceptions
that let religious organizations discriminate against gays whenever their
doing so imposes a cost we can live with. Second, dial back the
accusations of ‘bigot’ and ‘hater’ . . . . Not every religious
accommodation is valid, and it’s not always clear where to draw all the
lines. But the smart approach is to bend toward accommodation, not
away from it, whenever we can live with the costs.”).

90.

See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (holding
that neutral and generally applicable laws do not violate the First
Amendment no matter how much they burden an individual’s or
organization’s exercise of religious liberty), superseded by statute,
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4) (2006), as
recognized in Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651 (2011). Whether the
Smith decision was correctly decided or represents an improper restraint
on free exercise remains a deeply contested question. See, e.g., David B.
Frohnmayer, Employment Division v. Smith: “The Sky That Didn’t
Fall”, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1655 (2011); Douglas Laycock, The Religious
Exemption Debate, 11 RUT. J. L . & RELIGION 139, n.44 (2009); Kent
Greenawalt, Fighting Words: Individuals, Communities, and
Liberties of Speech 138 (1995) (“The decision was statist and
majoritarian in a virulent form. It was inadequate whether one focuses
on individual liberty, church autonomy, or long-term benefit of the
polity.”). For a discussion of possible challenges to religious liberty
protections based on the Establishment Clause, see Robin Fretwell
Wilson, Insubstantial Burdens: The Case for Government Employee
Exemptions to Same-Sex Marriage Laws, 5 Nw. J. L. & Soc. Pol’y
318 (2010).

91.

See infra Table A3.
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and the Enacting Jurisdictions vary from state to state, all provide far
more insulation than the alternative—a judicial decision alone.92
Nothing prevents a legislature from following on the heels of a
judicial decision with legislation that is more protective of religious
objectors.93 But at the date of this Article’s writing, only Connecticut
and California have followed a judicial decision requiring recognition
of same-sex marriage with legislation giving religious liberty
protections.94 Connecticut expressly allows a religious organization95 to
refuse to “provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities,
goods, or privileges to an individual if the request for such . . . is
related to the . . . solemnization or celebration” of any marriage—for
example, by hosting the wedding reception—when doing so would
violate their religious tenets.96 Connecticut also shields covered groups
from private civil suits for refusing to solemnize or celebrate a
marriage.97 It further protects them from state action to penalize them
or withhold benefits for such refusals.98 Lastly, Connecticut expressly
allows a religiously affiliated adoption or foster care agency to place
children only with heterosexual married couples so long as they
receive no government funding for that program.99

92.

For additional detail, see infra Table A3.

93.

Connecticut passed legislation on the heels of a judicial decision
requiring same-sex marriage. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health,
957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Table A1.

94.

See S.B. 899, 145th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2009) (enacted);
S.B. 1140 (Cal. 2012) (amended as Section 400 of the Family Code); see
also Kreis &Wilson, supra note 21.

95.

See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b–35a (West Supp. 2013) (covering “a
religious organization, association or society, or any nonprofit institution
or organization operated, supervised or controlled by or in conjunction
with a religious organization, association or society”).

96.

Id.

97.

See id. (“Any refusal . . . shall not create any civil claim or cause of
action . . . .”).

98.

See id. (“Any refusal . . . shall not . . . result in any state action . . . .”).

99.

See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-35b (West Supp. 2013) (“Nothing . . .
shall be deemed or construed to affect the manner in which a religious
organization may provide adoption, foster care or social services if such
religious organization does not receive state or federal funds for that
specific program or purpose.”). For a discussion of an exodus from the
marketplace when an exemption for religiously affiliated social services
was not forthcoming see Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of
Accommodation: Contraception, Abortion, Same-sex Marriage, and Other
Clashes Between Religion, and the State, 53 B.C. L. Rev. 1417 (2012)
(chronicling the exodus of Catholic Charities after 103 years).
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California enacted stand-alone legislation after Proposition 8,100
giving clergy unneeded protection from a duty to solemnize any
marriage, if and when same-sex marriage became legal101—a protection
that was more symbolic than substantive since the right to refuse is
almost certainly secured to them by the First Amendment.102
California’s stand-alone law also assured religious denominations that
they could not lose their tax exemption if they refuse to solemnize any
marriage. Because the stand-alone bill protects the tax-exempt status
of religious denominations only when refusing to “solemnize” a
marriage, a decision surely secured to religious denominations
already,103 it is highly doubtful whether the stand-alone bill adds
anything to constitutional guarantees.
It should surprise no one that the Enacting Jurisdictions provide
more meaningful shelter to religious objectors than California’s standalone legislation—and certainly than judicial decisions alone.
Bargaining power is at its zenith when one party can provide
something the other wants.104 In the Enacting Jurisdictions, same-sex
marriage opponents demanded religious liberty concessions in
exchange for support of same-sex marriage.105
100. S.B. 1140 (Cal. 2012) (amended as Section 400 of the Family Code).
101. See Cal. Fam. Code § 400 (West Supp. 2013) (“Although marriage is a
personal relation arising out of a civil, and not a religious, contract, a
marriage may be solemnized by any of the following who is 18 years of
age or older: (a) A priest, minister, rabbi, or authorized person of any
religious denomination. A person authorized by this subdivision shall
not be required to solemnize a marriage that is contrary to the tenets of
his or her faith. Any refusal to solemnize a marriage under this
subdivision, either by an individual or by a religious denomination, shall
not affect the tax-exempt status of any entity.”).
102. Marc Stern, Same-Sex Marriage and the Churches, in Emerging
Conflicts, supra note 30; see also Corvino, supra note 26.
103. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 132 S.
Ct. 694, 706–07 (holding that the ministerial exception, grounded in the
First Amendment’s Religion Clauses, applies to an employee who works
in a church-affiliated entity (e.g., in a church school), based on an
overall assessment of the role of the employee, which in turn derives
partially from the church’s own understanding of that role, barring
recovery against the entity under the Americans with Disabilities Act).
104. See Sarah Eekhoff Zylstra, Evangelicals’ Favorite Same-Sex Marriage
Law? CHRISTIANITY TODAY (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.christianity
today.com/ct/2014/january-web-only/evangelicals-favorite-same-sexmarriage-law-oklahoma-utah.html (As Professor Laycock explains,
“Somebody has to credibly say, ‘Give us a real religious liberty provision
and we’ll withdraw our opposition.’”).
105. See supra Introduction and accompanying note 24 (interviewing Rick
Watrous); see also infra note 116 (interviewing Kach); Schuermann,
supra note 21. Clearly, some legislators vote for same-sex marriage
because they view it as the right thing to do. For example,
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And same-sex marriage advocates gained from the exchange, too.
Consider the legislative experience enacting same-sex marriage in
Maryland, charted in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Maryland Same-Sex Marriage Legislation

In 2008,106 and again in 2009,107 bills with illusory, clergy-only
exemptions failed.108 In 2011, the Maryland House of Delegates again
Representative Heidi Schuermann of the Vermont House of
Representatives explained: “I wanted to ensure that equality was there,
but at the same time, I wanted to make sure that the language in the
public accommodations act allowed [religious organizations] to keep
doing the things they’ve always done.” Id.
106. H.B. 351, 425th Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess., (Md. 2008); S.B. 290, 425th Leg.,
2008 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2008).
107. H.B. 1055, 426th Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess., (Md. 2009); S.B. 565, 426th
Leg., 2009 Reg. Sess., (Md. 2009).
108. Compare H.B. 351, 425th Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess., (Md. 2008) (“That this
Act may not be construed to require an official of a religious institution
or body authorized to solemnize marriages to solemnize any marriage in
violation of the right to free exercise of religion guaranteed by the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution and by the Maryland
Constitution and Maryland Declaration of Rights.”); and S.B. 290,
425th Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess., (Md. 2008) (“That an official of a religious
institution or body authorized to solemnize marriages may not be
required to solemnize any marriage in violation of the right to free
exercise of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United
State Constitution and by the Maryland Constitution and Maryland
Declaration of Rights.”) with H.B. 1055, 2008 Reg. Sess., 426th Leg.
(Md. 2009) (“That an official of a religious institution or body
authorized to solemnize marriages may not be required to solemnize any
marriage in violation of the right to free exercise of religion guaranteed
by the First Amendment of the United State Constitution and by the
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introduced a clergy-only bill and sent it across to the Senate, which
enlarged the protections and sent it back.109 Those new protections
ultimately proved insufficient to satisfy hold-out legislators, so the
bill died.110
In 2012, Governor Martin O’Malley added more protections to
the failed bill, this time shielding religious adoption agencies111 in “a
conscious attempt” to “pick up additional support in the House.”112
The Maryland House narrowly passed the Governor’s bill, with a
seventy-two to sixty-seven vote, and it cleared the Senate by an

Maryland Constitution and Maryland Declaration of Rights.”); S.B. 565,
2009 Reg. Sess., 426th Leg. (Md. 2009) (“That an official of a religious
institution or body authorized to solemnize marriages may not be
required to solemnize any marriage in violation of the right to free
exercise of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United
State Constitution and by the Maryland Constitution and Maryland
Declaration of Rights.”)
Bills with such “hollow” protections have failed everywhere they have
been tried. See Kreis & Wilson, supra note 21.
109. Compare the First Reading version of H.B. 175 and the First Reading
version of S.B. 116, 2011 Reg. Sess., 428th Leg. (Md. 2011),
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2011rs/bills/sb/sb0116f.pdf (restating constitutional protections for the clergy only) with the second iteration of
the bill at third reading: S.B. 116, 2011 Reg. Sess., 428th Leg. (Md.
2011) (providing protections for religious organizations and religiously
affiliated nonprofits from any requirement to facilitate marriages
through accommodations, religious programs, counseling, educational
courses, summer camps, and retreats). Senate Bill 116 was amended to
immunize these groups from civil claims and government penalties,
available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2011rs/bills/sb/sb0116t.pdf.
110. Kreis & Wilson, supra note 21, at n.90 (quoting Maryland Delegate Pam
Biedle, as saying that “[t]he Speaker took a whip count and we knew we
were a couple votes short”); see also Luke Broadwater, Md. Bishops Call
On Catholics to Oppose Same-Sex Marriage, Balt. Sun (Nov. 9, 2011),
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2011-11-09/news/bs-md-catholic-call20111109_1_religious-liberty-roman-catholic-bishops-religious-freedom
(discussing a letter from Maryland’s Roman Catholic bishops criticizing
the pending same-sex marriage bill for failure to include more expansive
religious liberty protections).
111. H.B. 438, S.B. 241, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012). The bill introduced
on February 1, 2012, broadened the 2011 protections to encompass
“promotion of marriage through any social or religious programs or
services, in violation of the entity’s religious beliefs, unless State or federal
funds are received for that specific program or service.” Id.
112. John Wagner & Aaron C. Davis, Governor Unveils Details of his
Legislative Agenda, Wash. Post, Jan. 24, 2012), at B5 (“Religiousexemption language included in O’Malley’s same-sex marriage bill is
intended to pick up additional support in the House of Delegates, where
a bill fell unexpectedly short last year after clearing the Senate.”).
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equally slim margin, twenty-five to twenty-two.113 The law survived a
referendum challenge, with 52.4% of Marylanders approving it.114
Additional protections made all of the difference to the 2012 bill’s
success. Maryland House of Delegates Speaker Michael Busch
said that:
We didn’t want to inhibit any religious organization from
practicing their beliefs. One of the issues was the adoption issue.
We wanted to make sure we didn’t impede on the Catholic
Church for adoption services. We had a clearer initiative in 2012
and I know for a fact that for two or three delegates [including
religious liberty protections] was an important component in
their decision to vote for it.115

Speaker Busch was not alone in believing that religious liberty
protections were critical to the bill’s passage. A last-minute vote in
support of same-sex marriage came from Republican Wade Kach, who
explained that “[w]ithout the religious liberty provisions, I would not
have voted for the bill.”116 Others in the legislature thought that
Delegate Kach would never vote for the bill.117 Delegate John
Olszewski, a “devoted Methodist [who] was worried about churches
that did not want to perform same-sex marriages,”118 delivered an
equally crucial vote. He said that his support solidified between 2011
and 2012 because of “the attention to the religious institution

113. See House Bill 438; Senate Bill 241, General Assembly of
Maryland (2012), http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/webmga/frmMain.aspx
?tab=subject3&ys=2012rs/billfile/hb0438.htm.
114. See 2012 Presidential General Election Results, Maryland.Gov
(Nov. 28, 2012, 8:56 AM), http://elections.state.md.us/elections/2012/
results/general/gen_detail_qresults_2012_4_0006S-.html.
115. Telephone Interview by Anthony Kreis with Michael Busch, Speaker of
the Md. House of Delegates (July 3, 2012).
116. Telephone Interview by Anthony Kreis with Wade Kach, Member of
Md. House of Delegates (Nov. 30, 2012).
117. Telephone Interview by Anthony Kreis with Luke Clippinger, Member
of Md. House of Delegates (Nov. 19, 2012) (describing Wade Kach as a
vote same-sex marriage advocates “never thought we would get”).
118. See Annie Linskey, Searching Souls on Gay Marriage; In the Face of
Formidable Pressure, Six Delegates Cast the Deciding Votes, Balt. Sun,
Feb. 19, 2012, at 1A. (noting that Del. Olszewski’s vote was needed to
push “the vote count past the 71 needed to pass the measure”).
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protections.”119 Had three votes gone the other way, a bill that passed
seventy-two to sixty-seven would have failed sixty-nine to seventy.120
Religious liberty provisions may have mattered to the
referendum’s success as well. The ballot text emphasized religious
liberty freedoms. While the extent to which Maryland voters
understood and accounted for the religious liberty protections in the
Civil Marriage Protection Act is unknown, supporters emphasized
them in the run up to the referendum.121 Governor O’Malley
emphasized that there are “strong religious freedom protections for
people of all faiths” in Maryland’s same-sex marriage legislation.122
In short, proponents succeeded when they expanded and honed
religious liberty protections. Of course, New York’s watershed law six
months before the 2012 session,123 the active involvement of Governor
O’Malley,124 and growing public support for same-sex marriage
certainly also factored in.125
119. Telephone Interview by Anthony Kreis with John Olszewski, Member of
the Md. House of Delegates (June 14, 2012).
120. See House Bill 438; Senate Bill 241, General Assembly of Maryland
(2012),
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/webmga/frmMain.aspx?tab=sub
ject3&ys=2012rs/billfile/hb0438.htm. See also Linskey, supra note 118.
121. See, e.g., Gene Robinson, Liberty and Justice for All in Maryland, On
Faith (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.faithstreet.com/onfaith/2012/10/
10/liberty-and-justice-for-all-in-maryland/10097 (endorsing Maryland’s
same-sex marriage legislation and stating “Maryland is one of many
states that has demonstrated the freedom to marry and the freedom to
worship are wholly compatible with one another”).
122. Gov. Martin O’Malley for Question 6, Youtube (Nov. 3, 2012, at 0:18),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Eo95lDAiBEU; see also Protecting
Religious Freedom and All Marylanders: Rev. Donté Hickman, Youtube
(Oct. 3, 2012, at 0:23), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-SYSVSQnTnA
(supporting the Maryland same-sex marriage law as “protecting religious
freedom and all Marylanders equally under the law”).
123. See, e.g., Busch, supra note 115 (“Once [same-sex marriage legislation]
passed in New York on a bipartisan basis that helped, too.”).
124. Maryland’s experience began with key legislators taking the lead on crafting
religious liberty protections. Later, Governor O’Malley, like Governor
Cuomo, guided the crafting of religious liberty protections and championed
the underlying legislation. See Annie Linskey, O’Malley introduces same-sex
marriage
bill,
Balt.
Sun
(Jan. 23, 2012), http://articles.
baltimoresun.com/2012-01-23/news/bs-md-same-sex-bill-20120123_1_
marriage-bill-religious-protections-marriage-debate (“O’Malley last year said
he would sign a same-sex marriage bill if it passed the General Assembly,
but he did not include such legislation in the administration’s package. This
year, he has said he will lead the fight for the bill.”).
125. See Amanda Terkel, Maryland Marriage Equality Poll Shows Increased
Support From African-American Voters, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 2,
2012, 11:05 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/02/ marylandmarriage-equality_n_1732555.html (noting the shifting popular opinions

1192

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 3·2014
Marriage of Necessity

Like Maryland, in all Enacting Jurisdictions with the exception of
two (Minnesota and Delaware), the successful legislation resulted
after unsuccessful attempts to enact same-sex marriage with purely
symbolic religious liberty protection limited only to the clergy.126 Only
after ponying up more robust, if imperfect, religious liberty
protections did advocates achieve their goal.
Maryland’s experience is typical of the progression of successful
legislation thus far. Religious liberty protections expand over the
course of legislative consideration. Only in Delaware did religious
liberty protections not improve over the course of legislative
consideration.127 In Judicial Decision States, however, there is no
opportunity for give-and-take over religious liberty protections—
absent a later codifying bill.
Some critics say that bargaining for religious liberty protections
has “gotten exactly nowhere”—lumping together tangible protections
for religious organizations with the almost nonexistent protections for
individuals.128 Now, it is abundantly clear that existing religious
liberty protections do not go far enough to protect individuals outside
religious organizations. Legislators have largely ignored the plight of
judges, government employees, and those in the wedding industry
who cannot assist with a same-sex marriage because of a “relationship
with Jesus Christ”129—or for any other sincerely held religious
reason.130 Individuals “find little asylum outside the walls of their

towards same-sex marriage and that “a growing majority of state voters
say[] they would . . . uphold a state law legalizing same-sex marriage. . . [in
addition to rising] support among African-Americans”); see also Nate Silver,
How Opinion on Same-Sex Marriage is Changing, and What it Means,
N.Y. Times (Mar. 26, 2013, 10:10 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.
blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/26/how-opinion-on-same-sex-marriage-ischanging-and-what-it-means/ (discussing the trend of public opinion on
same-sex marriage between 1996 and 2013). See generally infra Part II;
Table A5.
126. See Kreis & Wilson, Embracing Compromise, supra note 21.
127. Id.
128. See Franck, infra, note 37.
129. For example in Washington, a small florist, Arlene Flowers, which had
served a same-sex couple for a decade, now faces lawsuits from the state
attorney general and the couple for refusing to provide flowers for the
couple’s wedding because of the owner’s “relationship with Jesus Christ.”
Joel Connelly, AG Sues Florist Who Refused Flowers to Gay Wedding,
Seattle Post-Intelligencer (Apr. 9, 2013), http://blog.seattlepi.com/
seattlepolitics/2013/04/09/ag-sues-florist-who-refused-flowers-to-gaywedding/.
130. See Wilson, supra note 89 (discussing firings and other discipline of
government clerks who could easily be staffed around without undue burden
to employers or coworkers); see also Wilson, supra note 99 (describing
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churches,”131 facing the cruel choice: your livelihood or your
conscience.132 In effect, without protections, there is the real
possibility that members of a number of Christian, Jewish, and other
religious groups will effectively be debarred from certain professions
relating to weddings.133
Nonetheless, circumscribed as they are, religious liberty
protections in the Enacting Jurisdictions have netted out to the gain
of religious organizations. While critics legitimately fault state
lawmakers for not providing all of the religious liberty protections
that some urge,134 it simply is not true that the legislative process has
yielded nothing for religious objectors. As the remainder of this
Article documents, acting proactively to lock-in religious liberty
protections will pay dividends for all.

II. A (Closing) Political Window for Securing
Religious Liberty
In the past decade, support for same-sex marriage has escalated, a
phenomenon that will only continue. This Part, along with Part III,
demonstrates that increasing support, propelled by a constellation of
characteristics in the Enacting Jurisdictions, produced a favorable
environment for enacting same-sex marriage legislation.
Over the last five years, there has been a tremendous shift in
favor of support for same-sex marriage. Nate Silver, a statistician
whose modeling has accurately predicted the results of many same-sex

methods for staffing around religious objectors that are invisible to the
public, preserving the dignity interests of same-sex couples).
131. Dreher, supra note 40, at 12, 15.
132. Matthew J. Franck, Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Freedom,
Fundamentally At Odds, Witherspoon Institute (June 18th, 2013),
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2013/06/10393/ (“No state, on the
other hand, has credited or accommodated the religiously grounded
objections of other private actors—professionals or small business
owners—to being dragooned into offering their services on the wedding
day to same-sex couples. There are several well-known cases of bakers,
photographers—even a religious nonprofit property owner—facing grave
legal jeopardy for their refusal to offer their services or facilities in
contradiction of their felt obligations to witness to the truth about
marriage as it is taught by their faith.”).
133. See Laycock, supra note 87 (chronicling the historical barring of Catholics
from certain professions in England and Ireland, and Jews elsewhere).
Stated differently, without protections specific to marriage, there will be
no Evangelical photographers, Orthodox Jewish florists, and the like.
134. See supra note 88 (proposing model religious liberty protections specific
to marriage ceremonies or recognition).
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marriage ballot initiatives,135 analyzed results from 2008 exit polls in
three states.136 From that data, he distilled more than a dozen
characteristics that were influential to public support or opposition to
same-sex marriage; he extrapolates from those characteristics to
predict how other jurisdictions would have viewed same-sex marriage
if polled in 2008.137 Figure 4 shows Silver’s calculations for 2008.138

135. See Nate Silver, The Future of Same-Sex Marriage Ballot Measures, The
N.Y. Times (June 29, 2011, 10:35 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.
blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/29/the-future-of-same-sex-marriage-ballotmeasures/; Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, Keynote Speech at UC Davis
Law Review Symposium (Feb. 7, 2014), available at http://mediasite.
ucdavis.edu/Mediasite/Play/29ec228147e74da09625f244b3de28081d.
(Professor Chemerinsky named Nate Silver “if not the best, then the most
prominent pollster.”).
136. Silver, supra note 135 (analyzing “individual-level survey results from
exit polls in 2008 in the three states that voted on same-sex marriage
ballot initiatives that year (California, Florida, and Arizona). Each of
these states are quite demographically diverse, and among them more
than 5,000 voters were surveyed in the 2008 exit polls.”)
137. Id. (explaining his regression analysis: “[i]n essence, the technique is to
predict how likely an individual voter is to support same-sex marriage
given their particular demographic profile”).
138. A literature suggests that ballot exit polls after elections better predict
actual views of voters than telephone or other polls because of what is
known as the Bradley Effect. The term comes from an election contest for
Governor of California in 1982 between African-American mayor of Los
Angeles, Tom Bradley, and white opponent, George Deukmejian, in which
polls before the election showed measurably more support for Bradley.
“Analysts assume that one reason for the discrepancy between the polls
and the election result was that white supporters of Deukmejian were
reluctant to appear intolerant to survey researchers and thus falsely
reported being ‘undecided.’” Patrick Egan, Is There Really a “Bradley
Effect” for Same-Sex Marriage Initiatives? (Sept. 22, 2008) available at:
http://politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/4819/Egan_Bradley_Effect_in_SSM
_Initiatives.pdf. As to polling about same-sex marriage, Egan believes “a
careful analysis of polling data and election results indicates that if any
such ‘Bradley effect’ exists with regard to same-sex marriage initiatives, it
is small—and in 2006 it was effectively zero.” Id.; see also Patrick J.
Egan, Findings from a Decade of Polling on Ballot Measures Regarding
the Legal Status of Same-Sex Couples (June 15, 2010) available at
http://www.haasjr.org/sites/default/files/Marriage%20 Polling.pdf.
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Figure 4: Projected Support for Same-Sex Marriage in Ballot
Initiative (2008)

Figure 4 shows support in lighter shades and opposition in darker
ones. Support exceeded 50% in only nine states located in the
Northeast—not surprisingly, the incubator of same-sex marriage laws.
In the remaining states, support was below 50% and in twenty-one
states, below 39%.
Using the 2008 baseline, Silver projected support, state-by-state,
into the present (gauged by his projections for 2012) and out as far as
the year 2020.139 Figure 5 documents a drastic change in public
support between Silver’s estimates in 2008 and projections in 2012.

139. Id.
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Figure 5: Projected Support for Same-Sex Marriage Ballot
Initiative (2012)

By 2012, according to Silver’s projections, in twenty-one
jurisdictions, a majority of the population supported same-sex
marriage (those in the lighter shades). In three jurisdictions, Rhode
Island, D.C., and Massachusetts, support ranged as high as 63%. Only
seven states showed support below 39%, with a total of thirty states
having support below 50%.
Of course, Silver’s estimates of support for same-sex marriage in
2008 and 2012 may be too generous or even too stingy. Yet, Silver’s
projections mesh with other reported increases in support for same-sex
marriage. According to Gallup, public support has risen consistently
since 1996.140 In 1996, only twenty-seven percent of Americans
believed that marriages between same-sex couples should be legally
recognized, providing the same rights as traditional marriages.141 By
140. See Jeffrey M. Jones, Same-Sex Marriage Support Solidifies Above 50%
in U.S., GALLUP POLITICS (May 13, 2013), http://www.gallup.
com/poll/162398/sex-marriage-support-solidifies-above.aspx (telephone
interviewing those 18 and older living in all states and D.C. Gallop
weights samples to adjust for “unequal selection probability,
nonresponse, and double coverage of landline and cell users in the two
sampling frames. They are also weighted to match the national
demographics of gender, age, race, Hispanic ethnicity, education, region,
population density, and phone status”).
141. Id. (“27% in Gallup’s initial measurement on gay marriage, in 1996.”).
Gallop asked a random sample of 1,535 adults in a May 2–7, 2013, phone
interview the following: “Do you think marriages between same-sex
couples should or should not be recognized by the law as valid, with the
same rights as traditional marriages?” Fifty-three percent responded that
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2004, that slice grew to 42%, before falling to 37% the next year—a
wobble up and down that nonetheless continued in an upward trend
it “should be valid”; 45% responded that it “should not be valid”; and 3%
had “no opinion.” Jeffrey M. Jones, Same-Sex Marriage Support Solidifies
Above 50% in U.S.: Support Has Been 50% or Above in Three Separate
Readings in Last Year, Gallop Politics (May 13, 2013),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/162398/sex-marriage-supportsolidifiesabove.aspx.
Mere months later, pollsters at Quinnipaic University asked 1,776
American adults in a phone interview to land lines and cell phones in
September 2013, “Would you support or oppose a law in your state that
would allow same-sex couples to get married?” and reported that for all
adults, 56% would support it, 36% would oppose it, and 8% did not know.
Views of registered voters tracked these findings closely, splitting 57%,
36%, and 6%, respectively. U.S. Catholics Back Pope on Changing Church
Focus, Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds; Catholics Support Gay
Marriage, Women Priests 2–1, Quinnipiac University (October 4, 2013),
available at http://www.quinnipiac.edu/institutes-and-centers/pollinginstitute/national/release-detail?ReleaseID=1961. It should surprise no
one that results may differ since responses are sensitive to how a
particular question is framed and the questions that precede it. For a
survey finding significantly less support, see Pew Research Center, infra
note 157 (discussing longitudinal study of Americans by Rice University).
The well-known Bradley Effect may influence stated support. See Egan,
supra note 138.
Some also point out that Gallup’s question followed a question that asked
whether “gay or lesbian relations between consenting adults should or
should not be legal” and suggest that the order of questions may boost
stated support as a result of “priming.” Mark Regnerus, What Polls Really
Say About Gay Marriage, Chicago Sun-Times (Aug. 20, 2013),
http://www.suntimes.com/news/otherviews/22053066-452/what-pollsreally-say-about-gay-marriage.html (citing News That Matters, by political
psychologists Donald Kinder and Shanto Iyengar that “document[s] how
priming shapes respondents’ answers to subsequent questions, particularly
where sentiments about a previous question spill over”).
In its briefs about same-sex attitudes, Gallup presents “Trends for
Comparison” to illustrate responses when the same-sex marriage question
followed a sexual relations question and when it did not. Jeff Jones &
Lydia Saad, Gallop News Service: Gallup Poll Social Series: Values and
Beliefs Gallop Politics (May 2–7, 2013) http://www.gallup.com/file/poll/
162404/Gay_marriage_130513.pdf. There, a quick review of those
answers shows skewing, but in different directions at different times.
Thus, in an August 22–25, 2005, poll in which the same-sex marriage
question was preceded by the sexual relations question, 37% said same-sex
marriage “should be valid.” Id. at 2. A contemporaneous survey
conducted on April 29–May 1, 2005, asking only the marriage question
found that slightly more, 39%, said it should be valid. By contrast, in
2004, 42% responded that same-sex marriage “should be valid” in a
survey that first asked about the legality of sexual relations. In a
contemporaneous survey with only the marriage question, 33% said it
should be valid. Id. at 2 (reporting results of polls in May 2–4, 2004, and
March 5–7, 2004, respectively).
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for several years.142 By the end of 2010, a majority of those polled
believed that “marriages between same-sex couples should . . . be
recognize[d] by the law.” And that number reached 53% in 2011.
Gallop reported in May 2013 that support across the United States
remained at or above 50% in “three separate readings in the
last year.”143
It is worth pausing to note the explanatory power of these
statistics. Until 2012, same-sex marriage opponents had “won”
twenty-nine consecutive constitutional amendments fights—putting
aside Arizona’s 2006 failed constitutional amendment to ban same-sex
marriage and civil unions both.144 That streak ended abruptly in 2012
when opponents lost the referenda over Washington145 and Maryland’s
same-sex marriage laws,146 failed to secure a constitutional amendment
in Minnesota,147 and Maine voters enacted same-sex marriage at the
ballot box148—all of which occurred after the tide of national public
opinion had shifted in favor of same-sex marriage.
Silver projects that this uptick in support will only continue. As
Figure 6 shows, by 2016, more than half of all voters in a clear
majority of jurisdictions, thirty-two, are projected to support samesex marriage. Voters in only two states, Alabama and Mississippi,
show support below 39%, while in nineteen states support remains
below 50%. Silver projects that in thirteen states, more than 60% of
voters will support same-sex marriage.

142. Jones, supra note 140 (presenting results of Gallup polling across time).
Support grew to 46% by 2007 but fell again to 40% in years 2008 and
2009.
143. Id.
144. See Kreis & Wilson, supra note 21.
145. Voters sustained Washington’s law by a popular vote of 53% to 47% in
the November 2012 referendum. See Noah Michelson, Minnesota
Amendment 1 Same-Sex Marriage Ballot Measure Fails, HUFFINGTON
POST (Nov. 7, 2012, 7:41 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/11/07/minnesota-amendment-1-results-2012_n_2050310.html. See
generally Table A5 for support in the state at the time of legislation.
146. See supra notes 121–124 and accompanying text (describing Maryland’s
2012 referenda supporting same-sex marriage). See generally Table A5
for support in the state at the time of legislation.
147. See Michelson, supra note 145 (“Minnesota voters voted against an
amendment on Nov. 6 that would have defined marriage as being
between a man and woman in the state's constitution . . . .”).
148. 2012 General Election Results for Maine, BANGOR DAILY NEWS
(last
updated
Nov.
14,
2012),
http://web.archive.org/web/
20130118025105/http://maineelections.bangordailynews.com/
(47.4%
responded “no”) (accessed by searching for the original URL in the
Internet Archive index).
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Figure 6: Projected Support for Same-Sex Marriage in Ballot
Initiative (2016)

By 2020, represented in Figure 7, Silver projects overwhelming
support for same-sex marriage. At that point, only in Mississippi will
support for same-sex marriage remain below 39%. In all states but six
(South Carolina, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Alabama, and
Mississippi), a majority of voters are projected to support same-sex
marriage. In four of the latter (South Carolina, Arkansas, Georgia,
and Louisiana), support for same-sex marriage is projected to be
within two percentage points of a majority. In twenty-four
jurisdictions, over 60% of voters are projected to support same-sex
marriage.
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Figure 7: Projected Support for Same-Sex Marriage in Ballot
Initiative (2020)

In Silver’s view, “the steadiness” of this trend-line:
makes same-sex marriage virtually unique among all major
public policy issues, and which might give its supporters more
confidence that the numbers will continue to break their way.149

Given all this data, it would be surprising if advocates did not think
same-sex marriage was inevitable. In fact, 85% hold the belief that
“legal recognition of same-sex marriage is ‘inevitable.’”150
Fifty-nine percent of opponents also believe it is inevitable.151 Of
all people polled on the question, 72% in 2013 said “legal recognition
of same-sex marriage is ‘inevitable,’” up from 59% in 2004.152 In every
demographic group polled, except those aged 18-29, the fraction who
believed same-sex marriage to be inevitable increased from March of
149. Silver, supra note 125.
150. Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, In Gay
Marriage Debate, Both Supporters and Opponents See Legal
Recognition as “Inevitable” 1 (2013).
151. Id. Interestingly, the belief of inevitability extends to those most
opposed to same-sex marriage. Seventy percent of white evangelicals,
only 22% of whom favor same-sex marriage, believe same-sex marriage
recognition is inevitable. Id. at 3. While 31% of Republicans favor samesex marriage, 73% believe recognition is inevitable. Id. Finally, 39% and
45%, respectively, of blacks and those 50–64 favor same-sex marriage,
while 69% and 74%, respectively, believe it to be inevitable. Id.
152. Id. at 1.
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2004 to May of 2013.153 Even the most “tireless opponent” of same-sex
marriage, Maggie Gallagher, believes same-sex marriage is a “foregone
conclusion.”154
Of course, people could be misgauging opposition, causing a rush
to the judgment that “the game is over.” But at least Gallup polling
suggests otherwise. When people misjudge public support, they tend
to see “most Americans [as] com[ing] down on the side of not
legalizing it.”155 In other words, most people who misjudge support for
same-sex marriage estimate on the low side, not the high side, but
they nonetheless see same-sex marriage as inevitable.
The demographic profile of those opposed to same-sex marriage
can only make same-sex marriage more inevitable.156 Social scientists
153. Id. at 7.
154. Dreher, supra note 40, at 12.
155. See Jones, supra note 140 (emphasis in original).
156. It is always difficult to predict the future. One thorny question is whether,
notwithstanding the broader trend of increasing support for same-sex
marriage, individual attitudes will harden against same-sex marriage as
those individuals age (e.g., if they become more conservative with age) or
for other reasons. Far more probative of this possibility than national
polls over time are longitudinal surveys of the same respondents.
Researchers at Rice University have tracked responses to the statement,
“the only legal marriage should be between one man and one woman.”
Michael O. Emerson & Laura J. Essenburg, What Is Marriage?
Americans Dividing, Kinder Institute for Urban Research (June 24, 2013)
available at http://kinder.rice.edu/uploadedFiles/Kinder_Institute_for_
Urban_Research/Publications/White_Papers/Marriage%20Definition%20
White%20Paper.pdf. Interviewing the same 1,294 Americans in 2006 and
again in 2012, researchers found that “no significant overall change
between 2006 and 2012,” with a slight majority, 57% and 53%, opposed to
same-sex marriage in 2006 and 2012, respectively. Id. In those years, 31%
and 33%, respectively, supported same-sex marriage. Id. at 5, Fig. 1. This
rough constancy masked changes in individual attitudes.
Sixteen percent of those who originally opposed same-sex marriage (i.e.,
agreed with the statement) changed their view to supporting same-sex
marriage (i.e., disagreed) over the intervening years. Id. at 5–6, Fig. 2.
Twenty-eight percent of people who supported same-sex marriage in 2006
(i.e., “disagreed” with the statement) reported being against same-sex
marriage by 2012 (i.e., they “agreed”). Id. at 6. Nearly two-thirds of those
in the undecided category, “who in 2006 neither disagreed nor agreed with
the statement (13% of the sample), by 2012 . . . had taken a different
position: 42% disagreeing, and 23% agreeing.” Id. at 6. In all, among those
who people changed a fixed view, a greater fraction went from supporting
same-sex marriage to opposing it (i.e., from “disagreeing to agreeing”); for
those on the fence in 2006, a greater fraction embraced same-sex marriage
by 2012.
The division in opinion between 2006 and 2012 grew “along educational,
religious, and age lines,” suggesting a “growing cultural divide across the
nation.” Id. at 1.
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and polling groups alike have all documented a generational divide
over same-sex marriage.157 In general, younger people are more
supportive of same-sex marriage, and support reliably drops off
with age.
Pew, for example, found that in 2013, 66% of “Millenials,” those
born after 1981, who in 2013 were less than 33 years old, supported
same-sex marriage.158 Fifty-two percent of “Generation X,” those born
between 1965 and 1980, who in 2013 were between 33 and 49 years
old, support same-sex marriage.159 Only 41% of “Baby Boomers,”
those born between 1946 and 1964, who in 2013 were between 49 and
67 years old, support same-sex marriage.160 Only slightly more than a
third, 35% of the “Silent Generation,” those born between 1928 and
1945 who in 2013 were 68 to 85 years old, favor same-sex marriage.161
In every age bracket, stated support in 2013 represented the record
high since polling began in 2001. The gap between generations is a
persistent one. For example, in no year since 2013 was the gap
between the Millennials and Generation X less than 4%. This support

Importantly, the law of the jurisdiction in which the respondent lived
seemed not to have influenced the findings. Researchers “examined the
opinions of Americans depending on whether they live in a state that
defines marriage as one man and one woman (29 states [at the time of the
study]) or not (21 states [at the time of the study]),” expecting to see a
red–blue divide. Id. at 7.
Instead they found that “[r]egardless of what type of state people live in,
in 2012, 54% agreed with the marriage statement, about a third disagreed,
and the remainder was uncertain.” They concluded that “how marriage is
legally defined across the states has little to do with actual public opinion,
and more to do with higher-level political debates and special interest
groups.” Id.
Even though individuals who once supported same-sex marriage may
harden against it, it seems unlikely that this hardening will reverse the
broader trend of greater support. Younger people are not going to
uniformly change their opinions to oppose same-sex marriage, even if some
younger adults do as they age. See infra notes 156–65 and accompanying
text (discussing persistent divide according to age on stated support for
same-sex marriage).
157. See Pew Research Center, Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage, Pew
Research: Religion & Public Life Project (June 2013),
http://features.pewforum.org/same-sex-marriage-attitudes/slide2.php
(“Younger generations express higher levels of support for same-sex
marriage.”).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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among the younger generations extends even to young evangelicals,162
a group in which support for same-sex marriage is typically lower
than average.163
Opponents of same-sex marriage could afford to ignore the
phenomenon of a generational divide if it was localized to a fraction of
states. However, the phenomenon is universal across all fifty states, as
Figure 8 illustrates. Taking actual polling numbers from 1994 through
2008, which they then weighted, Professors Jeffrey Lax and Justin
Phillips broke down support for same-sex marriage by state and age
group for 2009.164 In no state did younger voters show less support
than older ones.

162. Neil King Jr., Evangelical Leader Preaches a Pullback From Politics,
Culture Wars, Wall St. J., Oct. 22 2013, at A1. The Wall Street
Journal reported in 2013 that 51% of young evangelicals, those aged
18 to 34 years, either “strongly favored” or “favored” same-sex
marriage. By contrast, only 15% of evangelicals who were 65 years and
older either “strongly favored” or “favored” same-sex marriage. Id.
The reporting about these findings has been controversial. See Napp
Nazworth, Russell Moore Clarifies Misleading WSJ Article, Praises
Predecessor’s ‘Prophetic Voice,’ Christian Post Reporter (Oct.
24, 2013), http://www.christianpost.com/news/russell-moore-clarifiesmisleading-wsj-article-praises-predecessors-prophetic-voice-107387/.
163. See Pew Research Center, supra note 157 (“Support among white
evangelical and black Protestants remains lower than other groups.”).
164. Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, Gay Rights in the States: Public
Opinion and Policy Responsiveness, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 367, Fig.8
(online appendix only) (2009), available at http://www.columbia.edu/~jr
l2124/Lax_Phillips_Gay_Policy_Responsiveness_2009.pdf.
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Figure 8: Explicit Support for Same-Sex Marriage by State and
Age. Data from 1994 to 2008; estimates weighted for 2008.165

And matters are only going to get worse for opponents. To show
the effects of the strongest objectors passing from the scene, Figure 9
replicates Lax and Phillips’ data.166 In it, each age group is weighted
by their relative fraction in a given state’s population, using 2010
Census data where possible.167 The calculated averages in Figure 9
closely track Lax and Phillips’ figure.
165. Id. Reprinted with permission.
166. Id. While Figure 9 is an approximation because it begins with data in
Lax and Phillips’ published figure as opposed to their data set, it
illustrates the effect of the oldest generation passing away.
167. Lax and Phillips broke out state populations into four groups: 18–29,
30–44, 45–64 and 65+. Id. at 384. Figures 9 and 10, and the calculations
used to generate them contained in Table A7, use Census data for age
groups 45–64, and 65 and older. See generally U.S. Census Bureau,
2010 Census Briefs Age and Sex Composition: 2010 (2011),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-03.pdf.
Because the Census breaks down the group that is 18–44 years into
those who are 18–24 years and 25–44 years, it was not possible to use
Census numbers to generate the relative fraction of these groups to the
voting age population. Consequently, Figures 9 and 10 and Table A7
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Figure 9: Support for Same-Sex Marriage by State and Age,
including individuals 65 years and older

Figure 10 then eliminates the oldest generation, the effect of
which is that the weighted average support in every state shifts to the
right, showing greater average support. In 2009, without the oldest
generation, an additional eight states cross the threshold to a majority
of the population supporting same-sex marriage, bringing the total to
fifteen states in which a majority would have supported same-sex
marriage. An additional six states would be closing in on majority
use Lax and Phillips’ fractional breakdown by state for the groups 18–29
and 30–44.
See Lax & Phillips, supra note 164. Thus, in Alabama, the 2010 Census
reported that 26.8% were between 45 and 64, and 13.8% were over the
age of 65. See U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Census Briefs Age and
Sex Composition: 2010 7 (2011), available at http://www.
census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-03.pdf; Table A7, 3rd set of
columns.
Lax and Phillips reported that 18.5% of the Alabama population was
between 18 and 29, while 19.2% were 30–44. To generate weighted
averages, we calculated what percent each group represented to the
voting age population. In other words, the denominator did not include
those under the age of eighteen.
Table A7 presents the relative weights of each age group used to
produce Figures 9 and 10, as well as the state by state population
broken down by age group drawn from the 2010 Census and Lax and
Phillips’ data. See Table A7.
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support, with support above 45%. While Figure 10 can only provide a
coarse approximation,168 it illustrates that public support will likely
balloon with time.

Figure 10: Support for Same-Sex Marriage by State and Age,
without individuals 65 years and older

Other factors contribute to increased support, as well:
As a rule of thumb, perhaps about half of the increase in
support for same-sex marriage is attributable to generational
turnover, while the other half is because of the net change in
opinion among Americans who have remained in the
electorate.169

Changing attitudes toward same-sex marriage and homosexuality
among the electorate explains some of the softening of opposition.
More Americans have gay family members, or now know that they
do, and more have familiarity with lesbians and gays.170 Many more
168. See Table A7 for data used to arrive at the weighted average without
individuals who are 65 and older. To really capture how quickly the
window is closing, one would have to age in new voters who turn eighteen,
who presumably, like their counterparts under twenty-nine, will voice strong
support for same-sex marriage.
169. See Silver, supra note 125.
170. See generally Pew Research Center for the People & the Press,
supra note 150. By 2013, 87% of Americans “kn[e]w someone who is gay
or lesbian”—up from 61% twenty years before. Id. at 1. Twenty-three
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now do not share the view that same-sex marriage “will be bad for
marriage, bad for children, and very bad indeed for those people of
faith who want to maintain their faith’s teaching on marriage, in their
religious institutions and in their work.”171
In the face of these trends, some opponents urge that religious
liberty protections provided cover for cowardly legislators who
otherwise would have not voted to allow marriage equality.
Specifically, they say exemptions “allow[ ] a legislature to do the
wrong thing, which is pass same-sex marriage.”172 Certainly, the close
vote counts shown in Table 1 lend credence to the view that religious
liberty protections mattered to the outcome in some states.

percent of people know “a lot” of gay and lesbian people while 44%
know some. Id. Forty-nine percent have “a close family member or” a
close friend who “is gay or lesbian.” Id. Additionally, 31% know a samesex couple raising children. Id. Pew Research Center explains that “even
holding demographic factors constant, those who have many gay
acquaintances, or close gay friends and family members, are more likely
to favor same-sex marriage than those who do not.” Id. at 16.
171. See Franck, supra note 37. A shrinking fraction of people express
negative views about same-sex couples raising children. Pew Research
Center for the People & the Press, supra note 150, at 11. Even a
few years has made a difference. Id. When asked if it is a good, bad, or
does not matter for “American society” to have same-sex couples raising
children, in April 2013, 21% said it is good, 35% bad and 41% said not
much difference in. Id. In March 2011, 14% said good, 35% bad, and
48% said it does not make a difference. Id. In February 2007, only 11%
said that it was good, while 50% said it was bad and 34% said it did not
make much difference. Id.
172. Matthew Brown, Why America’s Long History of Protecting Religion Is at
the Center of Gay Marriage Debate, Deseret News Nat’l,
Nov. 14, 2013, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865590501/WhyAmericas-long-history-of-protecting-religion-is-at-the-center-of-the-gaymarriage-debate.html?pg=all (quoting Matt Franck as saying exemptions
“‘allow[ ] a legislature to do the wrong thing, which is pass same-sex
marriage, which is bad for marriage, bad for kids and bad for religious
freedom no matter what concessions you think you are making’”).
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Table 1: Enacting Jurisdictions Vote Counts and Support for
Same-Sex Marriage
ENACTING
JURISDICTION
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Hawaii
Illinois
Maryland
Minnesota
New Hampshire
New York
Rhode Island
Vermont
Vermont Veto
Washington

Vote Count House
%
For Against
For
100
44
69%
23
18
56%
11
2
85%
30
19
61%
61
54
53%
72
67
52%
75
59
56%
198
176
53%
80
63
56%
56
15
79%
95
52
65%
100
49
67%
55
43
56%

Vote Count Senate
%
For Against
For
28
7
80%
12
9
57%
(DC is unicameral)
19
4
83%
34
21
62%
25
22
53%
37
30
55%
14
10
58%
33
29
53%
26
12
68%
26
4
87%
23
5
82%
28
21
57%

Support at
Time of
Enactment
52%
54%
57%
55%
50%
52%
46%
55%
55%
56%
54%
—
53%

As noted above, many commentators and legislators believe that
protections did, in fact, matter to the legislation’s ultimate success.173
At least one legislator, Vermont House Leader Lucy Leriche, candidly
says she and others would have supported a law without exemptions
if it was feasible, but it was not:
We couldn’t have [passed same-sex marriage legislation] without
the religious liberty exemptions. If we could have, we would
have, honestly. But we would not have been able to get enough
votes without them.174

A more salient question is whether any enacted law would have
passed within a year or two, with or without protections. In every
Enacting Jurisdiction (except Minnesota), a majority of the populace
supported same-sex marriage at the time of enactment.175 Even in the
states where the vote counts were closest (Illinois, Maryland, New
Hampshire, and New York), a majority, albeit slight, of the state’s
population supported same-sex marriage. Given growing public
173. See supra notes 23–31 and accompanying text.
174. Telephone Interview by Anthony Kreis with Lucy Leriche, Vt. House of
Representatives Assistant Majority Leader (June 26, 2012). Not every
legislator attaches the same weight to the religious liberty protections. A
primary sponsor of Vermont’s same-sex marriage bill, Senator Claire
Ayer, minimized them as “putting a little oil in the water.” Telephone
Interview by Anthony Kreis with Claire Ayer, Vt. State Senator (May
28, 2009); see Kreis & Wilson, supra note 21.
175. See infra Tables A4 and A5.
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support across the country, it is likely that same-sex marriage would
have passed eventually in some form—but it would have required
delaying marriage for couples clamoring to marry. Making enactment
of same-sex marriage in those jurisdictions all the more inevitable, the
same-sex marriage movement has followed a tried and true pattern, as
Part III shows.

III. A Cluster of Political Factors Supported
Marriage Equality
Social scientists identify a short list of demographic factors that
influence support for same-sex marriage. While other factors matter
to public support,176 experts note that:
1) Democrats tend to support same-sex marriage in huge
numbers,177
2) Religious affiliation, or lack of it, matters to same-sex
marriage support178—as does weekly or rare church
attendance,179
3) Those with greater formal education tend to favor same-sex
marriage.180

Taking a deeper look at the Enacting Jurisdictions, it is no surprise
that they share this cluster of characteristics.181 As Figure 11 shows,
176. See Silver, supra note 125. Silver posits that a number of other factors
also influence support for same-sex marriage (“There are clearly a
number of other factors that also affect opinion on same-sex marriage,
however, most notably age, race, urbanity, and education levels.”).
177. See Pew Research Center, supra note 157.
178. See id.
179. Lydia Saad, In U.S., 52% Back Law to Legalize Gay Marriage in 50
POLITICS
(Jul.
29,
2013),
http://www.
States,
GALLUP
gallup.com/poll/163730/back-law-legalize-gay-marriage-states.aspx. In a
longitudinal study of the same 1,294 Americans in 2006 and 2012, Rice
University researchers identified three characteristics as strongly
influencing attitudes on same-sex marriage recognition—“most especially
education, religion, and age.” Emerson & Essenburg, supra note 156.
180. Id.; see also Silver, supra note 125.
181. Obviously, some characteristics may influence (a) public support for
same-sex marriage and (b) any specific political characteristic, like
Democratic control of the legislature. For example, urbanity of a state
may yield both Democratic control and high support. This Article is
intended to give a descriptive account of a handful of state-level
characteristics that might have influenced the legislative process. Clearly
a more sophisticated analysis would control for multiple variables
through regression to tease out, with greater specificity, what factors
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in every Enacting Jurisdiction (except New York182), Democrats
controlled both houses of the legislature. In the sole exception, the
New York Senate, a handful of holdout Republican Senators
demanded, and received, religious liberty protections that exceeded
those meager protections proffered by New York Governor Andrew
Cuomo.183

Figure 11: Legislative Control at Time of Successful Same-Sex
Marriage Legislation

As illustrated in Figure 12, every Enacting Jurisdiction had a
Democratic Governor, with the exception of Connecticut and
Vermont.184 Connecticut’s Republican Governor had no choice but to
sign the legislation given the Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision in

matter most. With so few states having enacted same-sex marriage, a
statistical analysis of this kind may not be feasible. This Article only
seeks to take characteristics identified by others as influential and use
them to assess the political terrain going forward.
182. See infra Table A4 (showing that New York’s Senate was controlled by
the Republican Party). See generally Table A4 for underlying data.
183. See Kreis & Wilson, supra note 21 (showing progression of legislation in
New York); see also Christopher W. Dickson, Inseverability, Religious
Exemptions, and New York’s Same-Sex Marriage Law, 98 CORNELL L.
REV. 181, 183 (2012) (reporting that legislators agonized over religious
liberty protections).
184. See generally Table A4 for underlying data.
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Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health.185 The Vermont
Legislature overrode the Republican Governor’s veto by a vote of
twenty-three to five in the Senate and one hundred to forty-nine in
the House.186

Figure 12: Governor Party at the Time of Same-Sex Marriage
Legislation

With scattered exceptions, the Enacting Jurisdictions all had
populations that rank among the least religious but most educated.187
To measure “religiosity,” Gallup conducts telephone interviews with
individuals eighteen years and older living in all states and D.C. and
asks whether “religion is an important part of their daily life and
[whether] they attend religious services every week or almost every
week,” and based on that response, reports the percentage of the
population that is “very religious.”188 To assess the influence of
religiosity, Table A4 presents Gallop’s measure of “religiosity” by
state. Rank-ordering the states from most religious to least allows one
to then break those states into thirds. Every Enacting Jurisdiction
185. 957 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn. 2008) (striking down a law limiting marriage
to heterosexual couples based on the Connecticut Constitution’s equal
protection clause).
186. See Vt. State Legislature, Current Status of a Specific Bill
or Resolution: 2009-2010 Legislative Session (2010), available at
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/database/status/summary.cfm?Bill=S.0115&
Session=2010.
187. See generally Table A4 for underlying data.
188. Frank Newport, Mississippi Maintains Hold as Most Religious U.S.
State, Gallup Politics (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/
160415/mississippi-maintains-hold-religious-state.aspx#1.
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ranks among the lowest third in religiosity in the country—except
four (Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, and Minnesota), which occupy the
lower portion of the middle third, as Figure 13 shows.189

Figure 13: Ranking of Enacting Jurisdictions by Religiosity

Figure 14 is based on educational attainment data derived from
Census Bureau reports on the percentage of the population with a
bachelor’s or advanced degree.190 Rank ordering states from the
highest to the lowest, in thirds, reveals that in the Enacting
Jurisdictions, every state falls in the top one-third for educational
attainment, except Hawaii. Hawaii appears near the top of the middle
rung.

189. One might predict that statutory, if not constitutional, protections for
religious freedom might roughly track self-identified religiosity among
the states populace. Here it is interesting to note that among the
Enacting Jurisdictions, three had enacted state RFRAs, modeled on the
federal RFRA. See supra note 76 (listing Connecticut, Illinois and
Rhode Island as the three Enacting Jurisdictions with state RFRAs).
So, despite, the fact that Enacting Jurisdictions are generally ranked
low for religiosity, three of them have enacted protections for religion.
190. See generally Table A4 for underlying data; Educational Attainment,
US Census Bureau (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/
socdemo/education/.
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Figure 14: Ranking of Enacting Jurisdictions by Educational
Attainment

The short list of demographic factors posited to influence support
for same-sex marriage likely created a favorable environment for
same-sex marriage recognition. But existing legal constructs surely
favored enactment of marriage equality, too. Some legislators see
same-sex marriage legislation as “a reasonable extension”191 of the
non-discrimination laws that open access for lesbian, gay, bisexual,
and transgender (LGBT) persons to housing, hiring, and public
accommodations.192 Those same laws provide not just a platform for
191. Religious Liberty Implications of D.C.’s Same-Sex Marriage Bill:
Hearing on Bill 18-482 Before the D.C. Council, 19th Sess. (Nov. 2,
2009) (statement of Councilmember Graham at 7:11:18) (on file with
author) (“I assume that this is a reasonable extension of the Human
Rights Act of the District of Columbia . . . .”).
192. To be clear, it is shameful for a state not to give a basic promise of
nondiscrimination in employment, housing, and public accommodations to
LGBT people. Many of these laws specifically insulate religious groups from
predictable violations of their religious beliefs, like opening married student
housing to unmarried couples. See, e.g., N.Y. Exec. Law § 290, 292(9)
(McKinney 2010) (barring discrimination based on sexual orientation in
employment, education, housing, and public accommodations); see also
N.Y.C, N.Y., Admin. Code § 8-107(12) (2010) (expressly not barring “any
religious or denominational institution or organization or any organization
operated for charitable or educational purposes, which is operated,
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same-sex marriage, but a powerful rhetorical argument against
religious liberty protections, which some charge will chip away at
those protections. Jenny Pizer, senior counsel for Lambda Legal,
succinctly captures this contention:
In some states, the price of equality in marriage has been
agreeing to give up protections against discrimination as part of
the negotiations . . . . In ways, I think, other politically
vulnerable groups are not required to pay that price.193

These arguments have resonated with some legislators who say that if
same-sex marriage legislation is about “equality, marriage equality”
then “the extent to which we keep carving away at its vitality, that’s
very problematic.”194 (Properly understood, religious liberty
protections should not be seen as a rollback of prior protections.)195
supervised or controlled by or in connection with a religious organization
from . . . sales or rental of housing accommodations . . . to persons of the
same religion or denomination or from making such selection as is calculated
by such organization to promote the religious principles for which it is
established or maintained”).
193. Zoll, supra note 55, at 2.
Importantly, religious liberty protections appear in hundreds of U.S. and
state laws including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of
Singling Out Religion, 50 DePaul L. Rev. 1 (2010) (listing hundreds of
laws with accommodations for religious believers). The state’s choice to
accommodate religious dissenters is not a denial of equality by the state. See
Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987) (noting
that the Court “has never indicated that statutes that give special
consideration to religious groups are per se invalid. That would run contrary
to the teaching of our cases that there is ample room for accommodation of
religion under the Establishment Clause”). Some have argued that the best
doctrinal ground for recognizing same-sex marriage is equal treatment in a
fundamental right, rather than pure equality. See Nelson Tebbe & Deborah
A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1375
(2010), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1594361.
194. See supra note 191 (statement of Councilmember Graham).
195. Religious liberty protections in same-sex marriage laws do not roll back
antidiscrimination laws, which “largely address commercial services, like
hailing taxis, ordering burgers, and leasing apartments, for which it is
hard to imagine that a refusal to serve another individual can reflect
anything other than animus toward that individual.” Wilson, Calculus,
supra note 99, at 1476. Unlike those commercial services, facilitating
another’s marriage is a religiously freighted and deeply personal matter,
where a denial can reflect something other than animus towards another
individual. Because many nondiscrimination laws were passed decades
before same-sex marriage was permitted anywhere in the world, those
laws could not have foreseen application to such a deeply religious service
like facilitating another’s marriage. See, e.g., Title II of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act (prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations on
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Not surprisingly, every Enacting Jurisdiction prohibited sexual
orientation discrimination in housing, employment and public
accommodations well before recognizing same-sex marriage, as Figure
15 shows.196 Some Enacting Jurisdictions also separately prohibited
gender identity discrimination.197
specified bases, like race). Moreover, the extension by the Enacting
Jurisdictions of such general nondiscrimination laws to sexual orientation
discrimination occurred in some cases decades before the enactment of
same-sex marriage by legislation. See Table A2.
196. For Connecticut, compare Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-20a (Apr. 23, 2009)
with Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46a-60 (West 2009); Conn. Gen.
Stat. Ann. § 46a-64c (West 2009); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-64 (West
2009); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46a-66 (West 2009); Conn. Gen.
Stat. Ann. § 46a-75 (West 2009) (prohibiting sexual orientation
discrimination in housing, private and public employment, public
accommodation, credit, and education); for Delaware, compare H.B. 75,
147th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2013) (July 1, 2013) with Del. Code Ann.
tit. 19, § 711 (West 2013); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 4603 (West 2013);
Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 4504 (West 2013) (prohibiting sexual
orientation discrimination in housing, public and private employment,
and public accommodation); for the District of Columbia, compare D.C.
Code § 46-401 (LexisNexis 2012) (March 3, 2010) with D.C. Code § 21402.11 (LexisNexis 2012); D.C. Code § 32-408 (LexisNexis 2012);
D.C. Code § 2-1402.21 (LexisNexis 2012); D.C. Code § 2-1402.41
(LexisNexis 2012) (prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in
private and public employment, housing, and education); for Hawaii,
compare S.B. 1, 27th Leg. 2d Spec. Sess. (Haw. 2013) (Dec. 2, 2013)
with Haw. Rev. Stat. § 515-3 (West Supp. 2012); Haw. Rev. Stat.
§ 489-3 (West Supp 2012) (prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination
in housing and public accommodation); for Illinois, compare S.B. 0010,
98th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2013) (June 1, 2014) with 775 Ill. Comp.
Stat. Ann. 5/1-102(A) (West 2011) (prohibiting sexual orientation
discrimination in housing, private and public employment, public
accommodation, credit, and education); for Maryland, compare Md.
Code Ann., Fam. Law § 2-201 (Jan. 1, 2013) with Md. Code Ann.,
State Gov’t § 20-606 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013; Md. Code Ann.,
State Gov’t § 20-705 (LexisNexis 2009); Md. Code Ann., State
Gov’t § 20-304 (LexisNexis 2009); Md. Code Ann., Educ. § 7-424
(LexisNexis 2008) (prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in
housing, private and public employment, public accommodation, and
education); for Minnesota, compare H.F. 1054, 88th Sess. (Minn. 2013)
(Aug. 1, 2013) with Minn. Stat. Ann. § 363A.08, subd. 2 (West
2012), Minn. Stat. Ann. § 363A.09 (West 2012), Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 363A.11, subd. 1 (West 2012), Minn. Stat. Ann. § 363A.16 (West
2012), subd. 1, Minn. Stat. Ann. § 363A.13 (West 2012) (prohibiting
sexual orientation discrimination in housing, private and public
employment, public accommodation, credit, and education); for New
Hampshire, compare N.H. Rev. Stat. § 457:1-A (Jan. 1, 2010) with
N.H. Rev. Stat. § 354-A:6 (2009), N.H. Rev. Stat. § 354-A:8
(2009), N.H. Rev. Stat. § 354-A:10 (2009), N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 354-A:16 (2009); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 354-A:17 (2009)
(prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in housing, private and
public employment, and public accommodation); for New York,
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compare N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-a (McKinney Supp. 2014) (enacted
July 24, 2011) with N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 (McKinney 2013); N.Y.
Exec. Law § 296-a (McKinney 2013) (prohibiting sexual orientation
discrimination in housing, private and public employment, public
accommodation, credit, and education); for Rhode Island, compare H.B.
5015B, 2013 Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2013) (codified at R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-1-1
(2013)) with R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-7 (2003); R.I. Gen. Laws § 3437-4 (2011); R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-24-2 (2002); R.I. Gen. Laws
§ 28-5.1-8 (Supp. 2013) (prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination
in housing, private and public employment, public accommodation, and
education); for Vermont, compare Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 8 (Sept. 1,
2009) with Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 495(a), Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9,
§ 4503 (Supp. 2013); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 4502(a) (Supp. 2013) ;
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8, § 10403 (Supp. 2013); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 16,
§ 11 (Supp. 2013); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 16, § 565 (Supp. 2011)
(prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in housing, private and
public employment, public accommodation, credit, and education); for
Washington, compare Wash. Rev. Code § 26.04.010(1) (LexisNexis
2013) (enacted Dec. 6, 2012) with Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.180
(2012); Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.222 (2012); Wash. Rev. Code
§ 49.60.215 (2012); Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.175 (2012); Wash.
Rev. Code § 49.60.040(2) (2012) (prohibiting sexual orientation
discrimination in housing, private and public employment, public
accommodation, credit, and education). See also States with Protections
for Being Gay, N.Y. Times (May 31, 2013) available at
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/05/31/business/States-WithProtections-for-Being-Gay.html?ref=your-money.; Colo. Rev. Stat.
Ann. §§ 24-34-401-402 (2013); Iowa Code Ann. § 216.6 (West 2009);
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 4553 (2013); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.
ch. 151B, § 4 (West 2013); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 281.370 (West 2013);
N.J. Stat. Ann. 10:1-1–10:1-3 (West 2013); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 28-1-2
(2012); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 28-1-7 (2012); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 28-1-9
(2012); Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030 (2013); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 111.31(2) (West Supp. 2013). See Table A2 for a calculation of how
long the earliest nondiscrimination ban in statewide law preceded samesex marriage in each Enacting Jurisdiction.
197. See generally Inst. of Real Estate Mgmt., Laws Prohibiting
Discrimination Based On Sexual Orientation And Gender
Identity, ( 2013).
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Figure 15: Sexual Orientation Protection at Time of Same-Sex
Marriage Legislation

Leveraging a “perfect storm” of demographic variables, public
support, and preexisting legal constructs, supporters succeeded in
securing same-sex marriage in the Enacting Jurisdictions with modest
religious liberty protections. Absent those protections, same-sex
marriage surely would have been forthcoming, with or without
protections, in a few short years.

IV. The Political Terrain Going Forward
So what does a die-hard opponent of same-sex marriage do in the
face of these trends? What do the trends mean for those who are
pursing marriage equality? Putting aside game-changing judicial
decisions,198 Professor Laycock rightly concludes that opponents, who
are “losing this fight . . . need to get some more liberty protections
while they have a chance. Once a law is passed, it’s too late.”199 But,
same-sex marriage advocates should continue to bargain as well
because the movement has nearly exhausted states with high support

198. See supra note 63 (discussing New Jersey’s judicial decision).
199. Zylstra, supra note 104.
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for same-sex marriage and favorable political terrain,200 and it remains
uncertain when and if the U.S. Supreme Court will take a marriage
equality case.201
But unlike the Enacting Jurisdictions, in the thirty-one
Nonrecognizing States,202 the characteristics favoring marriage
equality fragment. In more difficult political terrain, especially states
in which legislators are accountable to more “very religious” people,
one might reasonably expect that legislators will tip the balance
between marriage equality and religious liberty in favor of religious
objectors.
Here, the “perfect storm” works against an easier victory for
same-sex marriage advocates, placing a premium on bargaining. As
Figure 16 demonstrates, in the thirty-one Nonrecognizing States,
Democrats control only three legislatures. Republicans control the
legislature in twenty-five states and split control in three others.203

200. Religious liberty advocates in the near term can deliver precious votes
for same-sex marriage. Marriage equality proponents benefit from samesex marriage with religious liberty protections when the alternative is no
marriage, at least for now.
201. See supra note 58 (discussing the importance of meaningful circuit
splits).
202. The discussion of political climate in Part III backs out Utah and
Oklahoma since lower federal court decisions striking the constitutional
bans on same-sex marriage in those states occurred before the date cutoff for the snapshot of state marriage laws on January 14, 2014, even
though the decisions were stayed. See supra notes 4–5. New Jersey and
New Mexico also recognized same-sex marriage by a dispositive judicial
decision before January 14, 2014, and so are also not considered in Part
III. See supra note 8.
203. See Table A4. Compare Figure 16 with Figure 11.
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Figure 16: Legislative Control of States That Do Not Permit
Same-Sex Marriage (2013)

Figure 17 shows that in the Nonrecognizing States only seven
governors as of October 22, 2013, are members of the Democratic
Party. Republicans occupy the governor’s mansion in remaining
twenty-four states.204

204. See Table A4. Compare Figure 17 with Figure 12. See infra note 232 for
a discussion of changes in control of the governor’s office since the
Symposium date.
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Figure 17: Party of Governor in States That Do Not Permit
Same-Sex Marriage (2013)

In addition to being largely Republican-controlled, the
Nonrecognizing States have more religious constituents.205 As Figure
18 shows, only six of the Nonrecognizing States rank in the bottom
third for religiosity. Twenty-five of the Nonrecognizing States rank in
either the top or middle third.206

205. See Table A4. Compare Figure18 with Figure 13.
206. Not surprisingly, thirteen of the Non-recognizing states have RFRAs.
See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-1493 to -1493.02 (2009); Fla. Stat.
Ann. §§761.01-.05 (West 2010); Idaho Code Ann. §§ 73-401 to -404
(2009); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-5301–5305; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 446.350 (2013); La. Rev. Stat. §§ 13:5231–5242 (2010); Mo. Ann.
Stat. §§ 1.302–.307 (West 2010); 71 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 2401–
2407 (West 2009); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-32-10 to -60 (2010); Tenn.
Code Ann. § 4-1-407 (2009); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
§§ 110.001–.012 (Vernon 2009); Va. Code Ann. §§ 57-1 to -2.02 (2009).
Alabama’s state constitution subjects state law burdening religious
practice to heightened scrutiny. See Ala. Const. art. I, § 3.01.
Of the states with recent judicial decisions requiring same-sex marriage,
New Mexico and Oklahoma have RFRAs. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 28-221 to 28-22-5 (2006); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 51, §§ 251–258 (West 2010).
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Figure 18: Religiosity Index for States That Do Not Permit
Same-Sex Marriage

Figure 19 shows that the levels of formal education in the
Nonrecognizing States is strikingly lower in than the Enacting
Jurisdictions.207 While three states rank in the top tier, as nearly every
Enacting Jurisdiction did, twenty-eight Nonrecognizing States rank in
the bottom two-thirds for educational attainment. Only Colorado,
Virginia, and Oregon defy this trend.

207. See Table A4. Compare Figure 19 with Figure 14.
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Figure 19: Educational Attainment for States That Do Not
Permit Same-Sex Marriage

Finally, same-sex marriage advocates will not have a background
promise of non-discrimination working in their favor. Figure 20 shows
that only a handful of remaining states, four, prohibit discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation in housing, hiring, and public
accommodations.208 The absence of a statewide guarantee of
208. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-402 (2013); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-502
(2013); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-601 (2013); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1259-106(1)(s) (2013) (prohibiting discrimination in private and public
employment, housing, public accommodations, and education); Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 613.330 (2012); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 118.020 (Supp. 2013);
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 651.070 (West Supp. 2013) (prohibiting
discrimination in private and public employment, housing, and public
accommodations); Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030 (2013); Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 659A.421 (2013); Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.403 (2013); Or. Rev.
Stat. § 659.850(2) (2013) (prohibiting discrimination in private and
public employment, housing, public accommodations, and education);
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.31(2) (West Supp. 2013); Wis. Stat. Ann. §
106.50 (West Supp. 2013); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 106.52 (West Supp.
2013); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 36.12 (West 2013) (prohibiting
discrimination in private and public employment, housing, public
accommodations, and education). Of these states, only Wisconsin does
not also prohibit gender identity discrimination. Presumably, a state
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nondiscrimination is significant: it means that legislators crafting
accommodations for same-sex marriage will be writing on a blank
slate when deciding how little latitude—or how much—to give
religious dissenters. If nothing in state or local law prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or marital status,
religious dissenters will not need religious liberty protections.
Legislators interested in providing greater protections will not be
legislator weighing religious liberty exemptions is concerned only about
rolling back protections for which they are accountable.
Other laws can provide important protections for LGBT individuals.
Some states ban sexual orientation discrimination by public employers,
like
Indiana,
Michigan,
Montana,
and
Pennsylvania.
See
http://employment.findlaw.com/employment-discrimination/sexualorientation-discrimination-in-the-workplace.html#sthash.T1frmnwH.
dpuf. Executive Orders in some Nonrecognizing States do bar
discrimination against public employees on the basis of sexual
orientation. See, e.g., Mo. Exec. Order No. 10-24 (July 9, 2010) http:
//governor.mo.gov/orders/2010/10-24.htm; Va. Exec. Directive No. 1
(2010)
http://www.dhrm.virginia.gov/documents/ExecutiveDirective
One.pdf. These states are treated here as not providing state-wide
protection against sexual orientation discrimination.
Further, in states that lack statewide nondiscrimination bans,
“[m]unicipal law provides powerful protections” in many localities.
Municipal Equality Index: A Nationwide Evaluation of Municipal Law
Human Rights Campaign (2013), available at: http://www.hrc.org/
files/assets/resources/MEI_2013_report.pdf.
Because the number of municipalities providing such protections varies
dramatically from state to state, localized protections are also not
factored in, although they provide an important source of redress for
LGBT individuals. Compare Arizona where municipal nondiscrimination bans cover only Phoenix with Nevada, where
nondiscrimination bans covering all major cities. See id. Some states,
while providing no promise of non-discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, do provide special protection based on sexual orientation in
state hate crime laws. For example, Texas has some protection built
into their hate crime statutes. See Act of June 19, 1993, ch. 987, 1993
Tex. Gen. Laws § 4 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
Texas Penal Code and the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure); Act of
May 11, 2001, ch. 85, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws § 1.02 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of the Texas Penal Code, the Texas Education
Code, the Texas Government Code, and the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure). In particular, Texas’s 2001 hate crime statute requires that,
in a criminal trial, the trier of fact determines if the defendant acted on
basis or prejudice against a number of different classifications including
sexual preference, id, at § 1.02, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws at § 1.01 (codified
as Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.014 (West 2014)) and
increases the punishment if the trier of fact finds such prejudice, Act of
June 19, 1993, § 1, 1993 Tex. Gen.Laws at § 1 (codified as amended at
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.47 (West 2014)). Further, a state
legislator weighing religious liberty exemptions presumably is concerned
only about rolling back protections the state impressed into law.
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subject to the claim—which has swayed some elsewhere—that
religious liberty protections in the same-sex marriage law will “roll
back” existing LGBT protections.209

Figure 20: Sexual Orientation Protections in State-Wide Law

Not only do the remaining states not offer statewide nondiscrimination guarantees, nearly all of the remaining states ban
same-sex marriage in the state constitution. As Figure 21 shows, in
twenty-seven Nonrecognizing States the state constitution presently
bars same-sex marriage.210 Only the constitutions of Wyoming,
209. See supra note 180 (describing the force of this idea and why it should
not be seen as rolling back protections).
210. Ala. Const. art. I, § 36.03; Alaska Const. art. I, § 25; Ariz. Const.
art. XXX, § 1; Ark. Const. amend. LXXXIII, § 1; Colo. Const. art.
II, § 31; Fla. Const. art. I, § 27; Idaho Const. art. III, § 28; Kan.
Const. art. XV, § 16; Ky. Const. § 233a; La. Const. art. XII, § 15;
Mich. Const. art. I, § 25; Miss. Const. art. XIV, § 263A; Mo.
Const. art. I, § 33; Mont. Const. art. XIII, § 7; Neb. Const. art. I, §
29; Nev. Const. art. I, § 21; N.C. Const. art. XIV, § 6; N.D. Const.
art. XI, § 28; Ohio Const. art. XV, § 11; Or. Const. art. XV, § 5a;
S.C. Const. art. XVII, § 15; S.D. Const. art. XXI, § 9; Tenn. Const.
art. XI, § 18; Tex. Const. art. I, § 32; Va. Const. art. I, § 15-A; Wis.
Const. art. XIII, § 13. Utah’s and Oklahoma’s bans have been
invalidated by federal district courts although the decisions are
currently stayed. Okla. Const. art. II, § 35; Utah Const. art. I, § 29.
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Indiana, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania do not ban same-sex
marriage.211

Figure 21: Same-Sex Marriage Banned in State Constitution

Some of the constitutional bans have been challenged, but ultimately
were left in place. See Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859
(8th Cir. 2006) (upholding Nebraska’s state conditional ban on same-sex
marriage against a federal constitutional challenge). A number of
challenges to state constitutional bans are pending across the country.
See Jillian Rayfield, 4 Pivotal Gay Rights Court Cases You Should
Know About: The U.S. Judicial System Has Become the Main
Battlefield in the Fight for Equal Rights, The Week (Jan. 28, 2014)
available at: http://theweek.com/article/index/255595/4-pivotal-gayrights-court-cases-that-you-should-know-about (discussing challenges in
Virginia, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Ohio).
211. The remaining Nonrecognizing States all ban same-sex marriage by
statute. See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 31-11-1-1 (West 2008) (making
same-sex marriage unlawful in Indiana and refusing to recognize out-ofstate marriages); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1704 (West 2010)
(defining marriage as between one man and one woman); W. Va. Code
Ann. §48-2-104 (LexisNexis 2009) (defining marriage as a lifelong union
between a woman and a man); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-101 (2013)
(defining marriage as a civil contract between a male and female
person). Unlike a constitutional ban, the statutory ban poses no special
hurdles to removal of the ban.
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In light of the state constitutional bans, some opponents might
resist any bargain over same-sex marriage, believing that the outcome
they seek—no same-sex marriage—is already in effect. However, state
constitutional bans are not all set in stone, as Part V shows.
Those states in which the populous is highly supportive of samesex marriage are no longer in play. As Figure 22 shows, in 2012, six of
the Nonrecognizing States were deeply opposed to same-sex marriage,
showing support less than 40%. In an additional twenty
Nonrecognizing States, a majority of the populace simply does not
support same-sex marriage.

Figure 22: Support for Same-Sex Marriage in States That Do
Not Permit Same-Sex Marriage

The extent to which religious liberty protections will influence the
fate of same-sex marriage in any given state likely will depend on a
complicated interplay of preexisting nondiscrimination law, state
constitutional prohibitions, popular support, legislative control,
education, and religiosity, as well as a host of other factors, including
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pending constitutional litigation in state and federal courts,212 and
even the personal convictions of individual legislators.213

V. Difficult Terrain Does Not Mean
Opponents Can Hold Out
Same-sex marriage opponents face the real fork in the road:
Should they oppose same-sex marriage to the bitter end or take a
more pragmatic approach and bargain now, trading marriage equality
for “substantial protections for religious dissenters[?]”214 For some
opponents (and supporters), the fight over same-sex marriage is an
existential one, making it unthinkable to compromise.215 For others,
212. As of February 2014, 42 suits challenging marriage bans were pending
across U.S. See David Cruz at UC Davis Law Review Symposium
(February 7, 2014) (citing James Esseks of the ACLU).
213. See supra notes 21, 24, 29 (providing interviews with individual
legislators, such as Hawaii Representative Jo Jordan of Hawaii).
214. Dreher, supra note 40, at 15. Some vow to stay focused on fighting
same-sex marriage on the merits, rather than actively (and exclusively)
seeking religious liberty protections. See supra note 40. Some opponents
do not see these approaches as an “either-or.” Caleb Dalton, an attorney
for the Alliance Defending Freedom, says:
We will continue to advocate for marriage between one man and
one woman as the building block of society. But in cases where a
state has chosen to redefine its marriage laws, we support the
active inclusion of robust religious liberty protections in pending
legislation.
Id. Russell Moore, president of the Southern Baptist Convention's
Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission, echoed the sentiment:
So while we're fighting for religious liberty, we're articulating
why we believe marriage is significant and important. And while
we're fighting for marriage, we're articulating why the religious
liberty concerns that inevitably come from these discussions are
significant. . . . We do both, and we don't abandon or
marginalize either plank.
Id.
215. See Matthew J. Franck, “Is Sex Just Like Race?,” The Public
Discourse (July 8, 2011), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2011/
07/3520 (“Today it is those claiming a specious ‘freedom to marry’ who
make a claim at odds with the institution’s nature and alien to its
purposes. It is they who would instrumentalize it by a redefinition, a
destroying and remaking, that puts marriage to a new kind of work in
the service of state policy.”).
On this issue, like other deeply divisive issues, the most strident voices
on each side sometimes gain by seeking a total win, because it rallies
their base. Surely some people in this fight benefit from continuing to
oppose compromise. A perverse conflict of interest can arise because
compromise turns down the temperature on an issue. See Sally
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central tenets of their faith tradition direct them not to compromise
on the particular question of marriage equality.216 But for those who
may be swayed by pragmatic arguments,217 a clear-eyed view of the
benefits of compromise is important.218 Arguably, the strongest reason
not to compromise is that voters have foreclosed same-sex marriage
by state constitutional amendment in twenty-seven states.219 But
Steenland, Return of the Culture Wars: Tea Party’s Social and
Religious Agenda and How Progressives Can Respond (Nov. 29, 2010),
available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/religion/news/
2010/11/29/8601/return-of-the-culture-wars-tea-partys-social-andreligious-agenda-and-how-progressives-can-respond/29292010).
216. For example, a Vatican document instructs:
[W]here a matter of the common good is concerned, it is
inappropriate for Church authorities to endorse or remain
neutral toward adverse legislation even if it grants exceptions to
Church organizations and institutions. The Church has the
responsibility to promote family life and the public morality of
the entire civil society on the basis of fundamental moral values,
not simply to protect herself from the application of harmful
laws (cf. no. 17).
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Some Considerations
Concerning the Response to Legislative Proposals on the NonDiscrimination
of
Homosexual
Persons
(July
24,
1992),
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/r
c_con_cfaith_doc_19920724_homosexual-persons_en.html.
217. Commentator Rod Dreher believes that a “consensus is emerging . . .
that the most important goal . . . [is] to secure as much liberty as
possible for dissenting religious and social conservatives while there is
still time.” Dreher, supra note 40, at 12. Dreher likely is premature
about the existence of a consensus.
218. Professor Douglas Laycock argues that “conservative churches would do
well to concede the liberty of the other side, including on same-sex
marriage, and concentrate on defending their own liberty as
conscientious objectors; and similarly, that supporters of rights to
abortion, contraception, gay rights, and same-sex marriage would do
well to concentrate on securing their own rights and to concede that
conscientious objectors should rarely be required to support or facilitate
practices they view as evil.” See Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and
the Culture Wars, U. Ill. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at
1); see also Thomas C. Berg, Progressive Arguments for Religious
Organizational Freedom: Reflections on the HHS Mandate, J.
Contemp. Legal Issues (2013); U. of St. Thomas (Minnesota) Legal
Studies
Research
Paper
No.
13-20.
Available
at
SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2268824 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.
2268824 (arguing that religious freedom is important and that there is
value in the social-service contributions of religious nonprofits).
219. See Rex W. Huppke, Lawsuits filed in Cook County claiming state’s
same-sex marriage ban unconstitutional, The Chicago Tribune (May
31, 2012) (“31 states have amended their constitutions to ban gay
marriage.”). This tally included California’s invalidated Proposition 8.
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unlike the U.S. Constitution, which cannot be amended without great
difficulty, many state constitutions do no erect momentous barriers
to change.
To undo a constitutional ban, some states require a supermajority
(60% or more) of legislators, followed by a majority of voters, to make
any change, creating a strong lock-in effect. Consider, for example,
Texas, which requires two-thirds of state legislators in both houses to
pass the amendment, after which a simple majority of the electorate
must also approve it.220 In some of these states, an elaborate
convention method also permits amendment, but still nonetheless
requires a super-majority of the legislature. Seven of the
Nonrecognizing States erect significant barriers to amendment, and
therefore significant barriers to repeal (Georgia, Idaho, Kansas,
Louisiana, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas).221 Because
See Chris Cillizza and Sean Sullivan, How Proposition 8 Passed in
California—and Why It Wouldn’t Today, Wash. Post (Mar. 26,
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/03/26
/how-proposition-8-passed-in-california-and-why-it-wouldnt-today/
(discussing the history and background of California’s Proposition 8).
Hawaii was included among the thirty-one, but its constitutional
amendment, which permitted the legislature to “reserve marriage to
opposite sex couples,” is now mooted. See Haw. Const. art. I, § 23
(“The legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to oppositesex couples.”).
220. Tex. Const. art. XVII, § 1.
221. See Ga. Const. art. X, § 1, para. 1–6 (Legislative Method: requires 2/3
vote of both houses of the legislature and then a simple majority of the
electorate; Convention Method: a convention can only be called by a
2/3 vote of both houses of the legislature); Idaho Const. art. XX, § 1–
3 (Legislative method: requires 2/3 vote of both houses of the legislature
and then a simple majority of the electorate. Convention Method: a
convention can only be called by a 2/3 vote of both houses of the
legislature affirmed by a majority of the electorate); Kan. Const. art.
XIV, § 1–2 (Legislative method: requires 2/3 vote of both houses of the
legislature and then a simple majority of the electorate. Convention
Method: a convention can only be called by a 2/3 vote of both houses of
the legislature affirmed by a majority of the electorate); La. Const. art.
XIII, § 1–3 (Legislative Method: requires 2/3 vote of both houses of the
legislature and then a simple majority of the electorate. Convention
Method: a convention can only be called by a 2/3 vote of both houses of
the legislature); N.C. Const. art. XIII, § 1–4 (Legislative Method:
requires 3/5 vote of both houses of the legislature and then a simple
majority of the electorate. Convention Method: a convention can only
be called by a 2/3 vote of both houses of the legislature and then any
amendment arising out of a convention must be approved by a simple
majority of voters); S.C. Const. art. XVI, § 1–3 (Legislative Method:
requires 2/3 vote of both houses of the legislature and then a simple
majority of the electorate. Convention Method: a convention can only
be called by a 2/3 vote of both houses of the legislature affirmed by a
majority of the electorate); Tex. Const. art. XVII, § 1 (Legislative
method: requires 2/3 vote of both houses of the legislature and then a
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this process is so onerous, once an amendment is adopted, it cannot
easily be undone.
In another eight states, constitutional bans enjoy a mild lock-in
effect. Alabama, Alaska, Kentucky, Nevada, Oregon, Tennessee,
Virginia, and Wisconsin erect some barriers to repeal, but not ones as
daunting as Texas’.222 Generally, these states provide a legislative
method for amendment, requiring only a majority of legislators and a
majority of voters to amend the state’s constitution. Some of these
states also allow amendments by a periodic convention that either (a)

simple majority of the electorate). Utah’s same-sex marriage ban was
invalidated but would have exerted a strong lock-in effect. See Utah
Const. art. XXIII, § 1-3 (Legislative method: requires 2/3 vote of both
houses of the legislature and then a simple majority of the electorate.
Convention Method: a convention can only be called by a 2/3 vote of
both houses of the legislature affirmed by a majority of the electorate).
222. See Ala. Const. art. XVIII, § 284–287 (Legislative Method: requires
3/5 vote of both houses of the legislature and then a simple majority of
the electorate. Convention Method: a simple majority of legislators from
both houses plus a simple majority of voters can call a constitutional
convention); Alaska Const. art. XIII, § 1–3 (Automatic Submission
Method: Every 10 years the voters of Alaska are asked to decide
whether or not to hold a constitutional convention. If the majority of
voters say they want a constitutional convention, then delegates to that
convention are elected during the next general election. Legislative
Method: requires 2/3 vote of both houses of the legislature and then a
simple majority of the electorate); Ky. Const. § 256–263 (Legislative
Method: requires 3/5 vote of both houses of the legislature and then a
simple majority of the electorate. Convention Method: a convention can
be called by a simple majority of legislators in both houses plus a simple
majority of voters. Any proposed amendments arising out of the
convention must then be approved by a majority of voters); Nev.
Const. art. 16, § 1–2 (Legislative Method: Simple majority of legislators
from both house plus a simple majority of the electorate. Convention
Method: a convention can only be called by a 2/3 vote of both houses of
the legislature affirmed by a majority of the electorate); Or. Const.
art. XVII, § 1–2 (Legislative Method: Simple majority of legislators from
both house plus a simple majority of the electorate. Legislative Revision
Method: the legislature may “revise” all or part of the constitution by a
2/3 vote of both houses. The revision must then be approved by a
simple majority of voters); Tenn. Const. art. XI, § 3 (Legislative
Method: requires 2/3 vote of both houses of the legislature and then a
simple majority of the electorate. Convention Method: a convention can
be called by a simple majority of legislators in both houses plus a simple
majority of voters. Any proposed amendments arising out of the
convention must then be approved by a majority of voters); Va. Const.
art. XII, § 1–2 (Legislative Method: Simple majority of legislators from
both house plus a simple majority of the electorate. Convention Method:
a convention can only be called by a 2/3 vote of both houses of the
legislature); Wis. Const. art. 12, § 1 (Legislative Method: Simple
majority of legislators from both house plus a simple majority of the
electorate).
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requires approval by a simple majority of voters, but the convention
may be called only after long periods of time (e.g., ten years), or (b)
permits a convention to take place after two steps—approval by a
majority of legislators and approval by majority of the electorate.
Consider, for example, Virginia, which provides two paths to adoption
or repeal: the legislative method—requiring approval by a simple
majority of legislators in both houses and a simple majority of the
electorate—and periodic constitutional conventions called by the
Legislature, where voters can approve amendments by a simple
majority.223 Because amendments can pass without super-majority
support in the legislature, this process creates a milder lock-in effect.
Twelve states (Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, and
South Dakota) fall in the final category, where constitutional bans
can be adopted or repealed with relative ease.224 A negligible lock-in
223. Va. Const. art. XII, § 1–2.
224. Ariz. Const. art. XXI, § 1–2 (Legislative Method: Simple majority of
legislators from both house plus a simple majority of the electorate. Voter
Initiative Method: Petition must be signed by 15% of the total vote cast
for governor in the preceding election. Then the proposed amendment
appears on the ballot to be decided by a majority of voters in a general
election. Convention Method: a convention can be called by the people by
referendum); Ark. Const. art. XIX, § 22 (Legislative Method: Simple
majority of legislators from both house plus a simple majority of the
electorate); Colo. Const. art. XIX, § 1-2 (Legislative Method: requires
2/3 vote of both houses of the legislature and then a simple majority of
the electorate. Convention Method: a convention can only be called by a
2/3 vote of both houses of the legislature affirmed by a majority of the
electorate); Fla. Const. art. XI, § 1–5 (Legislative Method: requires 3/5
vote of both houses of the legislature and then 60% of the electorate.
Initiative Method: Signatures of 8% of total electors voting in the last
Presidential election for the question to be placed on the ballot. The
ballot initiative is approved by 60%of voters. Convention Method: A
convention can be placed on the ballot if 15% of voters based on the last
Presidential election sign a petition requesting a petition. The issue is then
placed on the ballot and a convention is called if a simple majority of
voters approve); Mich. Const. art. XII, § 1–3 (Voter Initiative Method:
Petition must be signed by 10% of the total vote cast for governor in the
preceding election. Then the proposed amendment appears on the ballot
to be decided by a majority of voters in a general election. Automatic
Submission Method: Every 16 years the question of whether or not to
have a constitutional convention reaches the ballot in a general election.
The people can vote to have a constitutional convention by a simple
majority. They then can approve the proposed amendments coming out of
the convention by a simple majority. Legislative Method: requires 2/3
vote of both houses of the legislature and then a simple majority of the
electorate); Miss. Const. art. XV, § 273 (Legislative Method: requires
2/3 vote of both houses of the legislature and then a simple majority of
the electorate. Voter Initiative: “An initiative to amend the Constitution
may be proposed by a petition signed over a twelve-month period by
qualified electors equal in number to at least twelve percent (12%) of the
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votes for all candidates for Governor in the last gubernatorial election.
The signatures of the qualified electors from any congressional district
shall not exceed one-fifth (1/5) of the total number of signatures required
to qualify an initiative petition for placement upon the ballot.”); Mo.
Const. art. XII, § 2–3 (Legislative Method: Simple majority of legislators
from both houses plus a simple majority of the electorate. Automatic
Submission Method: Every 20 years the question of whether to hold a
constitutional convention is placed on the ballot. A convention can be
called by a simple majority of the electorate); Mont. Const. art. XIV,
§ 1–9 (Voter-Initiated Convention Method: 10% of voters in each of
2/5ths of the legislative districts must sign a petition for a constitutional
convention and submit it to the secretary of state. Automatic Submission
Method: Every 20 years the question of whether or not to have a
constitutional convention reaches the ballot in a general election. The
people can vote to have a constitutional convention by a simple majority.
They then can approve the proposed amendments coming out of the
convention by a simple majority. Legislative Method: requires 2/3 vote of
both houses of the legislature and then a simple majority of the electorate.
Legislatively-Initiated Convention Method: a convention can also be called
by a 2/3 vote of both houses of the legislature. Voter Initiative: “The
people may also propose constitutional amendments by initiative.
Petitions including the full text of the proposed amendment shall be
signed by at least ten percent of the qualified electors of the state.”); Neb.
Const. art. XVI, § 1–2 (Legislative Method: requires 3/5 vote of both
houses of the legislature and then a simple majority of the electorate.
Convention Method: a convention can only be called by a 3/5 vote of
both houses of the legislature affirmed by a majority of the electorate);
N.D. Const. art. III, § 1–9 (Initiative Method: petitioners must gather
signatures equaling 2% of the resident population at the last federal
census for a proposed amendment to make the ballot. After crossing this
threshold, the amendment is approved or disapproved by simple majority
vote in the general election); Ohio Const. art. XVI, § 1–2; 2 (Legislative
Method: requires 3/5 vote of both houses of the legislature and then a
simple majority of the electorate. Convention Method: a convention can
only be called by a 2/3 vote of both houses of the legislature affirmed by a
majority of the electorate. Automatic Submission Method: Every 20 years
the voters of Ohio are asked to decide whether or not to hold a
constitutional convention. If the majority of voters say they want a
constitutional convention, then delegates to that convention are elected
during the next general election. The convention delegates then have
plenary power to amend the constitution subject only to ratification by
the people by a simple majority. Voter Initiative: “The . . . power
reserved by the people is designated the initiative, and the signatures of
ten per centum of the electors shall be required upon a petition to propose
an amendment to the constitution.”); S.D. Const. art. XXIII, § 1–3
(Legislative Method: Simple majority of legislators from both houses plus
a simple majority of the electorate. Convention Method: A convention
may be called by 3/4 of legislators in both houses. Voter Initiative: “An
amendment proposed by initiative shall require a petition signed by
qualified voters equal in number to at least ten percent of the total votes
cast for Governor in the last gubernatorial election.”).
Oklahoma’s same-sex marriage ban was invalidated but would have
exerted a negligible lock-in effect. See also Okla. Const. art. 24, § 1–3
(Legislative Method: requires 2/3 vote of both houses of the legislature
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state permits change with only a small fraction of voters petitioning
for it followed up with a simple majority of voters voting in support
of the amendment. Typically, the states require 10% of the electorate
to initiate the process, but may range as low as 4% and as high as
15%.225 Arizona is emblematic of this approach. It requires a petition
to be signed by 15% of the total number of voters who cast votes for
governor in the preceding election. At that point, the proposed
amendment appears on the ballot to be decided by a majority of
voters in a general election. 226
In short, state constitutional amendments are surmountable in all
twenty-seven Nonrecognizing States, as Figure 23 shows. In all but
seven states, constitutions can be surmounted without “supermajority” votes by the legislature.

Figure 23:
Marriage Ban

Lock-In

Effect

of

Constitutional

Same-Sex

and then a simple majority of the electorate. Convention and Initiative
Methods: the voters may amend the constitution directly by referendum
by a simple majority of voters).
225. See sources cited supra note 205.
226. Ariz. Const. art. XXI, § 1–2. Note that if Arizona only had a
Legislative Method as opposed to a Legislative and a Voter Initiative
method, then Arizona would have a mild lock-in effect.
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While constitutional amendments contribute to the difficult
political terrain, it is clear that legislation to recognize same-sex
marriage will be possible in nearly all of these states by the end of the
decade, as Figure 24 shows.

Figure 24: Projected Support for Same-Sex Marriage by 2020

By 2020, putting aside the lock-in effect, virtually every state is
likely to have sufficient support to recognize same-sex marriage. Only
six states show support below 50% and all but two are within a few
percentage points of a majority. Average support for same-sex
marriage will crest 55.8% across the Nonrecognizing States.
Mississippi brings up the bottom with support at 37.8%, while at the
top end, support in Oregon will hit 65.4%. 2020 may seem a long way
away, but constitutional bans are fragile today, at least in the
negligible and mild lock-in states.
Because so many state constitutional bans can be undone with a
fraction of the population’s signatures and majority support, it is
important to stay focused on the tide of popular support. Figure 25
shows actual support in 1994–96, actual support at the time of the
constitutional amendment, and actual support in 2008, as well as
projected support for 2012 and 2016.227 It shows that of the states
227. The 1994–96 and 2010 support data are taken from the New York
Times. Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey Lax & Justin Phillips, Over Time, a
Gay Marriage Groundswell, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 2010, at WK3. (“In
all of the time periods shown here, a statistical technique has been used
to generate state estimates from national polls. Public opinion is
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with negligible lock-ins, by 2012, a majority of the population in ten
of the twelve do support same-sex marriage or are within striking
distance of majority support (Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Missouri,
Montana, Michigan, Nebraska, Ohio, North Dakota, and South
Dakota).228 By 2016, only four of the negligible lock-in effect states
would not have majority support for same-sex marriage (Arkansas,
Mississippi, Missouri, and South Dakota).229 Because the constitutions
in these states are almost as easy to amend as enacting ordinary
legislation, the need to bargain now is at its greatest.
Negligible Lock-In States
60
50
40
1994-96 Support

30

Support at time of Ban
20

2008 Support

10

2012 Support (projected)

0

2016 Support (projected)

Figure 25: Projected Support in Negligible Lock-In States

Figure 26 further illustrates the flimsiness of state constitutional
amendments. Of the eight mild lock-in states, a majority of the
populations in three states (Nevada, Oregon, and Wisconsin) already
supported same-sex marriage by 2012, putting those bans at risk
today.230 By 2016, in more than half of the states, five of the eight, a
majority of the population will support same-sex marriage (Alaska,
Nevada, Oregon, Virginia, and Wisconsin).231
estimated in small demographic categories within each state, and then
these are averaged using census information to get state-level
summaries. Estimates in 2010 are projected from 2008 state-level
estimates using an aggregate national estimate of forty-five percent (or
fifty percent) support for gay marriage.”). The 2012 and 2016 statistics
are taken from Silver, supra note 125. Table A6 gives actual support at
the time of the amendment at the ballot box by subtracting opposition
support from one hundred.
228. See infra Table A6.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
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Figure 26: Projected Support in Mild Lock-In States

Figure 27 does paint a different picture. The strong lock-in effect
states generally show low support for same-sex marriage. The seven
strong lock-in states are not likely to enact same-sex marriage in the
near future, based either on public support or the strength of the
constitutional amendment.232
Strong Lock-In States
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Figure 27: Projected Support in Strong Lock-In States

In only those states where projected support likely will remain
well below 50% by 2020 (Mississippi and Alabama) and those strong
lock-in states (Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, North Carolina,
South Carolina, and Texas) are opponents reasonably assured of being
able to push back same-sex marriage if the question is left to the
political process. While no one can predict with confidence what the
232. Id.
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future holds,233 how one bargains today is often influenced by how one
perceives the future and the bargain one believes one can strike
tomorrow or beyond.
Even with the difficult terrain, in the long term, advocates are
likely to secure same-sex marriage in the political process when
popular support eventually overpowers all other characteristics. For
same-sex marriage opponents who may be tempted to rely on the
more difficult terrain facing advocates,234 Utah and Oklahoma are
illustrative.
233. The political terrain of any state may change overnight. In 2013, samesex couples filed suit challenging Virginia’s same-sex marriage ban on
federal constitutional grounds. See Bostic v. Rainey, No. 2:13-cv-395,
2014 WL 561978, (E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 2014); see also Harris v.
McDonnell, No. 5:13-cv-00077, 2013 WL 5720355, (W.D. Va. Oct. 18,
2013) (a class action lawsuit). Then-Attorney General Ken Cuccinelli
defended the suits. See Robert Barnes, Virginia to Fight Gay Marriage
Ban, The Washington Post (Jan 23. 2014). On the heels of the
November 2013 election, Virginia’s new Attorney General Mark Herring
will not defend Virginia’s constitutional ban, saying that he believes it is
unconstitutional. In the vacuum created by General Herring’s decision,
it is unclear who, if anyone, has standing to defend the law. For a
discussion of the unique issues of standing in ballot initiatives, see
Vikram D. Amar, Should Initiative Proponents Be Permitted Under
Article III to Defend in Federal Court?, 48 UC Davis L. Rev.
(forthcoming Dec. 2014); Vikram Amar, Revisiting Standing:
Proposition 8 in the Ninth Circuit, Jurist (Feb. 16, 2012),
http://jurist.org/forum/2012/02/vikram-amar-marriage-standing.php.
Virginia House Bill 706 seeks, after the fact, to provide the ability for
any legislator to defend the laws of the Commonwealth. See H.B. 706,
2014 Session (Va. 2014). Even though the dynamics of any one state
may quickly change in important ways, some of the characteristics
favoring marriage equality are more stable than others, like educational
attainment and religiosity. Moreover, while characteristics may see-saw
in an individual state, the broad pattern in the 31 Nonrecognizing States
is likely to remain consistent.
234. In this legislative cycle, stand-alone legislation “concerning religious
freedoms with respect to marriage” has been introduced in states that
are not anticipated to recognize same-sex marriage any time soon, like
Kansas. See H.B 2453, Session of 2014 (Kan. 2014). This Article
contends that the strongest religious liberty protections will result from
trading protections for marriage equality. It is possible that staggering
the two goods—religious freedom protections and the recognition of
marriage equality—so that they happen at different points in time, may
also result in strong protections. It is hard to know whether locking in
protections in advance of marriage equality would grease the way for
enabling marriage equality legislation or make it more difficult.
Advocates of a staggered approach say that when enabling legislation
does arise, opponents cannot then say that marriage equality will hurt
religious freedom. Thus, opponents of same-sex marriage forfeit a
powerful political weapon against same-sex marriage in exchange for
locking in religious liberty protections.
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Judicial decisions in Utah and Oklahoma underline what is at
stake. Oklahoma and Utah shared a number of characteristics
suggesting that both would have been among the last states to adopt
same-sex marriage by legislation. Party representation, religiosity,
education, lack of statewide sexual orientation protections, the
presence of a constitutional amendment against same-sex marriage,
and low support for same-sex marriage all played to the opposition.
A majority of people in Utah is not projected to support same-sex
marriage until 2020. In 2016, Silver estimates 48.1% would support
same-sex marriage. Utah’s Republican-controlled legislature and
Republican Governor, its status as the second most religious state in
the nation behind only Mississippi, its lack of a statewide sexual
orientation nondiscrimination law, and strongly locked-in
constitutional amendment all would make the reasonable observer
believe that Utah would not legislatively adopt same-sex marriage any
time soon. Only its relatively educated populace, just outside of the
top one-third and nineteenth overall for the United States, would
suggest otherwise.
Oklahoma is not much different. Projected support in Oklahoma
barely breaks a majority in 2020, with only 51.5% projected to favor
same-sex marriage—up from a projected 44.7% in 2016. Oklahoma’s
Republican legislature, Republican Governor, high religiosity (top
one-third), low education levels (bottom one-third), and lack of
If enacted, these protections would appear in stand-alone legislation that
presumably will be revisited when, and if, the state embraces marriage
equality. This approach cleanly makes religious freedom arguments on
their own merits, as opposed to making them during a pitched battle
over same-sex marriage recognition. When religious freedom is raised in
the context of a pitched battle, some advocates, members of the public,
and legislators may suspect the religious freedom arguments are nothing
more than an obstructionist tactic designed to defeat same-sex marriage
on the merits.
In states that lack a sexual orientation nondiscrimination ban in
statewide law, it is unclear what legal risk objectors are being
immunized against. See Figure 20. As important, unlike the model
protections that I and others propose, these proposals have not
contained important constraints on the size of organizations that could
claim an exemption, nor do they take into consideration any hardship to
same-sex couples. See supra note 88 (providing information about model
religious liberty protections). Standalone legislation in states that do not
give protections to LGBT individuals also smack of a one-sided deal
because it would protect only religious objectors while giving nothing
tangible to the LGBT community.
A better way forward for this kind of legislation would be to protect or
enlarge the rights of both sides in the same piece of legislation—for
example, by giving LGBT people a much-needed promise of nondiscrimination in society, recognition of relationships, or access to
marriage.
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statewide sexual orientation protections suggest Oklahoma would
have been a very late adopter. Oklahoma’s negligible lock-in effect for
its constitutional ban would have mattered little in light of very low
support for same-sex marriage. Utah and Oklahoma illustrate the
risks of delay for religious liberty advocates. What should legislators
in Utah and Oklahoma (and elsewhere) do now? Where federal
district court decisions require that same-sex marriage be recognized,
legislators who otherwise may not be inclined to grant marriage
equality by statute should act to do so, locking in religious liberty
protections pending the appeal.
With all the attention paid to judicial decisions in Utah and
Oklahoma, it is easy to forget that a number of constitutional
amendment states are in play. A ballot initiative underway now in
Ohio seeks to overturn Ohio’s 2004 Constitutional Amendment. In
Ohio, a mild lock-in effect state, public opposition to same-sex
marriage has dropped precipitously since the Amendment’s passage in
2004, falling to a mere 37% from 62%.235 The proposed Amendment in
Ohio would mandate marriage equality without any religious liberty
protections.236 A similar movement is underway in Oregon where
voters have “collected enough signatures to give voters a chance to
legalize same-sex marriage in 2014.”237 The Oregon measure, like
Maine’s, would provide modest religious liberty protections for
organizations.
Some may think that because the U.S. Supreme Court is likely to
decide the entitlement to same-sex marriage by 2015, it is pointless to
bargain now. Proponents may believe that it would be better to wait
out the next state legislative round, hoping for a victory in the
Supreme Court. Yet, there is no assurance that the Supreme Court
will wade in on this question in the near term, especially in the
absence of a circuit split.238 Moreover, a decision favoring marriage
equality is not assured, even if increasingly likely. Thus, bargaining
for marriage equality supporters delivers a concrete gain now for real
families clamoring to marry.

235. Sandhya Somashekhar & Peyton M. Craighill, Polls in 3 States See
Gay-Union Support, Wash. Post, October 10, 2012, at A8; see Table
A6.
236. Anna Staver, Same-Sex Marriage Amendment In Ohio Gets Green
Light, Huffington Post (April 3, 2012, 6:44 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/03/same-sex-marriage-amendment-ohio_n
_1400714.html.
237. KATU News, Oregon same-sex marriage advocates celebrate ballot
measure milestone, KATU.com (Dec. 9, 2013, 12:28 PM)
http://www.katu.com/politics/Oregon-same-sex-marriage-advocatescelebrate-ballot-measure-milestone-235105391.html.
238. See supra note 59.
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Even if the Court holds that marriage equality is constitutionally
demanded, red states could still enact religious liberty protections at
that point simply based on the state’s demographics. Ironically, the
chances of enacting religious liberty protections on the heels of a
Supreme Court decision may be greater in 2016 than if the Court’s
decision comes later.239
Others may believe that a victory in the Supreme Court at any
time will sideline every motivation for finding a “live and let live”
approach to same-sex marriage. True, religious liberty advocates may
not have any bargaining leverage on the marriage issue. But they may
have bargaining leverage if they are willing to enact sexual orientation
non-discrimination laws as part of a package to get religious liberty
protections with respect to marriage. In short, even if the right to
marry is assured by the Court, the bargaining may shift to sorely
needed nondiscrimination protections, rather than disappearing
entirely.

Conclusion
No one can say with confidence that the United States Supreme
Court will not “shut down the marriage debate and impose gay
marriage uniformly.”240 Until that happens, there is a closing window
of opportunity for healing the schism over same-sex marriage. The
way forward in this very divisive debate is for both sides to be
respectful of the other.241 As with many deeply divisive topics, the
natural impulse often is to resist compromise, but neither side can
afford to do so.
Same-sex marriage by legislation has been a decidedly blue state
phenomenon, but it will not remain so. The political terrain facing the
marriage equality movement going forward means that religious
liberty will remain yoked to same-sex marriage recognition until
public support engulfs all opposition. The decision squarely in front of
marriage equality advocates is whether to lock-in same-sex marriage
now, with protections for religious dissenters, or to wait, relying on
overwhelming public support alone.242
239. See Table A4. Compare Figure 22 with Figure 24.
240. Dreher, supra note 38, at 12 (quoting Maggie Gallagher).
241. For a pair of views on the divisiveness debate, see Smith, supra note 63
and Laycock, supra note 218.
242. Some would contend that marriage equality advocates have an incentive
not to bargain, waiting for judicial decisions that deliver same-sex
marriage without exemptions specific to marriage. Because no one can
be assured of when courts will act, and what outcome they will reach,
refusing to bargain necessarily puts off rights that could be secured
legislatively today. For this reason, marriage equality advocates would
be gambling to say, “No thanks, we will wait for Justice Kennedy.”
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For opponents, the more challenging political terrain also means
that the best opportunity to cement meaningful religious liberty
protections is now. If opponents act now, trading recognition of samesex marriage for robust protections, then opponents will have muted
the impact of same-sex marriage on like-minded believers. It is true
that the struggle over same-sex marriage is an existential fight for
some who may not or cannot be moved by pragmatic appeals, but for
those who can, if they resist the “damage control” within their
means,243 they will only have themselves to blame.244

243. “There is not yet a unified sense of where we go from here, except for
this: there is an accelerating awareness that the consequence of marriage
equality is going to be extremely negative for traditionalist Christians.”
See Dreher, supra note 40 (quoting Maggie Gallagher).
244. For those for whom the struggle over same-sex marriage is an existential
fight, pragmatic appeals may find little reception. See Smith, supra note
63 (arguing that both sides are acting on legitimate concerns and are
not merely being intransigent—instead, the “contending parties
understand that there is a struggle over who will be doing the
accommodating to whom. Proponents of same-sex marriage perceive,
correctly, that domestic partnership is not likely to have all of the same
legal features and advantages as marriages; and even if it does, in such
an arrangement, heterosexual marriage is the ‘normal’ position, and it is
the same-sex couples who are being accommodated. By the same token,
more traditional citizens perceive that a law recognizing same-sex
marriage, even if it comes with religious freedom ‘exceptions’ or
‘exemptions,’ reverses these positions: now they are the ones who are the
outliers to be accommodated.”). For anyone who may be swayed by
pragmatic arguments, a clear-eyed view of the benefits of compromise is
important. In the end, compromise offers the best hope for closing the
schism over same-sex marriage.
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In 2012 the Washington legislature voted on and passed a same-sex
marriage bill. An Act Requiring Protection For All Families IN
Washington By Creating Equality In Civil Marriage And Changing
Domestic Partner Laws, While Protecting Religious Freedom, ch. 3, sec.
2, 2012 Wash. Sess. Laws 199, 200 (codified as Wash. Rev. Code
§ 26.04.010(1) (West 2012)). The same-sex marriage bill was then put to
a state vote as Referendum 74, and the Referendum passed, thereby
legalizing same-sex marriage in Washington. 2012 Wash. Sess. Laws
S S B 6239 (Referendum)

Enacting Legislation

Enacting Legislation

Washington

Illinois

Religious Freedom and Marriage Fairness Act, S.B. 0010, 98th Gen.
Assemb. (Ill. 2013) (enacted) (to be codified at 750 Ill. Comp. Stat.
5/201 (2014)) (effective, June 1, 2014).

Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 15, § 8 (2009) (effective Sept. 1, 2009).

Enacting Legislation

N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-a (McKinney Supp. 2014) (effective July 24, 2011).

Enacting Legislation

New York

Vermont

Minn. Stat. Ann. § 517.01 (West 2013) (Aug. 1, 2013).

Enacting Legislation

Minnesota

Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality Amendment Act of 2009,
57 D.C. Reg. 27 (2009) (codified as D.C. Code § 46-401 (LexisNexis
2012)) (effective Mar. 3, 2010).

N.H. Rev. Stat. § 457:1A (2010) (effective Jan. 1, 2010).

Enacting Legislation

New
Hampshire

Enacting Legislation

R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-1-1 (2013) (effective Aug. 1, 2013).

Enacting Legislation

Rhode Island

The District
of Columbia

Md. Code Ann. Fam. Law §§ 2-201 (LexisNexis 2012) (effective Jan. 1,
2013)

Enacting Legislation

Maryland

Legislation/Decision

Method of SameSex Marriage
Recognition

State
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Appendix

Table A1: States Recognizing Same-Sex Marriage and the Methods by
Which Same-Sex Marriage Is Recognized as of Jan. 14, 2014 245

245. Because the political landscape of same-sex marriage is in constant flux,
it is worth noting that this Article accounts same-sex marriage laws as
of January 14, 2014. During the editing cycle, a spate of same-sex
marriage decisions continued to emerge from federal district courts. As
just one example, Michigan’s ban on same-sex marriage (the Michigan
Marriage Amendment, Mich. Const. art. I, § 25) has been held
unconstitutional. See Deboer v. Snyder, No. 12-CV-10285, 2014 WL
1100794 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 2014). However, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has granted the state’s request to stay
the judgment of the district court until the appeals court has ruled on
the appeal. See Deboer v. Snyder, No. 14-1341 (6th Cir. Mar. 25, 2014).

Enacting Legislation

Enacting Legislation

Delaware

Maine

Judicial Decision

Enacting Legislation

Hawaii

California

Method of SameSex Marriage
Recognition

State

Prior to 1977, the California marriage statute was gender neutral, referencing neither a man or a woman. A.B. 43 2007
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007). When the California family code became effective on January 1, 1994 marriage was defined as a
“civil contract between a man and a woman.” A.B. 2560, 1992 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1992). In order to further combat concerns
about same-sex marriage Proposition 22 was adopted by California voters adding section 308.5 to the Family Code stating
that “Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California”. 2000 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 22
(West). During the 2005-2006 session, the California Senate and State Assembly passed Assembly Bill 849 which proposed
to legalize same-sex marriage. A.B. 849, 2005 Reg. Sess. (Cali 2005). This measure was vetoed by Governor
Schwarzenegger, citing Proposition 22 as his justification for the veto. Veto Message A.B. 849 (2005),
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab_0801-0850/ab_849_vt_20050929.html. In 2008, voters approved
Proposition 8, which amended the California State Constitution to say “Only marriage between a man and a woman is
valid or recognized in California.” 2008 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 8 (West). In the meantime, the California Supreme Court
had consolidated challenges to laws treating individuals differently based sexual orientation and held that Proposition 22
was unconstitutional. See In Re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (2008). Despite the decision in In Re Marriage Cases, in
2009 the California Supreme Court held that the passage of Proposition 8 was valid as voted by the people. See Strauss v.
Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (2009) (upholding Proposition 8 but also recognizing as valid the marriages performed between the
decision of In Re Marriage and the passage of Proposition 8). After conflicting rulings at the state level, two same-sex
couples brought action in federal court alleging that the Proposition 8 violated due process and equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (2010), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.
3d. 1052 (2012), aff’d sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (holding that the constitutional amendment
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).

In 2009 the Maine legislature introduced and passed a same-sex marriage bill. An Act To End Discrimination In Civil
Marriage And Affirm Religious Freedom, ch. 82, sec. 2, 2009 Me. Laws 150 (codified as Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19-A, §
650-A(2013)) (effective Dec. 29, 2012). However, the Act was repealed in a referendum in November of 2009. In November
of 2012 the Act was reinstated in another state referendum, and the law took effect in late 2012.

Del. Code Ann. tit. 13 § 101 (2013) (effective July 1, 2013).

Haw. Rev. Stat. §572-1 (West 2013) (effective Dec. 2, 2013).

Legislation/Decision
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Legislation/Decision

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-20 (2009)) (effective Apr. 23, 2009). This legislation followed on the heels of a judicial
decision recognizing same-sex marriage in the state. Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 289 Conn. 135
(2008).

Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (2009).

Goodridge v. Dept. of Pubic Health, 440 Mass. 309 (2003).

Garden State Equality v. Dow, 82 A.2d 336 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2013).

Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865 (2013).

Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, No. 04-CV-848-TCK-TLW, 2014 WL 116013 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 14, 2014).
This judicial decision was stayed, pending appeal, by the Judge at the end of this decision.

Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 2:13-cv-217, 2013 WL 6697874 (D. Utah Dec. 20, 2013). This judicial decision was
stayed, pending appeal, by the U.S. Supreme Court. Kitchen v. Herbert, 134 S. Ct. 893 (2014).

Method of Same-Sex
Marriage
Recognition

Enacting Legislation/
Judicial Decision

Judicial Decision

Judicial Decision

Judicial Decision

Judicial Decision

Judicial Decision
(Stayed)

Judicial Decision
(Stayed)

State

Connecticut

Iowa

Massachusetts

New Jersey

New Mexico

Oklahoma

Utah

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 3·2014
Marriage of Necessity
Table A1 (continued): States Recognizing Same-Sex Marriage and the
Methods by Which Same-Sex Marriage Is Recognized as of Jan. 14, 2014

1246

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 3·2014
Marriage of Necessity
Table A2: State-Wide Sexual Orientation Nondiscrimination Measures

Same-Sex
Other
Marriage Employment
Housing
Public
Nondiscrimination
(SSM) Discrimination Discrimination Accommodations
Measures
Legislation

Years
Other
Protections
Preceded
SSM
Legislation
246

Enacting Jurisdictions
CT

2009247

1991248

1991249

1991250

DE

2013253

2009254

2009255

2009256

DC

2009

257

1977

258

1977

259

1977

260

HI

2013

262

1991

263

2005

264

2006

265

IL

2013266

2004267

2004268

2004269

271

272

273

274

MD 2012

2009

2009

2009

MN

2013276

1993277

1993278

1993279

NH

2009281

1997282

1997283

1997284

NY

2011285

2002286

2002287

2002288

RI

2013290

1995291

1995292

1995293

VT

2009295

1992296

1992297

1992298

WA 2012300

2006301

2006302

2006303

1991251
(Education)
2011252 (Credit)

18 years
4 years

1977261
(Education)

32 years
22 years

2004270 (Credit)
2008275
(Education)
1993280 (Credit)

9 years
4 years
20 years
12 years

2002289
(Education,
Credit, and Other
Various
Protections)
1995294
(Education)
2000299 (Credit)
2006304 (Education
and Credit)

9 years

18 years
17 years
6 years

Nonrecognizing Jurisdictions with Antidiscrimination Measures
CO

N/A

305

306

307

308

310

311

N/A

NV

N/A

309

N/A

N/A

OR

N/A

312

313

314

315

N/A

WI

N/A

316

317

318

319

N/A

246. This column is only relevant for the enacting jurisdictions. It is
measured by the time which passed between the enactment of the
earliest nondiscrimination measure protecting against sexual orientation
discrimination and the enactment of same-sex marriage legislation.
247. An Act Implementing The Guarantee Of Equal Protection Under The
Constitution Of The State For Same Sex Couples, Pub. Acts No. 09-13,
sec. 3, 2009 Conn. Acts 78, 79 (Reg. Sess.) (codified as Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 46b-20 (2009)).
248. An Act Concerning Discrimination On The Basis Of Sexual Orientation,
Pub. Acts No. 91-58, sec. 3, 1991 Conn. Acts 118, 119 (codified as
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60 (West 2009)).
249. An Act Concerning Discrimination On The Basis Of Sexual Orientation,
Pub. Acts No. 91-58, sec. 5, 1991 Conn. Acts 118, 119-120; An Act
Concerning Discriminatory Housing Practices, Pub. Acts No. 92-257,
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sec. 2, 1992 Conn. Acts 839, 840-841 (codified as CONN. GEN. STAT. §
46a-64c (West 2009)).
250. An Act Concerning Discrimination On The Basis Of Sexual Orientation,
Pub. Acts No. 91-58, sec. 4, 1991 Conn. Acts 118, 119 (codified as
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-64 (West 2009)).
251. An Act Concerning Discrimination On The Basis Of Sexual Orientation,
Pub. Acts No. 91-58, sec. 10, 1991 Conn. Acts 118, 121 (codified as
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-75 (West 2009)).
252. An Act Concerning Discrimination On The Basis Of Sexual Orientation,
Pub. Acts No. 91-58, sec. 6, 1991 Conn. Acts 118, 120 (codified as
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-66 (West 2009)).
253. An Act To Amend Title 13 of the Delaware Code Relating to Domestic
Relations to Provide for Same-Gender Civil Marriage and to Convert
Civil Unions to Civil Marriages, H.B. 75, 147th Gen. Assemb. (Del.
2013) (enacted) (codified as Del. Code Ann. tit. 13 § 101 (2013)
(effective July 1, 2013).
254. An Act To Amend Titles 6, 9, 18, 19, 25, And 29 Of The Delaware
Code Relating To Discrimination In Employment, Public Works
Contracting, Housing, Equal Accommodations And The Insurance
Business, ch. 90, secs. 17-19, 77 Del. Laws 264, 265 (2009) (codified as
Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, § 711 (West 2013)).
255. An Act To Amend Titles 6, 9, 18, 19, 25, And 29 Of The Delaware
Code Relating To Discrimination In Employment, Public Works
Contracting, Housing, Equal Accommodations And The Insurance
Business, ch. 90, sec. 7, 77 Del. Laws 264, 265 (2009) (codified as Del.
Code Ann. tit. 6, § 4603 (West 2013).
256. An Act To Amend Titles 6, 9, 18, 19, 25, And 29 Of The Delaware
Code Relating To Discrimination In Employment, Public Works
Contracting, Housing, Equal Accommodations And The Insurance
Business, ch. 90, sec. 4, 77 Del. Laws 264 (2009) (codified as Del. Code
Ann. tit. 6, § 4604 (West 2013).
257. Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality Amendment Act of
2009, 57 D.C. Reg 27 (Mar. 10, 2010) (codified as D.C. Code § 46-401).
258. Human Rights Act of 1977, D.C. Law 2-38, title II, 24 D.C. Reg. 6038
(Dec. 13, 1977) (codified as D.C. Code § 2-1402.11 (LexisNexis 2012)).
259. Human Rights Act of 1977, D.C. Law 2-38, title II, 24 D.C. Reg. 6038
(Dec. 13, 1977) (codified as D.C. Code § 32-408 (LexisNexis 2012)).
260. Human Rights Act of 1977, D.C. Law 2-38, title II, 24 D.C. Reg. 6038
(Dec. 13, 1977) (codified as D.C. Code § 2-1402.21 (LexisNexis 2012)).
261. Human Rights Act of 1977, D.C. Law 2-38, title II, 24 D.C. Reg. 6038
(Dec. 13, 1977) (codified as D.C. Code § 2-1402.41 (LexisNexis 2012)).
262. Hawaii Marriage Equality Act of 2013, sec. 3, Hawaii S.B. No. 1 (2013)
(codified as Haw. Rev. Stat. § 572-1 (West 2013)) (effective Dec. 2,
2013).
263. A Bill For An Act Relating To Employment, Act 2, sec. 3, 1991 Haw.
Sess. Laws 3, 4-5 (codified as Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-2 (West 1991)).
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264. A Bill For An Act Relating To Civil Rights, Act 214, sec. 3 2005 Haw.
Sess. Laws 688, 689-690 (codified as Haw. Rev. Stat. § 515-3 (West
Supp. 2012)).
265. A Bill For An Act Relating To Civil Rights, Act 76, sec. 3, 2006 Haw.
Sess. Laws 214, 215 (codified as Haw. Rev. Stat. § 489-3 (West Supp.
2012)).
266. Religious Freedom and Marriage Fairness Act, S.B. 0010, 98th Gen.
Assemb. (Ill. 2013) (enacted) (to be codified at 750 Ill. Comp. Stat.
5/201 (2014)) (effective, June 1, 2014).
267. An Act Concerning Human Rights, Pub. Act No. 93-1078, art. 1, 2004
Ill. Laws 4837, 4838 (codified as 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/102(A) (West
2011)).
268. An Act Concerning Human Rights, Pub. Act No. 93-1078, art. 1, 2004
Ill. Laws 4837, 4838 (codified as 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/102(A) (West
2011)).
269. An Act Concerning Human Rights, Pub. Act No. 93-1078, art. 1, 2004
Ill. Laws 4837, 4838 (codified as 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/102(A) (West
2011)).
270. An Act Concerning Human Rights, Pub. Act No. 93-1078, art. 1, 2004
Ill. Laws 4837, 4838 (codified as 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/102(A) (West
2011)).
271. Civil Marriage Protection Act, ch. 2, sec. 1 2012 Md. Laws 9, 10
(codified as Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law §§2-201 (LexisNexis 2012))
(effective Jan. 1, 2013).
272. House Bill 51, ch. 120, sec. 6 2009 Md. Laws 540, 567-570 (codified as
Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 20-606 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013).
273. House Bill 51, ch. 120, sec. 7, 2009 Md. Laws 540, 581-583 (codified as
Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 20-705 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013).
274. House Bill 51, ch. 120, sec. 3 2009 Md. Laws 540, 554 (codified as Md.
Code Ann., State Gov’t § 20-304 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013).
275. An Act Concerning Public Schools-Bullying, Harassment, An
Intimidation-Policy And Disciplinary Standards, ch. 489, sec. 1, 2008
Md. Laws 4050, 4051-4054 (codified as Md. Code Ann., Educ. § 7424.1 (LexisNexis 2008)).
276. An Act Relating to Marriage, ch. 74, sec. 2, 2013 Minn. Laws 404, 405
(codified as Minn. Stat. Ann. § 517.01 (West 2013)) (Aug. 1, 2013).
277. An Act Relating to Human Rights: Prohibiting Unfair Discriminatory
Practices On The Basis Of Sexual Orientation, ch. 22, sec. 3, 1993 Minn.
Laws 121, 122-124 (codified as Minn. Stat. Ann. § 363.08 subd. 2
(West 2012)).
278. An Act Relating to Human Rights: Prohibiting Unfair Discriminatory
Practices On The Basis Of Sexual Orientation, ch. 22, sec. 4, 1993 Minn.
Laws 121, 124-125 (codified as Minn. Stat. Ann. § 363.09 (West
2012)).
279. An Act Relating to Human Rights: Prohibiting Unfair Discriminatory
Practices On The Basis Of Sexual Orientation, ch. 22, sec. 5, 1993 Minn.
Laws 121, 125-126 (codified as Minn. Stat. Ann. § 363A.11, subd. 1
(West 2012)).
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280. An Act Relating to Human Rights: Prohibiting Unfair Discriminatory
Practices On The Basis Of Sexual Orientation, ch. 22, sec. 12, 1993
Minn. Laws 121, 138-139 (codified as Minn. Stat. Ann. § 363A.16
(West 2012)).
281. An Act Relative to Civil Marriage and Civil Unions, ch. 59, 2009 N.H.
Laws 60, 60 (codified as N.H. Rev. Stat. § 457:1A (2010)).
282. An Act Amending The Law Against Discrimination To Prohibit
Discrimination On Account Of A Person’s Sexual Orientation, ch. 108,
1997 H.H. Laws 88, 91 (codified as N.H. Rev. Stat. § 354-A:6 (2009)).
283. An Act Amending The Law Against Discrimination To Prohibit
Discrimination On Account Of A Person’s Sexual Orientation, ch. 108,
1997 H.H. Laws 88, 92 (codified as N.H. Rev. Stat. § 354-A:8 (2009)).
284. An Act Amending The Law Against Discrimination To Prohibit
Discrimination On Account Of A Person’s Sexual Orientation, ch. 108,
1997 H.H. Laws 88, 92 (codified as N.H. Rev. Stat. § 354-A:10
(2009)).
285. Marriage Equality Act, ch. 95, 2011 N.Y. LAWS 749 (codified at N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a (McKinney Supp. 2014)).
286. Act of Dec. 17, 2002, ch. 2, secs. 2, 5–6, §§ 291, 296(1)–(1-a), 2002 N.Y.
LAWS 46, 46–48 (codified as amended at N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 291,
296(1)–(1-a) (McKinney 2013)).
287. Secs. 2, 8–9, 11, §§ 291, 296(2-a), (3-b), (5), 2002 N.Y. LAWS at 46–51
(codified as amended at N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 291, 296(2-a), (3-b), (5)
(McKinney 2013)).
288. Secs. 2, 7, §§ 291, 296(2) 2002 N.Y. LAWS at 46, 48 (codified as amended
at N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 291, 296(2) (McKinney 2013)).
289. Secs. 2, 10, 12–17, §§ 291, 296(4), (9)(a), (13), 296-a, 40-c, 313(1)(a),
(3), 2002 N.Y. LAWS at 46, 48, 51–53 (codified as amended at N.Y.
EXEC. LAW §§ 291, 296, 296-a; CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 40-c; EDUC. § 313
(McKinney 2013)).
290. An Act Relating to Domestic Relations-Persons Eligible to Marry, ch.
13-4, 2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ___ (codified as R.I. Gen. Laws §15-1-1
(2013))(effective Aug. 1, 2013).
291. An Act Relating To Civil Rights , ch. 32, sec. 4, 1995 R.I. Pub. Laws
83, 85-88 (codified as R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 28-5-7 (2003)).
292. An Act Relating To Civil Rights , ch. 32, sec. 3, 1995 R.I. Pub. Laws
83, 87-91 (codified as R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 34-37-4 (2013)).
293. An Act Relating To Civil Rights , ch. 32, sec. 7, 1995 R.I. Pub. Laws 83
(codified as R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 11-24-2 (Supp. 2013)).
294. An Act Relating To Civil Rights , ch. 32, sec. 7 1995 R.I. Pub. Laws 83,
107 (codified as R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 28-5.1-8 (Supp. 2013)).
295. An Act Relating to Civil Marriage, no. 3, 2009 Vt. Acts & Resolves 33
(codified as Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 8 (2009)).
296. An Act Relating To Discrimination On The Basis Of Sexual
Orientation, No. 135, 1992 Vt. Acts & Resolves 26, 26-27 (codified as
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 495(a) (2009))..

1250

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 3·2014
Marriage of Necessity

297. An Act Relating To Discrimination On The Basis Of Sexual
Orientation, No. 135, 1992 Vt. Acts & Resolves 26, 28-30 (codified as
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 4503 (Supp. 2013)).
298. An Act Relating To Discrimination On The Basis Of Sexual
Orientation, No. 135, 1992 Vt. Acts & Resolves 26, 30-31 (codified as
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 4502(a) (Supp. 2013)).
299. An Act Relating To The Modernization Of The Laws Related To Banks
And Banking, No. 153, 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 509, 593 (codified as
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8, § 10403 (Supp. 2013)).
300. An Act Requiring Protection For All Families In Washington By
Creating Equality In Civil Marriage And Changing Domestic Partner
Laws, While Protecting Religious Freedom, ch. 3, 2012 Wash. Sess.
Laws 199 (codified as Wash. Rev. Code § 26.04.010(1) (West 2012)).
301. An Act Relating To The Jurisdiction Of The Washington Human
Rights Commission, ch. 4, 2006 Wash. Sess. Laws 12 (codified as Wash.
Rev. Code § 49.60.180 (2012)).
302. An Act Relating To The Jurisdiction Of The Washington Human
Rights Commission, ch. 4, 2006 Wash. Sess. Laws 12 (codified as Wash.
Rev. Code § 49.60.222 (2012)).
303. An Act Relating To The Jurisdiction Of The Washington Human
Rights Commission, ch. 4, 2006 Wash. Sess. Laws 12 (codified as Wash.
Rev. Code § 49.60.215 (2012)).
304. An Act Relating To The Jurisdiction Of The Washington Human
Rights Commission, ch. 4, 2006 Wash. Sess. Laws 12 (codified as Wash.
Rev. Code § 49.60.040(2) (2012)).
305. An Act Concerning The Expansion Of Employment Nondiscrimination
Protections, ch. 295, 2007 Colo. Sess. Laws 1254, 1254-1256 (codified as
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-402 (2013)).
306. An Act Concerning The Expansion Of Prohibitions Against
Discrimination, ch. 341, 2008 Colo. Sess. Laws 1593, 1593-1595 (codified
as Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-502 (2013)).
307. An Act Concerning The Expansion Of Prohibitions Against
Discrimination, ch. 341, 2008 Colo. Sess. Laws 1593, 1595-1596 (codified
as Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-601 (2013)).
308. An Act Concerning The Expansion Of Prohibitions Against
Discrimination, ch. 341, 2008 Colo. Sess. Laws 1593, 1596-1597 (codified
as Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-59-106(1)(s) (2013)).
309. An Act Relating to Employment Practices, ch. 419, 1999 Nev. Stat.
1935, 1938 (codified as Nev. Rev. Stat. § 613.330 (2012)).
310. An Act Relating to Housing, ch. 191, 2011 Nev. State 867 (codified as
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 118.020 (Supp. 2013)).
311. An Act Relating to Public Accommodations, ch. 195, 2009 Nev. Stat.
716, 717 (codified as Nev. Rev. Stat. § 651.070 (West Supp. 2013)).
312. An Act Relating to Sexual Orientation Discrimination, ch. 100, sec. 29,
2007 Or. Laws 431, 443 (codified as Or. Rev. Stat. § 659.850(2)
(2013)).
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313. An Act Relating to Sexual Orientation Discrimination, ch. 100, sec. 4,
2007 Or. Laws 431, 432-433 (codified as Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030
(2013)).
314. An Act Relating to Sexual Orientation Discrimination, ch. 100, sec. 8,
2007 Or. Laws 431, 434-435 (codified as Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.421
(2013)).
315. An Act Relating to Sexual Orientation Discrimination, ch. 100, sec. 5,
2007 Or. Laws 431, 433 (codified as Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.403
(2013)).
316. 1981 Wisconsin Act 112, ch. 112, sec. 2, 1981 Wis. Sess. Laws 901, 902
(codified as Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.31(2) (West Supp. 2013)).
317. 1981 Wisconsin Act 112, ch. 112, sec. 4, 1981 Wis. Sess. Laws 901, 902
(codified as Wis. Stat. Ann. § 106.50 (West Supp. 2013)).
318. 1981 Wisconsin Act 112, ch. 112, sec.3, 1981 Wis. Sess. Laws 901, 902
(codified as Wis. Stat. Ann. § 106.52 (West Supp. 2013)).
319. 1989 Wisconsin 186, ch. 186, sec. 1, 1989 Wis. Sess. Laws 1113 (codified
as Wis. Stat. Ann. § 36.12 (West 2013)).

1252







330







D.C.





New York





Washington





Vermont




Hawaii









Illinois









Delaware





1253

Maryland








Rhode Island
New
Hampshire
Minnesota
Connecticut















9



Carries forward existing exemptions from preexisting
nondiscrimination statute329

8
Expressly exempts non-clergy authorized celebrants (e.g., judges and
justices of the peace) from duty to solemnize328

7
Expressly protect covered objectors from “promotion of marriage
through . . . housing designated for married individuals.”327

6

Expressly allow religiously affiliated fraternal organizations to limit
insurance coverage326

5

Allows a religiously affiliated adoption or foster care agency to place
children only with heterosexual couples unless program publicly
funded325

4

Expressly protect covered objectors from “promotion of same-sex
marriage through religious programs, counseling, courses, or
retreats”324

3

Expressly protect covered objectors, from government “penalty”323

2

Expressly protect covered objectors from private suit322

1

Expressly exempt a religious organization (including nonprofits)
from duty to “provide services, accommodations, advantages,
facilities, goods, or privileges” (or similar) for solemnization321

Expressly exempt clergy from duty to solemnize any marriage320
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Same-Sex Marriage by Legislation
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Table A3 (continued): Religious Liberty Protections in Same-Sex
Marriage States

Same-Sex Marriage by Ballot Initiative
Maine



Same-Sex Marriage by Judicial Decision
California

Iowa
Massachusetts
New Jersey
New Mexico
*
Oklahoma331

10

Carries forward existing exemptions from preexisting
nondiscrimination statute

9

Expressly exempts non-clergy authorized celebrants (e.g., judges
and justices of the peace) from duty to solemnize

8

Expressly protect covered objectors from “promotion of
marriage through … housing designated for married individuals.”

7

Expressly allow religiously affiliated fraternal organizations to
limit insurance coverage

6

Allows a religiously affiliated adoption or foster care agency to
place children only with heterosexual couples, unless program
publicly funded

5

Expressly protect covered objectors from “promotion of samesex marriage through religious programs, counseling, courses, or
retreats”

4

Expressly protect covered objectors, from government “penalty”

3

Expressly protect covered objectors from private suit

2

Expressly exempt a religious organization (including nonprofits)
from duty to “provide services, accommodations, advantages,
facilities, goods, or privileges” (or similar) for solemnization

Expressly exempt clergy from duty to solemnize any marriage

1




*

*

Utah332

320. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-22b (West 2009); Del. Code Ann. tit.
13, § 106 (2013), http://delcode.delaware.gov/title13/c001/sc01/index.
shtml; D.C. Code § 46-406(c) (LexisNexis 2012); S.B. No. 1 H.D.1 §
572-D, 27th Leg., 2nd Spec. Sess. (Haw. 2013); S.B. 10(a-5), 98th Gen.
Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013); Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law §§ 2-201, 2202, (LexisNexis 2012)); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 517.09 (West Supp. 2013);
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(II) (Supp. 2013); N.Y. Dom. Rel.
Law § 11(1) (McKinney Supp. 2014); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 5144(b)
(2012); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 15-3-6.1(b) (LexisNexis 2013); Wash.
Rev. Code § 26.04.010(4) (LexisNexis 2013). See also Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 19-A, § 655 (Supp. 2013). See also Cal. Fam. Code § 400
(West Supp. 2013) (“Although marriage is a personal relation arising
out of a civil, and not a religious, contract, a marriage may be
solemnized by any of the following who is 18 years of age or older: (a) A
priest, minister, rabbi, or authorized person of any religious
denomination. A person authorized by this subdivision shall not be
required to solemnize a marriage that is contrary to the tenets of his or
her faith. Any refusal to solemnize a marriage under this subdivision,
either by an individual or by a religious denomination, shall not affect
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the tax-exempt status of any entity.”); Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d. 865,
871 (N.M. 2013) (“Our holding will not interfere with the religious
freedom of religious organizations or clergy because (1) no religious
organization will have to change its policies to accommodate samegender couples, and (2) no religious clergy will be required to solemnize
a marriage in contravention of his or her religious beliefs.”).
321. See Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 46b-22b, 46b-35a (West 2009 & Supp. 2013);
D.C. Code § 46-406(e) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013); S.B. No. 1 H.D.1 § 572-E
(Haw. 2013); S.B. 10 (a-10) (Ill. 2013) (covers “facility” only; organizations
with “principal purpose” to advance religion); Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law
§§ 2-201, 2-202 (LexisNexis 2012); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 363A.26(3) (West
Supp. 2013); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III) (Supp. 2013); N.Y.
Dom. Rel. Law § 10-b(1) (McKinney Supp. 2014); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8,
§ 4501(1) (Supp. 2013); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 15-3-6.1(c) (2013); Wash.
Rev. Code Ann. § 26.04.010(5) (LexisNexis 2013). See also Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 19-A, § 655 (Supp. 2013) (provides there is no duty to “host”;
encompasses “other religious institution”).
322. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-35a (Supp. 2013); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13
§ 106
(2013),
http://delcode.delaware.gov/title13/c001/sc01/
index.shtml; D.C. Code § 46-406(e)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013); S.B. No. 1
H.D.1 § 572-D (Haw. 2013); S.B. 10 (a-5) (Ill. 2013); Md. Code Ann.,
Fam. Law §§ 2-201, 2-202 (LexisNexis 2012); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 517.09
(West Supp. 2013); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III) (Supp. 2013);
N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-b(1) (McKinney Supp. 2014); R.I. Gen. Laws
Ann. § 15-3-6.1 (2013); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8, § 5144(b) (2012); Wash.
Rev. Code § 26.04.010(6) (LexisNexis 2013). See also Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 19-A, § 655 (Supp. 2013).
323. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-35a (Supp. 2013); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13
§ 106
(2013),
http://delcode.delaware.gov/title13/c001/sc01/
index.shtml; D.C. Code § 46-406(e)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013); S.B. No. 1
H.D.1 § 572-D–E (Haw. 2013); S.B. 10 (a-10) (Ill. 2013); Md. H.B. 438 §§
2–3 (codified as Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law §§ 2-201, 2-202 (LexisNexis
2012); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 517.09 (West Supp. 2013); N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 457:37(III) (Supp. 2013); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-b(1)
(McKinney Supp. 2014); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 15-3-6.1 (2013); Wash.
Rev. Code § 26.04.010(4) (LexisNexis 2013). See also Me. Rev. Stat. tit.
19-A, § 655 (Supp. 2013). See also Cal. Fam. Code § 400(a) (West Supp.
2014) (“Any refusal to solemnize a marriage under this subdivision, either
by an individual or by a religious denomination, shall not affect the taxexempt status of any entity.”).
324. See D.C. Code § 46-406(e) (2011) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013). See also N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III) (Supp. 2013) (exempting “the promotion of
marriage through religious counseling, programs, courses, retreats, or
housing designated for married individuals”); Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law
§§ 2-201, 2-202 (LexisNexis 2012) (this protection only applies if the
program receives no state or federal funding); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 15-36.1 (2013) (exempting the “promotion of marriage through any social or
religious programs or service”); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §
26.04.010(7)(a)(ii (LexisNexis 2013)). New York may protect this. See N.Y.
Dom. Rel. Law § 10-b(2) (McKinney Supp. 2014) (“nothing in this article
shall limit or diminish the right, . . . of any religious or denominational
institution or organization, or any organization operated for charitable or
educational purposes, which is operated, supervised or controlled by or in
connection with a religious organization . . . from taking such action as is
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calculated by such organization to promote the religious principles for which
it is established or maintained”).
325. See Conn. Pub. Acts No. 09-13 § 19 (2009) (requiring that “such religious
organization does not receive state or federal funds for that specific program
or purpose”); Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law §§ 2-201, 2-202 (LexisNexis 2012)
(no “promotion” through “social programs . . . unless state or federal
funds” for “specific program”); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 517.201 (West Supp.
2014) (conditioning protection on fact that covered entity “does not receive
public funds for that specific program or purpose”). Rhode Island does not
condition this protection on not receiving public funds. R.I. Gen. Laws
Ann. § 15-3-6.1(c)(2) (2013).
326. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8 § 4501(b) (Supp. 2013); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 457:37(IV) (Supp. 2013); Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law §§ 2-201, 2-202
(LexisNexis 2012); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 15-3-6.1(e) (2013).
327. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III) (Supp. 2013). See also N.Y. Dom.
Rel. Law § 10-b(2) (McKinney Supp. 2014) (“[N]othing in this article shall
limit or diminish the right, . . . of any religious or denominational
institution or organization, or any organization operated for charitable or
educational purposes, which is operated, supervised or controlled by or in
connection with a religious organization to limit employment or sales or
rental of housing accommodations or admission to or give preference to
persons of the same religion or denomination”); Minn. Stat. Ann. §
363A.26 (West 2013) (providing that religious organization are not
prohibited from “in matters relating to sexual orientation, taking any action
with respect to . . . housing and real property”). See also N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 28-1-9 (West Supp. 2012) (“B. bar any religious or denominational
institution or organization that is operated, supervised or controlled by or
that is operated in connection with a religious or denominational
organization from limiting admission to or giving preference to persons of
the same religion or denomination or from making selections of buyers,
lessees or tenants as are calculated by the organization or denomination to
promote the religious or denominational principles for which it is established
or maintained, unless membership in the religious or denominational
organization is restricted on account of race, color, national origin or
ancestry; C. bar any religious or denominational institution or organization
that is operated, supervised or controlled by or that is operated in
connection with a religious or denominational organization from imposing
discriminatory employment or renting practices that are based upon sexual
orientation or gender identity; provided, that the provisions of the Human
Rights Act with respect to sexual orientation and gender identity shall
apply to any other:(1) for-profit activities of a religious or denominational
institution or religious organization subject to the provisions of Section
511(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended; or(2) nonprofit
activities of a religious or denominational institution or religious
organization subject to the provisions of Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended”).
328. Del. Code Ann. tit. 13 § 106 (2013), http://delcode.delaware.gov/
title13/c001/sc01/index.shtml (“[N]othing in this section shall be construed
to require any person (including any clergyperson or minister of any
religion) authorized to solemnize a marriage to solemnize any marriage, and
no such authorized person who fails or refuses for any reason to solemnize a
marriage shall be subject to any fine or other penalty for such failure or
refusal.”).
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329. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37 (“Nothing in this chapter shall be
deemed or construed to limit the protections and exemptions provided to
religious organizations under RSA 354-A:18.”); SF 925, 85th Legis. Reg.
Sess. (Minn. 2013) (“This chapter does not alter or affect the protections or
exemptions provided in chapter 363A for a religious association, educational
institution, business, labor union, place of public accommodation, employer,
or other person.”); S.B. 10, 98th Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013)
(“Nothing in this Act . . . is it intended to abrogate, limit, or expand the
Illinois Human Rights Act or the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.”);
R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 15-3-6.1 “Nothing in the marriage laws of this
state shall be deemed or construed to limit the protections and exemptions
provided to religious organizations under GL paragraph 28-5-6(7)(ii) and
subsection 34-37-4.2(a)”); 3. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-b. (“Nothing in this
section shall be deemed or construed to limit the protections and
exemptions otherwise provided to religious organizations under section three
of article one of the constitution of the state of New York.”). A catch-all
provision in Delaware provides that the same-sex marriage law “does not
affect rights, duties or obligations that matured or were owed, penalties that
were incurred, or proceedings that were begun, before its effective date.”
Delaware Laws Ch. 19 (H.B. 75 2013). See also In re Marriage Cases, 43
Cal. 4th 757, 784, 183 P.3d 384, 452 (2008), vacated by Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 113 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (“[a]ffording same-sex couples the opportunity
to obtain the designation of marriage will not impinge upon the religious
freedom of any religious \organization, official, or any other person; no
religion will be required to change its religious policies or practices with
regard to same-sex couples, and no religious officiant will be required to
solemnize a marriage in contravention of his or her religious beliefs. (Cal.
Const., art. I, § 4.).”); Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d. 865 (“Our holding will
not interfere with the religious freedom of religious organizations or clergy
because (1) no religious organization will have to change its policies to
accommodate same-gender couples, and (2) no religious clergy will be
required to solemnize a marriage in contravention of his or her religious
beliefs. )
330. Connecticut passed legislation on the heels of a judicial decision requiring
same-sex marriage. See Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 957
A.2d 407(2008).
331. Bishop v. U.S. ex rel. Holder, No. 04-CV-848-TCK-TLW, 2014 WL 116013,
at *33 (N.D. Okla. Jan 14, 2014) (permanently enjoining Oklahoma’s
constitutional same-sex marriage ban because it “violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
by precluding same-sex couples from receiving an Oklahoma marriage
license.”). The court stayed execution of the permanent injunction pending
any appeals in the Tenth Circuit. Id.
332. Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 2:13-cv-217, 2013 WL 6697874, at *27 (D. Utah
Dec. 20, 2013) (“Although the State did not directly present an argument
based on religious freedom, the court notes that its decision does not
mandate any change for religious institutions, which may continue to
express their own moral viewpoints and define their own traditions about
marriage. If anything, the recognition of same-sex marriage expands
religious freedom because some churches that have congregations in Utah
desire to perform same-sex wedding ceremonies but are currently unable to
do so, . . . By recognizing the right to marry a partner of the same sex, the
State allows these groups the freedom to practice their religious beliefs
without mandating that other groups must adopt similar practices.”).
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Table A4: State Political Climate333
Senate 2013

Alabama

South

37

63

Democrat

Gov.
Republican

House 2013
Republican

Region

Democrat

State

Constitutional
Ban

D/R
(Ind.)

11

23

R

X

Alaska

Pacific

14

26

7

13

R

X

Arizona

West

24

36

13

16

R

X

Arkansas

South

48

51

13

21

D

X

California

West

52

25

28

12

D

Colorado

West

37

38

18

17

D

Connecticut

Northeast

98

53

22

14

D

Delaware

South

27

14

13

8

D

DC

South

Florida

South

44

75

14

26

R

X

Georgia

South

58

118

18

37

R

X

Hawaii

Pacific

44

7

24

1

D

X

-

Idaho

West

13

57

7

28

R

Illinois

Midwest

71

47

40

19

D

X

Indiana

Midwest

31

68

13

37

R

Iowa

Midwest

46

53

26

23

R

Kansas

Midwest

32

91

8

32

R

X

Kentucky

South

54

45

14

23

D

X

Louisiana

South

43

59

13

26

R

X

Maine

Northeast

89

58

19

15

R

Maryland

South

98

43

34

11

D

Massachusetts

Northeast

130

29

36

3

D

Michigan

Midwest

49

59

12

26

R

Minnesota

Midwest

73

61

39

28

D

Mississippi

south

58

64

20

32

R

X

X

333. Sources: Region: Chapter 6-Statistical Groupings of States and Counties,
U.S. Census Bureau (last accessed Jan. 31, 2014) available at:
http://www.census.gov/geo/reference/pdfs/GARM/Ch6GARM.pdf; House,
Senate, and Governor data drawn from ballotpedia.org; Constitutional ban
and lock-in effect, see Part II.D; Sexual Orientation Protection: States With
Protections for Being Gay, N.Y. Times (May 31, 2013), http://www.
nytimes.com/interactive/2013/05/31/business/States-With-Protections-forBeing-Gay.html?ref=your-money; Education: Educational Attainment, US
Census
Bureau
(2011)
available
at:
http://www.census.gov/
hhes/socdemo/education/; Religiosity from State of the States, Gallop,
(2012) available at: http://www.gallup.com/poll/125066/state-states.aspx;
Nate Silver, How Opinion on Same-Sex Marriage Is Changing, and What It
Means
New
York
Times
(Mar.
26
2013)
available
at
http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/26/how-opinion-on-samesex-marriage-is-changing-and-what-it-means/?_r=0.
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Education

Lock In
Effect

State

Sexual
Orientation
Protection

Table A4 (continued): State Political Climate
Religiosity
2012

Nate Silver's Projected Support

% very
religious

2008

2012

2016

2020

Alabama

Mild

No

30

55.7

24.4

29.9

35.9

42.5

Alaska

Mild

No

36

31.3

41.5

47.6

53.7

59.6

Arizona

Negligible

No

35

36.6

42.4

48.4

54.6

60.7

Arkansas

Negligible

No

25

52.3

31.1

36.8

42.8

49.1

41

34.5

48.6

54.6

60.4

66.1

49

33.5

45.8

52

58

64

Connecticut

51

30.5

52

58.2

64.1

69.8

Delaware

40

35.2

49.2

55.7

62

68

DC

77

29.7

57.1

63.1

68.7

74

46.6

52.9

59.3

California
Colorado

Strong

Yes

Florida

Negligible

No

34

37.6

40.4

Georgia

Strong

No

37

47.9

30.8

36.7

42.9

49.5

40

31.4

52.2

58.6

64.6

70.3

31

45.1

36.4

42.4

48.5

54.8

Illinois

42

38

45.8

52.2

58.4

64.6

Indiana

31

42.7

37.8

43.7

49.8

55.9

Iowa

33

41.3

40.2

46.5

52.8

59.1

Hawaii
Idaho

Strong

No

Kansas

Strong

No

40

45.1

36.8

42.8

48.9

55.1

Kentucky

Mild

No

30

45.4

35.7

41.8

48

54.4

Louisiana

Strong

No

28

53.3

29.3

35.1

41.4

48.1

Maine

37

24.4

44.8

51.1

57.2

63.2

Maryland

52

36.7

48.6

55

61.2

67.2

Massachusetts

55

26.5

56.4

62.9

69

74.5

34

36.5

42.7

48.9

55

61.2

42

38.2

46.3

52.3

58.2

64

27

58.4

20.9

25.9

31.5

37.8

Michigan

Negligible

No

Minnesota
Mississippi

Mild

No
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Table A4 (continued): State Political Climate
Gov.

Republican

Senate 2013

Democrat

House 2013

Republican

Region

Democrat

State

Constitutional
Ban

D/R
(Ind.)

Missouri

Midwest

53

109

10

24

D

X

Montana

West

39

61

21

29

D

X

Nebraska

Midwest

0

0

0

0

R

X

Nevada

West

26

15

11

10

R

X

New
Hampshire

Northeast

218

179

11

13

D

New Jersey

Northeast

47

32

24

16

R

New Mexico

West

37

32

25

17

R

New York

Northeast

105

42

33

30

D

South

42

77

17

33

R

X

Midwest

23

71

14

33

R

X

Ohio

Midwest

38

61

10

23

R

X

Oklahoma

South

29

72

12

36

R

Ruled Uncon.
X

North
Carolina
North
Dakota

Oregon

West

34

26

16

14

D

Pennsylvani
a

Northeast

92

110

23

27

R

Rhode Island

Northeast

69

6

32

5

Ind.

South

45

78

18

28

R

X

Midwest

17

53

7

27

R

X

Tennessee

South

27

70

7

26

R

X

Texas

South

54

95

12

19

R

X

Utah

West

14

61

5

24

R

Ruled Uncon.

Vermont

Northeast

94

45

21

7

D

Virginia

South

32

65

20

20

R

Washington

West

55

43

26

23

D

West
Virginia

South

53

46

24

10

D

Wisconsin

Midwest

39

57

15

18

R

Wyoming

West

8

52

4

26

R

South
Carolina
South
Dakota
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Education

Sexual
Orientation
Protection

State

Lock In Effect

Table A4 (continued): State Political Climate

Religiosity
2012

Nate Silver's Projected Support

% very
religious

2008

2012

2016

2020

Missouri

Mild

No

35

42.1

37.5

43.6

49.7

56

Montana

Mild

No

36

34

41.9

47.8

53.7

59.6

Nebraska

Strong

No

36

44.2

37.9

44

50.2

56.5

Nevada

Mild

Yes

29

31.4

46.7

53

59.2

65.2

New
Hampshire

43

23.4

50.6

57.1

63.2

69.1

New Jersey

47

34.7

50.6

57

63.1

69

New Mexico

36

43.2

43.3

49.6

55.8

61.9

New York

46

31.5

51.9

58.1

64

69.7

North
Carolina
North
Dakota
Ohio

Strong

No

35

49.5

34.2

40.2

46.3

52.7

Negligible

No

33

41.6

38.5

44.8

51.2

57.7

Mild

No

33

38.2

40.4

46.6

52.8

59.1

Oklahoma

Mild

No

30

47.6

32.5

38.4

44.7

51.2

Oregon

Mild

Yes

40

28.8

48

54

59.7

65.4

Pennsylvania

37

39.5

45.8

52

58

64

Rhode Island

42

29.1

56.3

63.1

69.3

75.1

South
Carolina
South
Dakota

Strong

No

32

51.9

31.6

37.3

43.3

49.7

Mild

No

32

45.6

37.1

43.3

49.7

56.1

Tennessee

Mild

No

31

50.3

34.5

40.3

46.3

52.6

Texas

Strong

No

34

47

33.4

39.4

45.8

52.4

Utah

Strong

No

38

56

36.3

42.1

48.1

54.2

46

19.1

51.6

57.8

63.8

69.4

48

41.1

41.1

47.2

53.3

59.5

Washington

42

30.5

49.6

55.7

61.5

67.2

West
Virginia

24

41.9

37.3

43.5

49.9

56.3

34

36.7

45.6

51.8

58

64

31

32.8

34.6

40.6

46.8

53.2

Vermont
Virginia

Wisconsin
Wyoming

Mild

Mild

No

Yes
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Table A5: Vote Margins in Enacting Jurisdictions334
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334. Support at time of enactment: Connecticut Voters Back Same-Sex
Marriage, Quinnipiac University Poll Finds; Rell Approval Holds as
Dodd, Lieberman Scores Drop, Quinnipiac Univ. (Dec. 17, 2008),
http://www.quinnipiac.edu/institutes-and-centers/polling-institute/
connecticut/release-detail?ReleaseID=1243; New Poll: 54% of Delaware
Voters Support Marriage Equality Del. Equality (Mar. 4, 2013),
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/equalitydelaware/pages/54/
attachments/original/1362425933/Equality_Delaware_Press_Release__New_Poll_54__Support.pdf?1362425933; D.C. Poll, Wash. Post
(2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/postpoll
_013110.html; Poll: Hawaii Voters Support Allowing Gay Couples to
Marry,
Civil
Beat
(Jan.
28,
2013,
3:18
PM
HST),
http://hawaii.politics.government.blogs.civilbeat.com/post/41745936105
/poll-hawaii-voters-support-allowing-gay-couples-to;
Greg
Hinz,
Illinoisans back gay marriage 50-29: Crain’s/Ipsos poll, Crain’s
Chicago Business (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/
article/20130219/BLOGS02/130219779/illinoisans-back-gay-marriage-5029-crains-ipsos-poll#; Question 6 Civil Marriage Protection Act, Md.
State Board of Elections (Nov. 28, 2012), http://elections.
state.md.us/elections/2012/results/general/gen_detail_qresults_2012_4
_0006S-.html; Minnesotans like Dayton, Split on Gay marriage, Public
Policy Polling (June 1, 2011), http://www.publicpolicypolling.com/
pdf/PPP_Release_MN_06011118.pdf; New Poll Shows Majority of New
Hampshire Voters Continue to Support Marriage Equality for Lesbian
and Gay Couples, National Center for Lesbian Rights (2009),
http://nclrights.wordpress.com/2009/04/28/new-poll-shows-majority-ofnew-hampshire-voters-continue-to-support-marriage-equality-for-lesbianand-gay-couples/; 8/10: Majority Supports Legalization of Same-Sex
Marriage…63% Want Law to Remain in Place, Marist Poll (Aug. 10,
2011), http://maristpoll.marist.edu/810-majority-supports-legalizationof-same-sex-marriage%E2%80%A663-want-law-to-remain-in-place/
#sthash.gIbZUN2p.dpuf; Ted Nesi, Poll: Raimondo is favorite for gov;
Chafee
does
best
as
a
Dem, WPRI.
(Jan.
31,
2013),
http://blogs.wpri.com/2013/01/31/poll-raimondo-is-favorite-for-govchafees-best-shot-as-dem/; Minnesota Amendment 1 Same-Sex Marriage
Ballot Measure Fails, Huffington Post (Nov. 7, 2012), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/07/minnesota-amendment-1-results2012_n_2050310.html; Vote Counts: Substitute for Raised S.B. No.
899, Session Year 2009, Conn. Gen. Assem., http://www.
cga.ct.gov/asp/cgabillstatus/cgabillstatus.asp?selBillType=Bill&bill_nu
m=899&which_year=2009; Zach Ford, Delaware Becomes 11th State
with Marriage Equality, Think Progress (May 7, 2013)
http://thinkprogress.org/lgbt/2013/05/07/1975311/breaking-delawareto-become-11th-state-with-marriage-equality/; Governor Signs Marriage
Equality Bill into Law, State of Delaware (May 7, 2013),
http://news.delaware.gov/2013/05/07/governor-signs-marriage-equalitybill-into-law/;
Ian Urbina, District of Columbia Backs Same-Sex
Marriage, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 2009, at A28; Abercrombie signs samesex marriage bill into law, Honolulu Star-Advertiser (Nov. 13,
2013),
http://www.staradvertiser.com/news/breaking/20131113_
Abercrombie_to_sign_samesex_marriage_bill_into_law.html;
Reid
Wilson, Hawaii Set to Legalize Same Sex Marriage, Washington Post,
Nov. 13, 2013, at A2; Dave Mckinney, Gay marriage bill passes state
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House, Senate — heads to Quinn’s desk, Chicago Sun-Times (Dec. 7,
2013 6:25 AM), http://www.suntimes.com/23558841-761/gay-marriagebill-passes-in-illinois-house.html; Ill. S., S, Vote: S.B. 10 3rd Reading, 98th
Gen. Assem. at 1 (2013); Ill. H., H. Vote: S.B. 10 3rd Reading, 98th Gen.
Assem., at 4 (2013); David Hill, Maryland senate approves same-sex
marriage bill, Wash. Times (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.washington
times.com/news/2012/feb/23/maryland-senate-approves-same-sexmarriage-bill/?utm_source=RSS_Feed&utm_medium=RSS;
Bill
Information: H.B. 438 2012 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2012), http://mgaleg.
maryland.gov/webmga/frmMain.aspx?ys=2012rs%2fbillfile%2fhb0438.ht
m; HF 1054: Status in the House for the 88th Legislature (Minn. 2013),
https://www.revisor.mn.gov/bills/bill.php?view=chrono&f=HF1054&y=
2013&ssn=0&b=house#actions; Press Release, Empowering Spirits,
Empowering Spirits Applauds Passage of NH Marriage Equality Bill,
(Jun. 3, 2009),
http://www.empoweringspirits.org/PRDocServer/
Passage_of_NH_Marriage_Equality_Bill_060309.pdf; A.B 8520-2011:
N.Y. Open Legislation, N.Y. Sen. (2011), http://open.nysenate.gov/
legislation/bill/A8520-2011 (last visited Aug. 12, 2013); Randal Edgar,
R.I. Senate approves same-sex marriage 26 to 12, Providence
Journal (Apr. 24, 2013), http://news.providencejournal.com/breakingnews/2013/04/same-sex-marriage-bills-clear-rhode-island-senate.html;
Randal Edgar, Rhode Island House passes bill legalizing same-sex
marriage, 56 to 15 (May 2, 2013), http://news.providencejournal.com/
breaking-news/2013/05/rhode-island-house-passes-same-sex-marriagebill-56-to-15.html; Journal of the House of Representatives, H. Vol. 140,
No.41, May 2, Sess., at 11 (R.I. 2013); Journal of the Senate, S. Vol.
140, No.41, Apr. 24, Sess., at 8 (R.I. 2013); Status Summary: S. 115,
Vt. Leg. (2009), http://www.leg.state.vt.us/database/status/summary.
cfm?Bill=S.0115&Session=2010; Tom Watkins, Washington state
legislature votes to approve same-sex marriage, CNN (Feb. 9, 2012),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/08/us/washington-same-sexmarriage/index.html.
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Table A6: Same-Sex Marriage Support
(and Opposition) in Constitutional Ban States

Georgia (2004)

1994-96
Support
21

Strong
Support at time
of Ban
23.80

Idaho (2006)

17

36.65

Kansas (2005)

24

Louisiana
(2004)
North Carolina
(2012)
South Carolina
(2006)
Texas (2005)

Lock-In
2008
Support
34

2012 Support
(projected)
36.7

2016 Support
(projected)
42.9

33

42.4

48.5

30.00

37

42.8

48.9

23

22.22

36

35.1

41.4

21

38.94

36

40.2

46.3

21

22.00

32

37.3

43.3

24

23.75

35

39.4

45.8

1994-96
Support
17

Mild Lock-In
Support at time
2008
of Ban
Support
19.00
26

2012 Support
(projected)
29.9

2016 Support
(projected)
35.9

23

31.89

45

47.6

53.7

18

25.00

31

41.8

48

26

32.80

50

53

59.2

Oregon (2004)

26

43.00

52

54

59.7

Tennessee
(2006)
Virginia (2006)

19

19.00

31

40.3

46.3

24

42.94

42

47.2

53.3

26

41.00

44

51.8

58

1994-96
Support
25

Negligible Lock-In
Support at time
2008
of Ban
Support
43.80
48

2012 Support
(projected)
48.4

2016 Support
(projected)
54.6

17

25.05

29

36.8

42.8

27

44.98

52

52

58

26

38.10

41

46.6

52.9

26

41.00

46

48.9

55

17

14.00

27

25.9

31.5

26

29.40

37

43.6

49.7

23

33.50

45

47.8

53.7

20

29.90

35

44

50.2

22

26.77

38

44.8

51.2

24

38.29

45

46.6

52.8

23

48.17

38

43.3

49.7

Alabama
(2006)
Alaska (1998)
Kentucky
(2004)
Nevada (2002)

Wisonsin
(2006)

Arizona (2008)
Arkansas
(2004)
Colorado
(2006)
Florida (2008)
Michigan
(2004)
Mississippi
(2004)
Missouri
(2004)
Montana
(2004)
Nebraska
(2000)
North Dakota
(2004)
Ohio (2004)
South Dakota
(2006)
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Table A7: Support for Same-Sex Marriage by Age,
With and Without the Oldest Generation (65 and Older)335
STATE/
SUPPORT
Massachusetts
Vermont
Rhode Island
Connecticut
New York
New
Hampshire
Maine
California
Washington
Hawaii
New Jersey
Colorado
Oregon
Nevada
New Mexico
Arizona
Minnesota
Pennsylvania
Alaska
Wisconsin
Illinois
Montana
Maryland
Delaware
Michigan
Florida
Ohio
Iowa
Virginia
Wyoming
Kansas
South Dakota
Indiana
North Dakota
Missouri
Idaho
Nebraska
West Virginia
Texas
North
Carolina
Georgia
Louisiana
South
Carolina
Kentucky
Tennessee
Utah
Oklahoma
Arkansas
Mississippi
Alabama

65+

45-64

30-44

18-29

Average

34
33
32
32
32

53
49
49
49
47

61
57
58
57
56

74
70
71
69
70

55.5
52.3
52.5
51.8
51.3

Weighted
Average
56.2
52.1
53.0
51.8
51.8

31

47

56

69

50.8

30
31
28
27
27
26
26
26
25
25
23
24
22
23
23
23
23
23
21
23
20
20
19
19
19
18
17
16
17
16
16
16
16

46
46
45
46
45
44
44
43
43
41
38
40
36
38
38
38
37
36
35
36
34
34
33
32
32
31
30
30
30
30
29
29
28

56
53
53
53
53
50
50
49
49
48
47
48
44
46
46
46
45
45
43
44
43
43
40
39
40
40
38
39
38
37
36
37
35

69
67
66
66
67
63
64
64
63
62
61
63
57
61
60
60
58
59
57
57
56
56
54
54
54
54
53
53
52
51
51
52
48

50.3
49.3
48.0
48.0
48.0
45.8
46.0
45.5
45.0
44.0
42.3
43.8
39.8
42.0
41.8
41.8
40.8
40.8
39.0
40.0
38.3
38.3
36.5
36.0
36.3
35.8
34.5
34.5
34.3
33.5
33.0
33.5
31.8

18-29

30-44

45-64

65+

21.7
20.2
22.5
19.7
22.3

25.3
22.7
23.9
25.0
25.9

35.4
38.8
35.3
36.9
34.4

17.6
18.4
18.3
18.4
17.4

50.6

19.1

24.3

39.3

17.3

49.2
50.7
49.0
48.6
48.5
47.4
46.5
46.6
45.7
44.6
42.7
43.5
41.9
42.2
42.5
41.5
41.4
40.7
39.0
39.2
38.2
38.2
37.3
36.6
36.7
35.8
34.9
35.1
34.4
34.3
33.4
32.6
33.2

17.9
23.9
22.1
21.5
20.4
22.7
20.9
21.8
22.2
22.6
21.6
20.7
25.0
21.2
22.2
20.8
21.5
21.4
20.8
19.7
20.7
21.7
22.3
22.8
23.0
22.5
22.0
25.0
22.0
23.1
22.9
18.9
24.3

23.1
27.7
26.4
25.1
26.4
27.6
25.7
28.3
24.5
26.0
25.6
23.6
26.9
24.7
26.7
22.4
26.2
24.6
24.5
24.0
24.6
23.8
26.6
24.2
24.7
23.3
25.5
22.3
24.5
25.7
24.6
23.9
28.5

39.0
33.2
35.4
35.0
35.7
35.3
35.4
34.0
35.7
32.9
35.8
35.9
37.6
36.2
34.5
37.7
36.2
35.3
36.6
34.3
36.3
35.0
35.3
36.7
34.6
35.2
35.2
34.1
35.2
34.1
34.5
37.0
33.0

20.1
15.2
16.1
18.4
17.5
14.4
18.0
15.9
17.6
18.5
17.0
19.8
10.5
17.9
16.5
19.1
16.1
18.7
18.1
22.0
18.5
19.6
15.9
16.3
17.7
19.0
17.3
18.7
18.3
17.1
18.0
20.3
14.2

15

27

34

47

30.8

31.2

21.6

26.8

34.6

17.0

14
15

26
26

33
33

45
46

29.5
30.0

30.6
30.7

22.9
23.6

28.5
25.2

34.2
34.8

14.4
16.3

14

24

31

44

28.3

28.4

22.0

25.0

35.1

17.9

13
12
11
12
12
10
10

23
23
20
21
21
19
19

30
29
26
27
27
25
25

44
42
37
40
40
36
36

27.5
26.5
23.5
25.0
25.0
22.5
22.5

27.5
26.6
25.5
25.2
24.9
22.9
22.9

21.2
21.1
28.9
23.0
21.6
22.9
23.6

25.9
26.0
29.1
24.8
25.0
25.3
24.5

35.6
35.3
28.9
34.3
34.4
34.6
34.2

17.4
17.5
13.1
17.9
19.0
17.2
17.6
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Table A7 (continued): Support for Same-Sex Marriage by Age,
With and Without the Oldest Generation (65 and Older)
STATE/
SUPPORT
Massachusetts
Vermont
Rhode Island
Connecticut
New York
New Hampshire
Maine
California
Washington
Hawaii
New Jersey
Colorado
Oregon
Nevada
New Mexico
Arizona
Minnesota
Pennsylvania
Alaska
Wisconsin
Illinois
Montana
Maryland
Delaware
Michigan
Florida
Ohio
Iowa
Virginia
Wyoming
Kansas
South Dakota
Indiana
North Dakota
Missouri
Idaho
Nebraska
West Virginia
Texas
North Carolina
Georgia
Louisiana
South Carolina
Kentucky
Tennessee
Utah
Oklahoma
Arkansas
Mississippi
Alabama

45-64

30-44

18-29

Average

53
49
49
49
47
47
46
46
45
46
45
44
44
43
43
41
38
40
36
38
38
38
37
36
35
36
34
34
33
32
32
31
30
30
30
30
29
29
28
27
26
26
24
23
23
20
21
21
19
19

61
57
58
57
56
56
56
53
53
53
53
50
50
49
49
48
47
48
44
46
46
46
45
45
43
44
43
43
40
39
40
40
38
39
38
37
36
37
35
34
33
33
31
30
29
26
27
27
25
25

74
70
71
69
70
69
69
67
66
66
67
63
64
64
63
62
61
63
57
61
60
60
58
59
57
57
56
56
54
54
54
54
53
53
52
51
51
52
48
47
45
46
44
44
42
37
40
40
36
36

62.67
58.67
59.33
58.33
57.67
57.33
57.00
55.33
54.67
55.00
55.00
52.33
52.67
52.00
51.67
50.33
48.67
50.33
45.67
48.33
48.00
48.00
46.67
46.67
45.00
45.67
44.33
44.33
42.33
41.67
42.00
41.67
40.33
40.67
40.00
39.33
38.67
39.33
37.00
36.00
34.67
35.00
33.00
32.33
31.33
27.67
29.33
29.33
26.67
26.67
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Weighted
Average
60.99
56.41
57.69
56.28
56.03
54.72
54.04
54.20
53.05
53.42
53.01
50.98
50.98
50.46
50.17
49.05
46.77
48.28
44.27
46.34
46.42
45.87
44.89
44.78
42.99
43.76
42.30
42.58
40.77
40.01
40.54
39.98
38.59
39.52
38.32
38.02
37.24
36.84
36.00
34.46
33.41
33.76
31.50
30.58
29.75
27.66
28.13
27.91
25.54
25.66

18-29

30-44

45-64

26.4
24.7
27.5
24.1
27.0
23.1
22.4
28.1
26.3
26.3
24.8
26.5
25.5
25.9
26.9
27.7
26.1
25.8
27.9
25.8
26.6
25.7
25.7
26.3
25.4
25.2
25.4
26.9
26.5
27.2
27.9
27.8
26.6
30.7
26.9
27.9
27.9
23.7
28.4
26.0
26.7
28.3
26.8
25.6
25.6
33.3
28.0
26.6
27.7
28.7

30.7
27.8
29.2
30.6
31.4
29.4
28.9
32.7
31.5
30.8
32.0
32.3
31.3
33.6
29.7
32.0
30.8
29.4
30.0
30.1
32.0
27.6
31.3
30.3
29.9
30.8
30.2
29.5
31.6
28.9
30.0
28.8
30.8
27.4
30.0
31.0
30.0
30.0
33.2
32.3
33.3
30.2
30.5
31.3
31.6
33.4
30.3
30.9
30.6
29.8

42.9
47.5
43.2
45.2
41.7
47.5
48.7
39.2
42.2
42.9
43.3
41.2
43.1
40.4
43.3
40.4
43.1
44.8
42.0
44.1
41.4
46.6
43.1
43.4
44.6
44.0
44.5
43.6
42.0
43.9
42.1
43.4
42.5
41.9
43.1
41.1
42.1
46.3
38.5
41.7
39.9
41.6
42.7
43.0
42.9
33.3
41.7
42.5
41.7
41.6
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Table A7 (continued): Support for Same-Sex Marriage by Age,
With and Without the Oldest Generation (65 and Older)
45–64

65+

SUM

18–29

30–44

45–64

65+

18–29

30–44

45–64

SUM

18–29

30–44

45–64

Weighted Avg.

30–44

MA
VT
RI
CT
NY
NH
ME
CA
WA
HI
NJ
CO
OR
NV
NM
AZ
MN
PA
AK
WI
IL
MT
MD
DE
MI
FL
OH
IA
VA
WY
KS
SD
IN
ND
MO
ID
NE
WV
TX
NC
GA
LA
SC
KY
TN
UT
OK
AR
MS
AL

Without Silent
Generation

Weighted Avg.

18–29

State

With Silent Generation

17.0
16.0
17.7
15.2
17.3
14.9
14.2
17.9
16.9
16.7
15.8
17.2
16.2
16.4
16.6
16.8
16.4
16.1
18.4
16.2
16.8
16.1
16.5
16.5
15.9
15.5
15.8
16.5
17.1
17.3
17.1
16.9
16.6
19.4
16.8
16.8
17.1
14.9
17.7
16.4
17.0
17.8
16.9
16.2
16.1
19.8
17.3
16.3
17.1
18.5

19.8
18.0
18.8
19.3
20.1
19.0
18.3
20.8
20.2
19.5
20.4
20.9
19.9
21.3
18.3
19.4
19.4
18.4
19.8
18.9
20.2
17.3
20.1
19.0
18.7
18.9
18.8
18.1
20.4
18.4
18.4
17.5
19.2
17.3
18.7
18.7
18.4
18.9
20.7
20.4
21.2
19.0
19.2
19.8
19.9
19.9
18.7
18.9
18.9
19.2

27.7
30.8
27.8
28.5
26.7
30.7
30.9
24.9
27.1
27.2
27.6
26.7
27.4
25.6
26.7
24.5
27.1
28.0
27.7
27.7
26.1
29.2
27.7
27.2
27.9
27.0
27.7
26.7
27.1
27.9
25.8
26.4
26.5
26.5
26.9
24.8
25.8
29.2
24.0
26.3
25.4
26.2
26.9
27.2
27.0
19.8
25.8
26.0
25.8
26.8

13.8
14.6
14.4
14.2
13.5
13.5
15.9
11.4
12.3
14.3
13.5
10.9
13.9
12.0
13.2
13.8
12.9
15.4
7.7
13.7
12.5
14.8
12.3
14.4
13.8
17.3
14.1
14.9
12.2
12.4
13.2
14.3
13.0
14.5
14.0
12.4
13.5
16.0
10.3
12.9
10.7
12.3
13.7
13.3
13.4
9.0
13.5
14.4
12.8
13.8

78.3
79.4
78.7
77.2
77.6
78.1
79.3
75.0
76.5
77.7
77.3
75.7
77.4
75.3
74.8
74.5
75.8
77.9
73.6
76.5
75.6
77.4
76.6
77.1
76.3
78.7
76.4
76.2
76.8
76.0
74.5
75.1
75.3
77.7
76.4
72.7
74.8
79.0
72.7
76.0
74.3
75.3
76.7
76.5
76.4
68.5
75.3
75.6
74.6
78.3

21.7
20.2
22.5
19.7
22.3
19.1
17.9
23.9
22.1
21.5
20.4
22.7
20.9
21.8
22.2
22.6
21.6
20.7
25.0
21.2
22.2
20.8
21.5
21.4
20.8
19.7
20.7
21.7
22.3
22.8
23.0
22.5
22.0
25.0
22.0
23.1
22.9
18.9
24.3
21.6
22.9
23.6
22.0
21.2
21.1
28.9
23.0
21.6
22.9
23.6

25.3
22.7
23.9
25.0
25.9
24.3
23.1
27.7
26.4
25.1
26.4
27.6
25.7
28.3
24.5
26.0
25.6
23.6
26.9
24.7
26.7
22.4
26.2
24.6
24.5
24.0
24.6
23.8
26.6
24.2
24.7
23.3
25.5
22.3
24.5
25.7
24.6
23.9
28.5
26.8
28.5
25.2
25.0
25.9
26.0
29.1
24.8
25.0
25.3
24.5

35.4
38.8
35.3
36.9
34.4
39.3
39.0
33.2
35.4
35.0
35.7
35.3
35.4
34.0
35.7
32.9
35.8
35.9
37.6
36.2
34.5
37.7
36.2
35.3
36.6
34.3
36.3
35.0
35.3
36.7
34.6
35.2
35.2
34.1
35.2
34.1
34.5
37.0
33.0
34.6
34.2
34.8
35.1
35.6
35.3
28.9
34.3
34.4
34.6
34.2

17.6
18.4
18.3
18.4
17.4
17.3
20.1
15.2
16.1
18.4
17.5
14.4
18.0
15.9
17.6
18.5
17.0
19.8
10.5
17.9
16.5
19.1
16.1
18.7
18.1
22.0
18.5
19.6
15.9
16.3
17.7
19.0
17.3
18.7
18.3
17.1
18.0
20.3
14.2
17.0
14.4
16.3
17.9
17.4
17.5
13.1
17.9
19.0
17.2
17.6

17.0
16.0
17.7
15.2
17.3
14.9
14.2
17.9
16.9
16.7
15.8
17.2
16.2
16.4
16.6
16.8
16.4
16.1
18.4
16.2
16.8
16.1
16.5
16.5
15.9
15.5
15.8
16.5
17.1
17.3
17.1
16.9
16.6
19.4
16.8
16.8
17.1
14.9
17.7
16.4
17.0
17.8
16.9
16.2
16.1
19.8
17.3
16.3
17.1
18.5

19.8
18.0
18.8
19.3
20.1
19.0
18.3
20.8
20.2
19.5
20.4
20.9
19.9
21.3
18.3
19.4
19.4
18.4
19.8
18.9
20.2
17.3
20.1
19.0
18.7
18.9
18.8
18.1
20.4
18.4
18.4
17.5
19.2
17.3
18.7
18.7
18.4
18.9
20.7
20.4
21.2
19.0
19.2
19.8
19.9
19.9
18.7
18.9
18.9
19.2

27.7
30.8
27.8
28.5
26.7
30.7
30.9
24.9
27.1
27.2
27.6
26.7
27.4
25.6
26.7
24.5
27.1
28.0
27.7
27.7
26.1
29.2
27.7
27.2
27.9
27.0
27.7
26.7
27.1
27.9
25.8
26.4
26.5
26.5
26.9
24.8
25.8
29.2
24.0
26.3
25.4
26.2
26.9
27.2
27.0
19.8
25.8
26.0
25.8
26.8

64.5
64.8
64.3
63.0
64.1
64.6
63.4
63.6
64.2
63.4
63.8
64.8
63.5
63.3
61.6
60.7
62.9
62.5
65.9
62.8
63.1
62.6
64.3
62.7
62.5
61.4
62.3
61.3
64.6
63.6
61.3
60.8
62.3
63.2
62.4
60.3
61.3
63.0
62.4
63.1
63.6
63.0
63.0
63.2
63.0
59.5
61.8
61.2
61.8
64.5

26.4
24.7
27.5
24.1
27.0
23.1
22.4
28.1
26.3
26.3
24.8
26.5
25.5
25.9
26.9
27.7
26.1
25.8
27.9
25.8
26.6
25.7
25.7
26.3
25.4
25.2
25.4
26.9
26.5
27.2
27.9
27.8
26.6
30.7
26.9
27.9
27.9
23.7
28.4
26.0
26.7
28.3
26.8
25.6
25.6
33.3
28.0
26.6
27.7
28.7

30.7
27.8
29.2
30.6
31.4
29.4
28.9
32.7
31.5
30.8
32.0
32.3
31.3
33.6
29.7
32.0
30.8
29.4
30.0
30.1
32.0
27.6
31.3
30.3
29.9
30.8
30.2
29.5
31.6
28.9
30.0
28.8
30.8
27.4
30.0
31.0
30.0
30.0
33.2
32.3
33.3
30.2
30.5
31.3
31.6
33.4
30.3
30.9
30.6
29.8

42.9
47.5
43.2
45.2
41.7
47.5
48.7
39.2
42.2
42.9
43.3
41.2
43.1
40.4
43.3
40.4
43.1
44.8
42.0
44.1
41.4
46.6
43.1
43.4
44.6
44.0
44.5
43.6
42.0
43.9
42.1
43.4
42.5
41.9
43.1
41.1
42.1
46.3
38.5
41.7
39.9
41.6
42.7
43.0
42.9
33.3
41.7
42.5
41.7
41.6

335. For an explanation of where the data in this Table are taken from, and
how the weighted averages were generated, see supra note 166.
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